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*The Role of Language Attitudes and
Practices in the Emergence of European
Identity*

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2013

I hereby declare that the work presented in this manuscript is my own.

Abstract

During the past century, Europe has experienced significant political, social and economic changes. The European countries have successfully joined together to form a union aimed at prosperity and peace across the continent. In 2012, the European Union received the Nobel Peace Prize for human rights advancements. The 28 current members are united under common European symbols and institutions, whilst they maintain their national character. It has been posited that national identity is built around language and geographical borders. Yet, the EU's borders change continually with the accession of new members and the EU recognises all official languages of its members as official languages of the union itself.

In this dissertation I explore the function of positive attitudes and practices of multilingualism as a catalyst for European identity, while investigating the components of European identity and its relationship with national identity. A mixed methodology of questionnaires and interviews is used across three contexts: Romania, Belgium and the United Kingdom. Romania joined the EU in 2007; it presents a novel context for investigating European identity. Belgium, home of the EU, is one of the oldest members. It is symbolically divided by the French-Dutch linguistic border. Finally, the UK – where English, a global lingua franca, is an official language – has traditionally had a reserved stance towards the EU. These studies show that Europeans perceive their national and European identities as compatible, sometimes forming a hybrid identity. I find support for the notion that European identity has two components: civic and cultural – and that positive attitudes towards multilingualism are intrinsically related to and predict European identity. These results vary subtly across contexts and the interviews provide in-depth insights into these differences. I conclude by highlighting the role that European multilingualism can have in the development of a stronger union.

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1. Introduction

In October 2012, it was announced that the European Union would be awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. The Nobel Prize committee said that it was granted “for over six decades [of] contribut[ions] to the advancement of peace and reconciliation, democracy and human rights in Europe” (Nobel Prizes and Laureates). The initial goal of the European Union was to foster the economic recovery of Europe after decades of war, however, over the years, the goals and accomplishments of this unique institution have exceeded even the most optimistic expectations. Despite the fact that during the economic crisis that the world is faced with today many critics of the EU have argued that it could have done more to prevent the crisis or to speed the recovery, it is important to remember that the European political leaders have attempted to cooperate and work together to find an economic solution. This cooperation at the political and institutional level might have transpired to the social level, as well.

The creation and evolution of the European Union as a unique institution has influenced considerably the lives of its 500 million citizens, in most cases improving their quality of life and opportunities. Through European programmes such as Erasmus (offering a study abroad frame for higher education students), Leonardo (for vocational education and training), and many others, students, professionals, or researchers have had the opportunity to experience school, work or life in another European country. The open borders between the European nations led to an increase in tourism and trade within Europe. These examples are countless and it is not in the scope of this paper to list them, but to illustrate through them the changes Europe has undergone on a social level together with the creation of the European Union. All these changes over the past six decades have influenced the European citizens sentiments for each other and towards the EU.

The European continent is the home of very diverse nations and people, with many languages and cultures, with specific traditions and customs, with affinities for other groups, as well as antipathies. But as evidenced by the Nobel Peace Prize award, since WWII the Europeans have been successful at putting these differences aside and uniting under the symbols of the European Union, whether they did it consciously or not. As the EU motto proclaims it, we are “united in diversity”. Is it too much to assume that this unity extends as far as to form a common European identity? And if this identity exists, how does

it relate to the linguistic diversity of Europe? Are multilingual Europeans more prone to feeling European?

The purpose of this dissertation is to better understand how three different groups of Europeans understand the concept of European identity and how they see the role of multilingualism in the context of European identity using a mixed method approach. I will specifically investigate the role of multilingual attitudes and practices in the creation, development and/or existence of a European identity.

1.1. Identity

The concept of identity has been overwhelmingly present in various sciences for a long time. Even in the non-scholarly environment, we all ask ourselves “Who am I?” - it is one of the very basic questions of humanity. However, scholars have been struggling to answer this particular question for many centuries and even today there is still debate about the exact definition of the concept. It is extremely interesting and at the same time frustrating to pose this question: we all know who we are, we know which are the traits we have in common with our peers and what makes us different from them. On a very basic and almost instinctual level, we are all aware of our being and our surroundings; but pinpointing a comprehensive and accurate definition of the concept of identity has been a burdening task for scholars in many areas of the social sciences. Psychologists, philosophers, sociologists, anthropologists, linguists, political scientists and even biologists have tried to provide us with the best and most accurate representation of identity. It is worth noting here that *identity* has been used at times interchangeably with concepts such as *self*, *identification*, *persona*, *individuality*, *personality* and others.

For the purposes of this project, identity is understood in a more specific way, mainly encompassing the concept of *social identity*, but also drawing from work related to *linguistic* and *political identity*. The particular social identity studied here is European identity and its construction in various contexts. The view adopted is that social identity is a complex concept, incorporating a somewhat stable core, as well as changing characteristics. Caporaso (2005) suggests that identities provide a sense of stability and continuity, and they are the bond between us and the world around us. Risse (2010) argues that maintaining there are some stable aspects does not go against the social constructivist approach to identity. Rather, he states that “some constructions of European identity have

remained remarkably stable over the decades and even precede the European Union” (p. 21), but this is not to say that European-ness is ascribed to an individual based purely on his/her EU citizenship.

The fluid characteristics will be shown to be affected by various external factors, and at times even internal ones. Risse (2010) suggests that the social identities are acquired through socialisation within a social group, that is, learning and ascribing to the norms of a group. Thus, this study will attempt to show how individuals and groups form a particular kind of identity, in this case, the European identity. In very simple terms, the view on European identity adopted here is that it is a changing dimension of one’s social identity, it could be one of the multiple identities that an individual has, and it can be triggered by the context surrounding the individual and group in question.

Identity researchers provide an operational definition of identity, that they follow throughout their research. While some propose a stable, essentialist view, I believe that a constructivist approach to identity is better suited for the purposes of this study. Norton (1997) for example, defines identity as “how people understand their relationship to the world, how that relationship is constructed across time and space, and how people understand their possibilities for the future” (p. 410). She thus takes an inclusive perspective, indicating the importance of the temporal and spatial dimensions of identity, and the negotiation that takes place between the individual and the world he/she lives in. This relationship is not a uni-dimensional one, nor is it uni-directional. We will discuss how the notion of European identity is very much a temporal and spacial identity.

One important factor that has been shown to have an impact on aspects of social identity is language (Wodak et al., 2008; Norton, 2000; Heller, 1987; Yip, 2005; Block, 2006 and others). It is through language that people construct their identity and/or are socialised into a particular group. As it is often said, language and the ability to communicate verbally is what brings people together in communities. Bilingualism and multilingualism are phenomena that are more predominant than one would think, with more than half of the world’s population being able to communicate in two or more languages (Grosjean, 2010). In the present study I will take a closer look at how various aspects of one’s linguistic profile (attitudes to multilingualism, practices of bilingualism and/or multilingualism, self-assessed proficiency in more languages and frequency of use of these languages) relate to and/or influence the development of a sense of European identity.

In order to do all this, I will start by discussing recent literature on social identity, particularly from the point of view of social psychology and sociolinguistics. I will discuss the concepts of individual, collective and multiple identity. As a sub-category of social identity, I will explain what is meant by linguistic identity and describe some aspects which will be relevant to this study. I will then present the political, national identity and European identity, as particular forms of social identity. The last sections of this chapter will provide more details about the history of Europe and its relationship with identity.

1.2. Social identity

When discussing social identity in the present literature milieu, Tajfel's *Social Identity Theory* (1974) is the starting point for understanding this concept. Tajfel's seminal work in Social Identity Theory (SIT) marked the foundation of what would become a very influential perspective in social sciences. He suggests that social identity is "the individual's knowledge that he belongs to certain social groups together with some emotional and value significance to him of the group membership" (Tajfel, 1974, p. 31). The sense of affiliation to a group emerges as being related to the individual's self-image in a tridimensional way – cognitively (knowledge of the belonging to a group), affectively (the emotional significance of this group membership), as well as the evaluative significance of this membership (assigning a positive or a negative value to it). This definition however only takes into account the individual's perspective. Kohli (2000) argues that social identity also denotes the "interaction processes in which persons identify others and are identified by them, and these processes become the basis of self-identification" (p.115). Thus social identity is not only a personal act, but it is an identity performed in the interactions with others where the individual, as well as the others, acknowledge the belongingness to a particular group. It then emerges that the group is a very important piece in the construction of social identity. The relation between the individual and the group in light of social identity is discussed next.

1.2.1. Self-categorisation in SIT

As suggested by the concept of *self-categorisation* developed in the realms of the SIT, a person has an almost instinctive need to categorise the world around. This automatised mechanism allows individuals to draw conclusions regarding a particular object or person

by identifying the category it belongs to and thus assigning the characteristics of the group to the individual object or person. It is of course a way of simplifying the world, but it can have negative consequences (i.e., stereotyping, misjudgement etc.). The development of the concept of self-categorisation has also led to the establishment of the ‘in-group’ and ‘out-group theories’. In the process of self-categorisation, the individual develops the *us versus them* worldview, and thus includes him/herself in a group that in his/her opinion is different from another group. In this situation, the individual can accentuate traits that define him/her as a member (or a non-member) of a group. The minimal group paradigm has been studied extensively in social psychology and showed consistently that just categorising people into two categories is sufficient to foster discrimination (Sachdev & Bourhis, 1984; Turner, Sachdev & Hogg, 1983). In the context of ethnic or national identity, this worldview is a necessary tool used by politicians and others in power to stir ethnic and national identities, passions and conflicts.

When people self-categorise themselves as Europeans, Risse (2010) argues they could mean one of two things: an understanding of themselves as supporters of human rights, cosmopolitan, liberal, open-minded inhabitants of the European space, or people who identify themselves with the white, traditional, Christian Europe, whom Risse calls nationalist Europeans. When, for example, a person self-categorises as European, it is unclear which of these two postulations they actually refer to. However, it is not difficult to conceive how each understanding of European-ness would construct the ‘other’, or the ‘out-group’. For the latter, the nationalist Europeans, probably the most threatening representation of ‘the other’ would be immigrants from outside the European space; for the former, the cosmopolitan Europeans, one potential group to represent ‘the other’ could be the nationalist Europeans. Some identities lie dormant for a particular individual and come to the forefront of the conscience under certain circumstances. These aspects of social identity will be addressed next.

1.2.2. Salience and centrality of identity

In a homogenous environment, an identity might not surface until the members of the group come face to face with a different group. The idea that identity becomes salient when confronted with other groups (or ‘them’ or ‘others’) has been investigated by researchers looking at social identity. One does not necessarily think about his/her membership in a group until this membership is challenged. In the case of nationalist

Europeans discussed earlier, if they are never confronted with immigrants from other backgrounds, they might not develop such a strong sense of nationalist European identity. Once the immigrants settle in the same geographical space, the nationalist European identity can or will become a salient identity of the original inhabitants of that space. As Noels and Giles (2009) suggest, “social comparison is influenced by a motivational desire to see one’s own group in a positive light, in order to enhance one’s own self-esteem as a member of a positively valued group” (p. 651). Thus, people identify as belonging to a group for which they have positive attitudes (the in-group) compared to other groups (the out-groups), and through this mechanism, they increase their own self-esteem.

The idea of identity salience is also discussed by Yip (2005). She suggests that the salience of one’s identity is dependent on the contextual cues. Consequently, a specific identity comes to the forefront of people’s identity in certain contexts. For example, the use of a language or the presence of members of a particular group can make one’s identity salient. Yip discussed her findings in light of bicultural ethnic identity, a particular kind of social identity, which describes one’s membership to an ethnic group in relation to the majority group. Identity salience suggests that an identity could be primed by certain contextual cues. The situations and conditions in which an identity becomes salient indicate yet again the interactional nature of social identity or social identities (Kohli, 2000). The affiliation to multiple groups leads to the formation of multiple social roles (or identities) which emerge in social interactions or are triggered by contextual cues.

In an earlier study, Yip and her colleagues (2002) pinpointed another aspect of social identity, which is the centrality of an identity for a particular individual. They describe the concept of centrality as the extent to which some individuals “choose to build their identity around race/ethnicity” (Yip et al., 2002, p. 1568). In contrast with the concept of identity salience, centrality seems to invoke a sense of agency and voluntariness on the part of the individual, he/she *chooses* the degree to which a particular identity, or membership to a group, is central to his/her self-concept. Salience and centrality touch upon the same notions, however, salience as described above needs a contextual trigger for a particular identity, while centrality is less context-dependent and more stable.

Cameron (2004) also discussed the centrality of one’s identity as part of a three-dimensional model of social identity. The dimensions he proposed are cognitive centrality (the time spent thinking about the group membership and the subjective importance of the group to the self), in-group affect (the nature of the feelings associated with being a

member in the group) and in-group ties (the perception of belonging and being similar to other members of the group). This model takes Tajfel's social identity model and develops it further by providing more depth to the dimensions, connecting the individual and the group through a cognitive and an affective link, but also through the individual's sense of belonging.

Identity Process Theory (IPT) proposed by Breakwell (2004) suggests among other things that a person possesses one sole identity, the distinction between the concepts of personal and social identity is forgone, while his/her memberships in different groups are just elements of this identity. Breakwell (2004) argues that the content of one's identity has to be characterised on three dimensions: the degree of centrality, the hierarchical arrangements of elements and the relative salience of the components of that identity. The modification of each one of the elements of the identity determines a change in the whole identity, seen from a holistic perspective. Thus in her view, apart from the salience and centrality of identity, the hierarchy of elements plays an important role. I also maintain that an individual can have multiple identities based on his/her membership in various groups, and I will re-claim this categorisation of content of an identity as proposed by Breakwell (2004) as follows: identity can be characterised at any point in time by the hierarchical organisation of the multiple identities, as well as the centrality of some of these identities and their salience, usually determined by a particular context.

Smith (2010) argued that for different people national identity is more or less central, but nonetheless they all understand the meaning of it and that cannot exist without the existence of nation. Mirroring this discussion to European identity, it can be assumed that since everybody has an understanding of Europe, that translates into an understanding of the European identity. The understanding of Europe or the European Union (or whether people think of these terms as encompassing the same concept) will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 4, the qualitative part of the study.

In the case of European identity, people who work for the European Union or for institutions closely related to the EU might experience a more central role of this identity in their life. Furthermore, people who live in cities where the EU is more visible, such as Brussels, might experience the increased salience of their European identity. Thus, given the right environment, an identity can become salient without necessarily being central; but if that identity is a central identity for an individual it is more likely that it will be salient even without contextual triggers. It is implied in this discussion that individuals do

not hold one single identity, but various, some more central than others, and some that become salient under certain circumstances.

1.2.3. Multiple identities and identity negotiation

A person can have a multiplicity of identities, which become salient or central at different points in time and in different spatial contexts. An individual can never be part of only one group, therefore Kohli (2000) argues that we should refer to social identities in the plural form, since all individuals are part of multiple groups at the same time. Or to put it in Edwards' (2009) terms: "besides our uniquely personal sense of self, we also have social identities based upon the various groups to which we belong" (p.27). This is not to say that the individual has no agency in determining his/her identity, but that this individual is in a constant negotiation with his/her environment. Multiple identities are a normal feature of an individual and under most circumstances, people do not have a problem moving between them depending on the context (Ross, 2007; Smith, 1992; Wodak et al. 2008).

Not only is the transition between these identities fluid and effortless, but at times they can lead to hybrid or fused identities (Comănanu & Noels, in preparation; Benet-Martínez, 2005; Roccas & Brewer, 2002; Smith, 1992; Wodak et al. 2008 and many others). Wodak and her colleagues (2008) argued that one way to overcome conflicts and the negative aspects of self-categorisation (stereotypes, prejudices, racism, xenophobia - as discussed above) is to allow for these hybrid identities to emerge. They discussed the example of Switzerland, where about half of the German and half of the French speaking communities are Catholic and the other halves are Protestant, thus "linguistic and religious differences in Switzerland are reciprocally toned down" (p. 17). Nonetheless, at times these identities can become conflictual under particular external or internal factors, and need to be negotiated by the individual in his/her context (aspects of the hybrid and conflictual identities will be discussed in a later chapter with reference to European identity). The multiplicity of identities that one person possesses at all times can be understood through the kaleidoscopic self metaphor proposed by Deaux and Perkins (2001).

Deaux and Perkins (2001) argued that these multiple self-representations of an individual's identity are connected and influence each other in any given situation. In their view, depending on the situation, a particular self-representation comes forth, but the other aspects of identity are not silenced; on the contrary, even though they are not the main self-

representation, they are still part of the self and have an impact on the facet that is activated in a particular context. Thus, depending on the situation, one might feel one identity stronger, but that does not mean the other identities are eradicated. Although one identity might not play a significant role in a particular situation, it will always remain a part of the self and have an influence in that particular situation. The display of one identity and the suppression of the others in a context can be automatic or agential. But since identities are quite often influenced by the environment, the individual must negotiate them within him/herself and with the context in which the identity is to surface.

Having multiple identities signifies that at various points in time some of these identities need to be revised, thought out and negotiated. Pavlenko and Blackledge (2004) make a distinction between the construction and performance of identities, and the negotiation of identities. They argue that individuals perform out identities without necessarily being aware of it, by behaving in an appropriate manner depending on the contextual cues. But the negotiation of identities takes “place only when certain identities are contested” (Pavlenko & Blackledge, 2004, p. 20) and the individuals have agency in this negotiation. The researchers go on to discuss that the negotiation of an identity can take place between two parties (i.e., individuals, groups, or groups and individuals), but also within the same person. It is thus clear that an individual or a group has a definite sense of agency in constructing, negotiating and performing their identity. The European identity qualifies as a negotiable identity, as it is not imposed and only in some cases is it assumed.

It can thus be inferred that people need to manage and negotiate different identities frequently. The following section will investigate the various theories regarding the way in which multiple identities might interact within one individual. It will also describe in depth a particular study looking at bicultural identity and how this concept can be adapted to give a better understanding of the relation between national and European identity.

1.2.4. Models of identity relations

The Bicultural Identity Orientation Scale (BIOS) was developed in the Canadian context with the purpose of better understanding the ways in which bicultural individuals construct their identity and how they internalise and manage the two identities (Comănanu & Noels, in preparation). In order to better understand this relation, I will briefly present here the original study which led to the development of the scale and the concepts behind it. I will

then present other models in the literature, which describe the relation between national and European identity, using this literature as a rationalisation for adapting the BIOS to study the relationship between national and European identity.

The mobility of individuals provides them with opportunities to negotiate various identities often. There are many studies in psychology and sociology that investigated different models of acculturation. Notably, Berry's influential model of acculturation (1980, 1997) proposes that an acculturating individual will use one of these four strategies: assimilation, marginalisation, separation and integration. The desired outcome from Berry's perspective is integration. The integrated individuals will maintain their own identity, but will also interact and adapt to the new cultural environment. Although the other three options are not the most advantageous, they could still lead one to become bicultural, but to a lesser extent and possibly at a slower pace.

Another model is presented by LaFromboise and her colleagues (1993) and it postulates that the various modes of reconciling two cultures are assimilation, acculturation, alternation, multiculturalism and fusion. The fusion model seems to lead to the development of a hybrid identity, formed by the blend of the two original identities into a third, different one. Hybridity has been mentioned by other researchers as a possible way of managing two identities, but it carries different significance depending on the study. For example, Dallaire and Denis (2005) suggest a different definition for hybridity, in which the individual acquires high competence and strong identification with both cultures. Other researchers call it "third place identities" (see Block, 2007, p.21). This notion is different from LaFromboise model of fusion, in that the two cultures are not mixed, but the individual moves across them at ease, because of his/her competence of the norms of both.

Other notable studies in the literature on bicultural identity come for Benet-Martínez and her colleagues (2002, 2005) and suggest that bicultural identity integration is a two-dimensional concept, incorporating the perceptions of distance or overlap between the two cultures on one dimension, and conflict - harmony on the other. Thus, an individual might find that the two cultures are very distant or that they overlap (pointing again to the process of fusion, or hybridity) or that they can be in conflict or in harmony. The scale developed by Benet-Martínez to test these concepts has been used extensively in the context of investigating bicultural identity. These two orthogonal dimensions form the basis for the Bicultural Identity Integration concept. This instrument assessed the proposed characteristics of bicultural individuals (Benet-Martínez & Haritatos, 2005) and

the results showed that the distance items were related to the age of the participants, years spent in China, Chinese language proficiency, separation, linguistic stress and cultural isolation, and negatively related with years spent in the US, US identity, bicultural competence and openness. The conflict items positively correlated only with indicators of stress and neuroticism. The authors argue that if the bicultural individual does not experience situations of conflict between the two identities, their two identities can blend into a hybrid identity.

Santana (2004) investigated the relationship between the BII dimensions and psychological well-being (measured by situational coping and state-anxiety) and language use in a sample of bilingual Mexican Americans. Her results indicate that greater association with American culture, modest allegiance to the Mexican culture, being open to a potential mix of traditions and low levels of acculturative stress resulted in higher levels of blended-ness between the two cultures. She also found that the use of Spanglish was related to conflict, rather than fusion between the two cultures. The author argued that using Spanglish and code-switching for the second generation Mexican Americans might be a way of resolving conflicts between the two cultures (Santana, 2004). Other studies have investigated the notion of conflict between an individual's two cultures and identities (Ward, 2008; Ward, Stuart & Kus, 2011), found support for the existence of this concept and provided substance for its understanding.

A different theory was proposed by Herrmann and Brewer (2004). They argue that there are different ways to maintain the equilibrium between the multiple memberships in different groups. The three ways in which identities could relate to each other are: nested, cross-cutting and separate. The *nested* identities are conceived as “concentric circles or Russian Matruska dolls, one inside the next” (Herrmann & Brewer, 2004) or an onion's layers (Risse, 2010). An example of this type of nested identity would be somebody who identifies first with their family, then their neighbourhood, then the city identity and so on. Consequently, each small group is part of a larger one and every member of the small group identifies with the larger group. Díez-Medrano and Gutierrez (2001) review the literature on nested identities and suggest that often they are incompatible; for example a regional identity is characterised by parochialism, while national or European identities can be seen as cosmopolitan.

The *cross-cutting* model of balancing multiple identities suggests that some people from one group can be part of a different group, but not all members of the first group are to be

found in the second. To illustrate this model, we can think of national identity and religious identity, such that some women might be British and Muslim, while other British women might be Buddhist, or Christian, or atheists. But there are women who are not British and identify with these religious groups, thus religious identity can cross-cut national identity. The last model offered by Herrmann and Brewer (2004) argues that the multiple identities can also be *separate*, in the case when one group that a person belongs to has no members that are part of another group that s/he is a member of. For example, a person's membership in the work group might not overlap at all with their membership in a leisure group, such as a choir. All the models presented here can have implications on the psychological well-being of a person. If the memberships in various groups are in conflict, they will have a negative impact on the individual's well-being. However, the multiple identities can also be in harmony, if the person does not perceive them as conflictual, and thus they will not pose a threat to the individual's psychological well-being.

Risse (2010) adds another potential classification, which he considers less hierarchical to the one presented by Herrmann and Brewer (2004). It is called *blended* or the "marble cake" model (Risse, 2010, p. 25). This model argues that a local identity and a religious identity might be intertwined to such a degree that it would be almost impossible to look at them separately, similarly to the notion of hybridity or overlap described by Benet-Martínez (2005). Risse (2010) offers the example of a Rhinelander who "is often described as a particular type of comparatively tolerant and liberal Catholicism" (p. 25). In this case, the local and religious identities are so blended or woven together that they are very difficult to separate. Risse (2003) argues that this way of blending identities is relevant when considering the national and European identities and the relations that might develop between them. He argues that:

Since EU membership interacts with rather different national identity constructions, the overall effect will not be homogenous leading to a generalised European identity. Rather, Europe and the EU become enmeshed with given national identities leading to rather diverging identity outcomes. This concerns, above all, the content and substance of what it means to identify with Europe. (Risse, 2003, p. 491)

Grundy and Jamieson (2007) suggest that European identity might represent "a stepping stone in progress from divisive nationalism to an inclusive global citizenship" (p.664). They warn against oversimplification of the relations between various identities at an individual

level, arguing that the model might not be as simple as just nested identities or marble cake identities, but it may be a much more complex relation between local, regional, national, European and global identities.

It seems that in the literature on multiple identities and biculturalism, there are some features that appear to be relevant to the relation between two groups that an individual is part of: one is the idea that the two can blend, fuse, overlap, nest or form a hybrid; while the other is that the two might be in conflict and thus have negative implications for the well-being of the individual. Benet-Martínez and her colleagues described the concept of “cultural frame-switching” (Hong, Chiu, Morris and Benet-Martínez, 2000), which suggests that the context is an important factor in the way biculturals respond to the same stimuli. They found that when priming participants with cultural icons specific to their two cultures, the biculturals will react in accordance to the norms and values of the particular culture they were primed with. Thus, another dimension worth exploring is the stability - fluidity dimension, which attempts to underline the importance of context for the development of the relation between two cultures, as opposed to a more essentialist view, which states that people are predetermined to have a certain type of identity, a fixed identity, which is not influenced by the environment they live in.

Based on this literature, focus groups were conducted with first and second generation immigrants in Canada. Using these discussions and previous literature as starting points, a scale was developed, meant to address the three dimensions discussed above. The scale was tested empirically, and the exploratory factor analysis revealed that the most parsimonious solution was a five-dimensional model. A closer look at the resulting model suggests that it might represent a continuum of bicultural identity, in which individuals can find themselves at a point in time, but through which they can move from one dimension to another depending on the contextual and personal factors.

The five factors identified to form the dimensions of the bicultural identity are: *conflict* (a perceived disagreement, incompatibility or even opposition between the two cultures), *monocultural orientation* (the desire to be part of only one of the two cultures), *alternation* (the adjustment of behaviours and attitudes depending on the context), *compatibility* (perceived accord and harmony between the two cultures) and *hybridity* (the blend of the two cultures to create one). These dimensions were inter-correlated, but their correlations with various other established scales indicated that the five concepts were separate dimensions.

The model was then tested using confirmatory factor analysis on two groups of participants: first and second generation Canadians. The structural equation models suggested that the model was valid and reliable for both groups of participants and that these models were equivalent (i.e., there were no structural difference between the two groups of participants). Later, some participants were selected from the confirmatory analysis stage and invited for interviews. These participants were selected based on their scores (either very high or very low) on each one of the five factors. Using this triangulation approach to understanding bicultural identity allowed the development and testing an instrument for bicultural identity, as well as the understanding of how participants perceived it (construct validity) and how well it reflected their sense of bicultural identity.

Based on the statistical and content analysis, the five dimensions identified were deemed valid and relevant to the research on bicultural identity. The comparison of these five dimensions with well-being scales indicated that the first three (conflict, monocultural orientation and alternation) had a negative influence of the participants' lives and psychological well-being, while the other two (compatibility and hybridity) were closely related to higher self-esteem and adjustment. The negative connotation of the alternation factor as well as its positive and significant relation to measures of essentialism might indicate that participants who identified stronger with the alternation factor kept their two identities separate because they believed them to be fixed and should not be altered, thus moving between the two cultures almost like flicking a switch.

The five factors' relation with linguistic variables was investigated. The results suggested that perceived competence in English had a significant negative correlation with both conflict and monoculture, and a positive correlation with compatibility and hybridity, indicating that the better their perceived English skills, the less conflict the participants felt between their two cultures and the less they desired to be part of only one culture. Perceived competence in one's ability to communicate with the majority culture could prove beneficial in integrating faster and easier into this group, finding the aspects of the two cultures that were compatible and eventually developing a hybrid identity. Competence in the language of their other group was only correlated with alternation. This indicated that in order to be able to switch between the two cultures, the bicultural individual needed to have high perceived competence in their heritage language; speaking the language could play an important role in allowing them to be part of that group, when the situation required.




Figure 1. BIOS: the relations between the five dimensions (Comănanu & Noels, in preparation)

When asked about their levels of anxiety in using English and their group's language, participants indicated that high anxiety in both languages was strongly related to conflict. The ability to communicate has been related to perceived comfort in using the language and desire to communicate with members of the group. When the biculturals lacked confidence in their skills in their two languages, they also perceived a conflict between the two cultures. This could be an indicator that confidence in using both languages allows biculturals to negotiate their belongingness in the two groups. The other subscales all correlated with anxiety in communicating in English as follows: conflict, monocultural orientation and alternation showed a positive correlation, while compatibility and hybridity were negatively correlated to anxiety in English.

For the purposes of the present study, the BIOS instrument was adapted to reflect the relation between the national and European identity for each one of the three contexts of study. Risse (2003) draws attention that his model of the “marble cake” has not been used to test empirically the relationship between the national and European identity and the present study aims to address this lack of empirical data. I hypothesise that a stronger European identity will be related to perceiving the two identities, national and European, as compatible and maybe even forming a hybrid identity or a “marble cake” identity. Risse (2010) distinguishes between the inclusive and exclusive nationalists, the first one characterising the people that internalise and identify both with their nation and with Europe, while the latter points to those who identify only with their national identity. This categorisation can be reflected in the BIOS scale: the inclusive nationalists might find their

two identities complementary or even forming a hybrid, while the exclusive nationalists would fall along the lines of the monocultural orientation dimension. The relations observed in the development of the BIOS instrument with the linguistic variables cannot be assessed in a similar way in the context of European identity, since there is no official or dominant language of Europe. Thus, these relationships will be investigated against variables relating to multilingualism, suggesting that the stronger the positive attitudes to multilingualism and the weaker the feelings of anxiety in communicating in a foreign language will be related to stronger feelings of compatibility between the national and European identity. The ways in which national and European identities are related will be discussed in a subsequent section (see § 1.4.3.1).

As stated above, identities can be negotiated within an individual or within a group, thus leading to another important aspect of identity - individual and collective identity. The following section will review the current literature on these topics.

1.2.5. Individual and collective identity

Mirroring the previous discussion on salience and centrality of an identity, the distinction between the individual and the collective identity (Smith, 1992) is addressed next. An *individual identity* is the understanding that a person has of his or her identity, and it is characterised by its situational nature, thus changing depending on the context. For example, one can see his or her identity differently depending on whether they are in their home country or abroad. Others will potentially identify this individual differently depending on the context. An individual can identify and be identified as a Londoner when he is at home, but when he travels to Asia, his frame of reference might change to identify and/or be identified as an English, British or European person. Accordingly, the individual identity is situational and can easily be changed and influenced by the environment. As Risse (2010) argues, people are socialised into these identities, but they might or might not subscribe to them personally. So although a Londoner in Asia might be identified as European, he does not necessarily have to ascribe to this identity. Another possibility is that the Londoner might never feel European in his city, but when travelling through Asia, the European identity could surface. In this case, the context would influence the salience and even the centrality of the European identity.

On the other hand, *collective identities* are seen as more intense, durable, pervasive and persistent (Smith, 1992) and are characteristic of identities such as ethnic, gender, social class, religious and even national. Social identity theory argues that there is a continuum, ranging from inter-person to intergroup, from individual identity to collective identity. Thus, if the individual identity is easily malleable and changes depending on the context or situation, the collective identity finds itself at the other end of the continuum, denoting “those social identities that are based on large and potentially important group differences” (Kohli, 2000, p. 117), which are actually the basis for the ‘us’ versus ‘them’ worldview. Brewer (2001) also draws attention to the fact that there is a “distinction between social identity as identification with a collective and a collective identity as norms, values, and ideologies that such identification entails” (Brewer, 2001, p.119), thus establishing the connection between the collective and social identity. Edwards (2009) goes on to argue that the individual identities are “components and reflections of particular social (and cultural) ones” (p.20). This circular relation between the individual and collective identities marks their strong connectedness: the social identities are comprised of a multitude of individual identities and in turn influence their development and existence.

Talking about European identity as a collective identity, Eder and Spohn (2005) say that “*the more a human society is functionally differentiated, the more it needs a collective identity. The less it is, the less it needs a collective identity*” (p.204 emphasis in the original). Consequently, since the European society is so diverse because of the many cultures, nations, languages, traditions, customs, histories and so on, it needs a collective identity to bind it together. The institutional support provided at the European level can foster the creation of a stronger collective European identity (Herrmann & Brewer, 2004; Bruter, 2005 and others). Breakwell (2004) disagrees with this view and suggests that with the enlargement of the European Union, the differences between the groups are so dramatic that it would be impossible to create a coherent European identity without reducing it to “something bland or even vacuous” or an “unfinished category” (p. 35).

European identity will be considered to be both an individual identity and a collective identity. A person can understand him/herself to be European on a personal level and on a collective level, and the two determine each other. In the latter case, both facets of collective identity will be part of the study - the identification with Europe and the European Union, as well as ascribing to the norms and values of Europe.

1.2.6. Social constructivist versus essentialist views on identity

The perspectives on social identity presented so far suggest that identity is a malleable and evolving concept, that one's identity is not stable throughout his/her life or in various contexts, but that it changes and evolves depending on the personal circumstances, as well as the context and the environment one finds him/herself in. This perspective is a social constructivist view on identity. At the other end of this continuum are the essentialist beliefs about identity, which state that identity is largely determined by biological factors (such as, race, ethnicity), that it is stable and unalterable, and that boundaries between races, ethnicities and even nationalities are inflexible, thus making the move between cultures extremely difficult. Although some studies have attempted to test these hypotheses (Chao, Chen, Roisman & Hong, 2007; No, Hong, Liao, Lee, Wood & Chao, 2008), the foundation of the present study and many of the ones that precede it (see Block, 2007), is that identity is a fluid concept and that people are active agents in the construction of their identities, which can also be influenced to a larger or lesser extent by the contextual cues. Throughout the lifespan of a person and within a particular group, identity is both stable - allowing one to have a sense of continuity in his/her identity - , but also changeable - permitting various aspects of identity to surface depending on the context and enabling one's power to alter and mould it.

This discussion is relevant to the topic of European identity, as it implies that people as individuals and as groups can negotiate a sense of Europeanness into their self-concept if they feel it is necessary, desirable or appropriate to do so. Of course, the institutions play a part in the negotiation, using symbols of the European Union to make the European identity salient (see § 1.4.3.6.1); but people are actually the agents who decide whether to accept and embrace it or reject it. There are many other factors that come into play in the construction of European identity and they will be discussed in the following chapters.

This section attempted to show that European identity is a particular kind of social identity, one which can be voluntarily or involuntarily triggered by contextual factors and one that can be negotiated between and within individuals, leading to a more or less central role within a person's self-concept. European identity can be perceived to be an identity at an individual level or at a collective one. In order to better understand the notion of Europeanness as a collective identity, I will discuss the concept of 'imagined communities' (Anderson, 1991, 2006), which will be helpful in understanding the

mechanisms through which an individual connects to the group and extends characteristics of his/her identity to the group.

1.2.7. Imagined communities and possible selves

The idea of imagined communities (Anderson, 2006) is based on the fact that “members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives an image of their communion” (p. 6). Anderson suggests that this is the key to the formation of the nation-state, declaring that the basis of the nation-state concept is rooted in the development of printing technologies and thus the institutionalisation of a language over its vernacular variants. Through the advancements of the printing technology, one language becomes the language of power in a certain context. This development can then be used by the ones in power to create an imagined community and instil it in the minds of the others. Language is not only important in defining one’s relationship to the immediate group or community, but also in establishing an affiliation with a larger community, such as an ethnic group or a nation. The power of the printed word is best exemplified by its ability to bring together individual identities into a collective identity on a larger scale, where the individuals do not know each other personally and cannot establish rapport as such. The printed language though has the potential to unite these individuals into an imagined community to which they all feel a sense of belongingness and kinship. The standardisation of language through printing had significant effects on the communities formed around religion, and some suggest that was an important factor in the construction of national identity (Wright, 2004, argues that language aided this development through the dissemination of religious doctrine and the standardisation of one variety of the language over the others).

One could argue here that in the case of European identity the lack of a common language could hinder the development of a common identity. Risse (2010) suggests that on the contrary, not having a common language leads to the celebration of multilingualism, as evidenced by the motto of the European Union - “unity in diversity”. Various countries in Europe and in other parts of the world are multilingual, and this feature does not translate into a lack of national identity. The European identity, seen through the concepts of multiple and collective identity, and imagined community, could thus form around other linguistic variables, such as cosmopolitanism or multilingualism.

Multilingualism is quite widespread in the EU, with 54% of the EU citizens declaring that they can have a conversation in at least one other language than their native one (Special Eurobarometer 386, 2012). Another important statistic stipulates that 88% of EU citizens consider foreign language competence as being very useful, while an impressive 98% “consider mastering other foreign languages as useful for the future of their children” (Special Eurobarometer 386, 2012, p.7). These statistics indicate that Europeans do hold multilingualism in a high regard (the Eurobarometers will be discussed in more detail in §1.4.3.2); this study will investigate whether positive attitudes to multilingualism foster the development of a stronger European identity.

Could it be then that in order to promote the common European identity a common language is not needed, but rather the necessary condition encompasses positive attitudes to multilingualism? Risse’s (2010) notion of the cosmopolitan European identity would surely incorporate positive attitudes to multilingualism and to foreign languages in general, thus making it a possible precursor of European identity.

The concept of imagined communities has been transferred into the realm of linguistics by Pavlenko and Norton (2007), in their study of the imagined communities of the language learners. They set out to discuss how nations influence the imagination of their citizens and how their membership in a group, be it an actual membership or a desired one, mediates learning English. Apart from Anderson’s concept of imagined communities, they also draw on the theory of “possible selves” put forth by Markus and Nurius (1986), which states that “possible selves represent individuals’ ideas of what they might become, what they would like to become, and what they are afraid of becoming” (p. 954).

Markus and Nurius (1986) describe the possible selves as interconnected to the past and present self, and an imaginable future self, carrying them within themselves at all times. Dörnyei (2005), following Higgins’ work (1987) incorporates these concepts into the field of linguistics in his *Second Language Motivational Self System*, which is a three-component model. The first component of the model is the “ideal L2 self”, that is, the imagined future self who is a second language (L2) speaker; the second component is the “ought-to L2 self”, encompassing the characteristics that one believes one should have in order to “meet expectations and *avoid* possible negative outcomes” (Dörnyei, 2009, p. 29, emphasis in the original); the last component is the “L2 learning experience”, which is comprised by the motives present in the L2 learning context. The possible selves imagined by the language learner can also be tracked by measuring their motivational intensity to study a foreign

language (Gardner, 1985) and their intention to continue their pursuit of a foreign language (Ryan & Connell, 1987).

The imagined community proposed by Anderson (2006) has strong ties to the idea of possible and ideal selves described by Dörnyei (2009) in his model for foreign language learning, the former relating to an imagined collective identity, and the latter to an individual identity. Both these notions presuppose a similar way of envisioning one's individual and collective identity, in the present and in the future. The member of a nation will bestow traits that s/he considers representative for a group to the entire community, although there is no way of knowing whether these characteristics are actually valid or not. Similarly, a language learner will construct a future version of him/herself as a potential ideal identity to be acquired. Both these concepts require the individual to take a leap of faith: in the case of national identity this leap will allow the individual to acquire an ideal collective identity, while in the case of the language learner, s/he will envisage an ideal future self on an individual level.

These studies describe the role of the imagined community in constructing identity through language, be it the native or a foreign language. They point to the external factors and contextual influences that might affect the development of an identity, but also to the strength of the internal imagined vision an individual or a group can develop. The cross-disciplinary expansion of the concept of imagined communities and imagined future selves support the validity of the concept. Based on these studies, Europe has the potential of becoming, if it has not yet become, an imagined community, on an aggregate level, as well as an ideal self, on an individual level.

1.3. Language identity

In its simplest form, language identity is the identity determined by the language (or languages) one speaks and the two, language and identity, are “ultimately inseparable” (Joseph, 2004, p.13). Dörnyei's (2009) ideal L2 self described above can be understood as a future desired linguistic identity. Language can define a group and it can be the decisive factor in creating the ‘us’ versus ‘them’ dichotomy. Linguistic identity can bring people together or it can separate them, it can be a catalyst for unity, but also a means of exclusion. When talking about a linguistic group, “the symbolism of language provides the most central rally-point (...) while permit[ing] a quick enumeration of in-group

members” (Edwards, 2009, p.16), thus providing a means of separation between the in-group (the speakers of that language) and the out-group.

Many have argued over time that people construct and negotiate their identities through language (Block, 2007; Pavlenko & Norton, 2004; Pavlenko & Blackledge, 2004; Norton, 2000; Heller, 1987 and others). This view suggests that language is not a mere “medium of communication, but it is understood with reference to its social meaning” (Norton, 2000, p. 5). Individual identities are constructed through language, while at the same time collective identities and imagined communities are shaped and negotiated using language. Language is not a mere vehicle of communicating messages, rather it carries the message within itself. The intricate relationship between identity and language suggests that they influence each other and evolve together, to a point where they are almost inseparable, from a conceptual perspective. Communities shape their language and language shapes a community. The case of bilinguals and multilinguals has been discussed quite frequently in various fields and the consensus is that a foreign language allows one to gain access to a new culture and to a new community (Gardner, 1985; Dewaele, 2008, 2010 and many others). Learning a new language can even bring about another identity to the myriad of multiple identities an individual possesses.

Linguistic identity, or as Block (2007) refers to it, language identity, is one of the social identities that an individual (or a group) possesses, alongside his/her ethnic, racial, national, migrant, gender and social class identity (Block, 2007). This does not mean of course that each one of these identities is independent of the others; rather, they are linked and connected in overt and covert ways. Since identities are created, appropriated and negotiated through language, language identity is probably one of the most influential in the development of a person’s sense of selfhood. Block (2007) suggests that “language identity may be understood as the assumed and/or attributed relationship between one’s sense of self and a means of communication which might be known as a language, a dialect or a sociolect” (Block, 2007, p. 40). Citing work done by Rampton and his colleagues (1997), Block (2007) suggests that this relationship can take three forms: language expertise (or proficiency in that language), language affiliation (the attitudes towards that particular language and the emotional connection one feels with it), and language inheritance (being born into a particular linguistic community). These three concepts, together with a few other linguistic variables described below, will be used in the present study to provide a linguistic portrait of the participants. Background information regarding the place of birth

and place of residence (for the *language inheritance*) will be collected, as well as self-perceived competence in the participants' L1 and all other languages (*language expertise*) and attitudes towards multilingualism (for a slightly adapted concept of *language affiliation*, which will be described in the following sections).

1.3.1. Motivation and language attitudes

The process of learning a foreign language has received a lot of attention in linguistics and psychology. Researchers have struggled to pinpoint the exact factors that lead to the successful acquisition of a foreign language. Four decades ago, Gardner and Lambert (1972) published an influential book on the attitudes and motivation of L2 learners. They identified two types of motivation: the instrumental and the integrative motivation. The first type, *instrumental motivation*, refers to the learner's desire to acquire an L2 for practical reasons, such as a better job, class requirements etc. In this case, the language is perceived as an instrument in achieving another goal. The other type of motivation described by Gardner and Lambert (1972) is the *integrative motivation*, which alludes to the fact the a learner might want to acquire an L2 in order to be able to gain access to a new community and culture. To put this in Block's (2007) terms, although they do not possess a specific language inheritance, the integrative motivation would point towards the desire to gain language expertise because of positive affiliation to a specific language. Gardner and Lambert (1972) argue, and many later studies confirmed it, that integratively oriented learners will have a better chance at acquiring proficiency in an L2 than instrumentally oriented learners.

Another theory of motivation to study an L2 was adapted by Noels, Pelletier, Clément and Vallerand (2000; see also Noels, 2001; Comănaru & Noels, 2008) from Deci and Ryan's (1985) Self-Determination Theory (SDT). Within the realms of L2 acquisition, the SDT stipulates that the more self-determined orientation one has towards learning an L2, the higher the chances of success in this pursuit. SDT suggests that motivation is an affective factor that can be found on a continuum of self-determination. This continuum has *amotivation* at one extreme (the total lack of desire to learn an L2); it is followed by *external* regulation (gain rewards, avoid punishments); *introjected* (alleviate internal pressures and/or guilt); *identified* (personally significant reasons); and *integrated* regulation (the action is consistent with other life goals); *intrinsic* motivation is at the other end of the continuum (for the personal enjoyment of the task). Thus, the motivation can vary depending on

external and internal factors, but it has been shown consistently that the learners who find themselves closer to the intrinsic side of the continuum of self-determination experience more positive outcomes.

Gardner, Tremblay and Masgoret (1977) found that motivation referred to three underlying concepts: attitudes towards the L2, desire and motivational intensity to learn the L2. The latter factor has been used by other researchers to test the engagement in the L2 learning process (for example, Comănanu & Noels, 2008) and was found to be well predicted by more intrinsic and self-determined types of motivation. This concept of *motivational intensity* measures the commitment one has in pursuing another language. Regardless of whether their motivation is more instrumental or more integrative in nature, a strong motivational intensity can point to the importance L2 has for an individual. The scale and concept proposed by Gardner and his colleagues (1977) was adapted and used in this study as part of the set of linguistic variables, in order to test its relation to the identity variables. However, since our interest is not in a specific foreign language, but rather in foreign language learning as a general interest, the original scale was adapted to address this conceptualisation.

Another variable used to predict the learner's engagement in the process of language learning is *intention to continue* studying that language (Noels, Clément & Pelletier, 1999). As its name suggests, this concept measures the learner's determination to carry on learning foreign languages and it is based on Gardner and his colleagues' (1977) concept - the desire to learn a foreign language. This variable has also shown similar patterns of relation to the self-determined orientations for L2 learning as motivational intensity: in both cases, the more self-determined one's orientation was, the higher the level of these two variables measuring the engagement with the language learning process (Comănanu & Noels, 2008; Noels et al., 1999 and others). For the purposes of this study, the original scale was adapted to measure the desire (or intention) to continue learning FLs, without pointing to a specific one.

Apart from motivational intensity and intention to continue studying FLs, another variable that can complete the linguistic preference profile of potential language learners is *attitudes* towards that language. Gardner and his colleagues (1977) suggested that these three concepts determine the learners' strength of motivation. Later, Gardner (1985) provided the following definition for attitudes: "an evaluative reaction to some referent or attitude object, inferred on the basis of the individual beliefs or opinions about the referent" (p.9).

Nonetheless, the first studies by Gardner (1985; Gardner et al., 1977) refer to attitudes to a specific language, that is, French in the Canadian context. His theory on attitudes and motivation has been tested in many other international contexts (see Gardner, 2010 for a detailed description of these studies) showing consistently that positive attitudes, motivation and lack of anxiety towards the L2 are significantly related to successful acquisition of the desired language. The Attitude/Motivation Test Battery (Gardner, 1985) uses qualitative methods to tap at these concepts. The scale comprised 19 measures (Gardner, 1985b) which can be grouped into four indices: integrativeness, motivation, attitudes towards the learning situation and the attitude/motivation index. Although this scale has been used extensively and validated in many contexts, it does not address the aspect of linguistic attitudes that is of interest to the present study.

Rather than being concerned with the attitudes learners have towards a specific language, a learning situation or a language group, this study aims to investigate *attitudes towards multilingualism*, in general. The language directives given by the European Union do not stipulate particular languages to be learned by all the EU citizens, rather they encourage multilingualism in more general terms. Carrying on from the discussion regarding motivational intensity and intention to continue studying FLs in general, it is more suitable to discuss attitudes towards bilingualism (following the view on the concept put forth by Baker, 1992) and even multilingualism, rather than Gardner's concept of attitudes towards a specific language.

Baker (1992) considers "the nature and attributes of attitudes to bilingualism as different from attitudes to a language" (p. 76) and argues for the organic nature rather than the separated-ness of two languages in the concept of bilingualism. Baker (1992) maintains that in the case of attitudes to two separate languages, the scale demands that the participant choose one or the other, or since they are presented as being in a balance, it is hard to assert positive attitudes to both languages. Continuing the discussions proposed by Grosjean (1985, 1989) and Cook (1992), Baker argues that the bilingual should not be viewed as two monolinguals in one, but rather that the two languages are in constant interaction, might serve different purposes and that quite often it is a case of additive bilingualism and biculturalism (Baker, 2011; Lambert, 1974).

Thus, Baker (1992) developed and tested an instrument reflecting attitudes towards bilingualism in the Welsh context. His scale showed good reliability in the Welsh and international context, becoming one of the scales of choice when testing attitudes to

languages. In this study, multilingualism rather than bilingualism is of more interest. The reason for this lies again in the European Commission's suggestions on foreign language learning. Around the same period of time when Baker was developing and testing his scale, the European Commission delivered the White Paper on Education and Training (1995), which stipulates that each EU citizen should be proficient in three community languages:

[I]t is becoming necessary for everyone, irrespective of training and education routes chosen, to be able to acquire and keep up their ability to communicate in at least two Community languages in addition to their mother tongue. The Commission regrets the fact that the importance of this commitment was reduced, the Member States limiting its effect by using the words "if possible". (White Paper, 1995, p. 47)

As indicated above, the European nations are not required in any way to dictate national legislation on FL learning, and this directive from the European Commission cannot count as anything else but a suggestion. Nonetheless, in some European states multilingualism is already entrenched in the national linguistic legislation, having two or even more official national or regional languages. The close proximity of various linguistic communities in Europe make it an interesting case study. For these reasons, the scale developed by Baker (1992) was adapted to reflect the participants' attitudes to multilingualism, rather than bilingualism, defining multilingualism for the purposes of our study as the knowledge (as self-reported by the participants) of two or more languages.

Baker's scale (1992) has been previously adapted for other contexts. For example, Lasagabaster (2005) adapted and used it to test attitudes towards Basque, Spanish and English in the Basque context. He states that rather than "questioning the respondents about each of their three languages independently, in the traditional fashion, these three languages are put forward as a unit" (Lasagabaster, 2005, p. 26). Based on his work, Lasagabaster (2005) also advocates for a holistic view of multilingualism as a concept to be studied in the field of linguistics, stating that in his study, the different views can be separated based on the participants' LI. When he juxtaposes these results with previous ones obtained from traditional attitudes questionnaires (i.e., asking participants about their attitudes towards a specific language), the comparison indicates that the concepts are quite different. Nonetheless, Lasagabaster (2005) suggests that this does not invalidate the results obtained from using a holistic approach to attitudes towards multilingualism, rather, it points out to the underlying theoretical difference. Given the three very different contexts

in which the present study is carried out (Belgium, Romania and the United Kingdom) and the directive of the European Commission which does not place a language above another within the European context, an adapted version of the scale developed by Baker (1992) will be used, in which the term “bilingualism” will be replaced with “multilingualism”.

The terms “bilingualism” and “multilingualism” are sometimes used interchangeably in the literature, as in the case of them being used as antonyms to “monolingualism”; sometimes multilingualism is used to denote the knowledge of more than two languages. It is interesting to notice that in two different editions of his book on the “Foundation of bilingual education and bilingualism”, Baker revises some discussions on the “advantages of trilingualism” (Baker, 2006, p. 108) to the “advantages of multilingualism” (Baker, 2011, p. 105). This passage follows in both cases an account of the study by Dewaele (2000) in which Dewaele describes his daughter's impressive acquisition of three first languages at a very young age. The term “attitudes towards multilingualism” will be used to represent the participants' attitudes towards knowing more than one language, irrespective of number.

Glaser (2005) introduces a new term to denote knowledge of more than one language, and that is “plurilingualism”, a term often encountered in official EU documents. She argues that plurilingualism helps us deconstruct cultural and linguistic barriers. Drawing from social psychology, she argues that different language groups regard each other in the “us” versus “them” paradigm. One possibility to move away from a mentality that can create conflicts between the linguistic and cultural groups, is to encourage communication through the learning and use of more languages. Glaser argues that knowledge of several languages will help Europeans see past the differences between them and even forge a European identity.

1.3.2. Second language anxiety

Foreign language (or second language) anxiety has been identified as playing an important role in acquiring competence and using an L2. When individuals use their native language and in familiar contexts, they are aware of the norms and expectations of most communicative situations they find themselves in and can adjust their identity accordingly. However, when they need to interact in an L2, people tend to experience anxiety to various degrees. Communicating in a language that is not one's L1 can pose threats to one's self-

esteem. It might also make negotiating social interactions and presenting oneself in a positive light more difficult (Horwitz, Horwitz & Cope, 1986).

MacIntyre and Gardner (1994) define language anxiety as “the feeling of tension and apprehension specifically associated with L2 contexts, including speaking, listening, and learning” (p.284). Dewaele (2010) points out that since research in the field of L2 anxiety started in the 1970s and it has evolved to distinguish between different types of L2 anxiety, which are trait, situation-specific or state anxiety (Dewaele, Petrides & Furnham, 2008; Dewaele, 2002; MacIntyre, 2007).

Researchers have found that there are different types of anxiety related to the L2 context (for a detailed review, see Dewaele, 2010). Sometimes, people might experience anxiety because of the situation or the context in which they find themselves which can potentially be unfamiliar (as in the case of using an L2 in an environment where it is the language of the community - for example, a British tourist visiting France and attempting to interact with the local people in French). A *situation-specific type of anxiety* that has been studied extensively is Foreign Language Classroom Anxiety - in this case, high levels of anxiety have been found to be positively related to poor performance (Horwitz et al., 1986). The feelings of anxiety one might experience in their L2 can also be influenced by their personality - *trait anxiety* refers to individuals who might feel anxious in various situations and it is a characteristic of the individual (Dewaele, 2010). The last type of anxiety is called *state anxiety* and it refers to the fluctuating emotional reaction to a particular situation.

Although these three types of anxiety are quite different, they can all have a disruptive effect on the communicative act. Thus, “second language communication entails risk taking and is necessarily problematic” (Horwitz et al., 1986, p. 128), potentially making the communicative situation quite unnerving for the L2 learner. In more extreme cases, the anxiety that arises in these situations can become an impediment in the further acquisition of that language. Many studies have shown that low levels of anxiety in using an L2 is one of the most significant predictors of successful L2 learning.

1.3.3. Proficiency and frequency of use of L2

Competence in a L2 or FL can be determined in different ways: observing an individual in linguistic interactions, obtaining his/her scores on a standardised language test or in a language class, or simply asking them to self-report their perceived competence in that

particular language. Since the emergence of the concept of competence, it has been studied from various angles, looking at linguistics competence (a Chomskyan approach), the communicative competence (coming from the field of ethnography and communication), as well as pragmatic competence (incorporating not only the grammatical knowledge of the language, but also the understanding and correct interpretations of the situational norms). Sometimes, language competence and language proficiency are used interchangeably in the literature, but as Llurda (2000) points out, they refer to different concepts; he argues that *competence* should be used as to refer to the Chomskyan understanding of the term, while *language proficiency* should refer to an individual's "capacity to use language" (p.93). He goes on to define another term, the *communicative proficiency*, which Llurda (2000) argues refers to "both the knowledge of the world and the strategies necessary to apply language proficiency to contextualised situations" (p.93). Given this classification proposed by Llurda (2000), language proficiency will be used as the concept of interest in completing the linguistic profile of the participants in the study.

The technique to ask participants to self-report their perceived proficiency in an L2 has been used in linguistics studies and it has consistently proven reliable in studies comparing self-assessment with language class marks. In order to determine the level of proficiency in various FLs, the participants will self-report their perceived skills in reading, writing, listening and speaking in the various languages which they master. Being aware of the fact that some of these languages might be less used than others and taking into account the fact that the frequency of use of a FL has been suggested to have a strong effect on proficiency (Dewaele, 2010), participants will also address the frequency with which they use each of these languages. These measures of proficiency and frequency of use will complement the previously described linguistic variables in order to provide a more complete linguistic portrait of the participants in the studies.

Anxiety in using an L2, proficiency in various foreign languages and the frequency with which one uses these languages are good indicators of the communicative practices of Europeans. Europe provides space and a platform for interaction between the citizens of the European Union, but without the tools to engage in this interactions, the practices of the Europeans cannot be fully assessed. The concepts described in this section will provide a comprehensive picture of the potential and actual use of languages, as well as the attitudes towards one of the defining feature of the EU - multilingualism. The following

section will address the characteristics of the national and European identity, and will discuss the present linguistic milieu in Europe.

1.4. National and European identity

This section will present the concepts of national and European identity, as well as the relationship between them. I will discuss whether the concept of European identity is rooted in the concept of national identity, or whether they are fundamentally different. Some have argued that European identity is a form of transnational identity (Hermann, Risse & Brewer, 2004) - an identity that is carried across the borders of a nation. Others prefer to refer to it as a supranational identity, implying it is different and above the national identities, transcending them (Delanty, 2006); or post-national, suggesting that the moment European identity becomes reality, we move beyond the limitations of national identities (Delanty, 2006). All these terms have been used to describe and understand the identity created around the European Union, and the grounds for this will be discussed next.

1.4.1. National identity

National identity has been researched in different spheres for decades, if not centuries, and as our perception of it evolves, so does the concept. On a subjective level, it seems that it is rooted in the individual's understanding of the relation s/he has with the country of origin or the country of residence. But research in the field of political science and sociology has dealt in depth with the features of national identity and its creation and emergence in the modern world. From the point of view of identity, national identity is part of the multiple identities which define an individual and with which s/he associates (see § 1.2.3). As Smith (1991) suggests, national identity is as concrete as gender, religious, local, regional or ethnic identity.

In his book dedicated entirely to national identity, Smith (1991) argues that depending on the geographical location of a nation, there are different types of national identity. As Edwards (2009) points out, this is not a novel idea, but has been present in the political science literature for decades now. For example, Edwards (2009) discusses Kohn's proposition that nationalism is a dichotomous concept: there is the Western nationalism, which is considered to be progressive and cosmopolitan, and there is the Eastern

nationalism, described as a type of nationalism that is culturally-based. Smith's (1991) typology goes along the same lines of thought when he argues that in the Western world, the national identity that has emerged over time is civic identity. He says:

Historic territory, legal-political community, legal-political equality of members, and common civic culture and ideology; these are the components of the standard, Western model of the nation. (p.11)

He goes on to argue that the Eastern model of national identity (referring to countries in Eastern Europe and Asia) is based loosely on the emphasis on the native community in which one is born. In this model called the "ethnic" model of national identity, Smith (1991) suggests that the ties between the individuals are usually familial, and thus the members of the group share a common vernacular language, culture and mythology, thus making the nation primarily a "community of common descent" (p.12), created through the promulgation of these common elements. This differentiation between the civic and ethnic models of national identity seems to be based in different views on identity, such that the civic model appears as the social constructivist version of national identity, while the ethnic model takes an essentialist perspective. Smith (1991) goes on to argue that all nationalisms contain elements of both these models. Later, this definition was polished and more recently, Smith (2010) gives the following definition of national identity:

The continuous reproduction and reinterpretation by the members of a national community of the pattern of symbols, values, myths, memories and traditions that compose the distinctive heritage of nations, and the variable identification of individual members of that community with that heritage and its cultural elements (p.20).

As he emphasises (Smith, 2010, p.20) it is noteworthy to understand this definition as working on two levels. The first level is concerned with the individual - collective identity dimension, while the second aims at the stability - flexibility of identity dimension. This definition also touches on the significance of negotiating an identity. The collective identity is constantly interpreted and reinterpreted at an individual level, but this interpretation takes place within the boundaries set up by the heritage of one particular nation, and Smith considers that they relate to that nation's set of cultural elements. Edwards (2009) takes this idea further and suggests that the boundaries do not need to be physical borders: "What *is* essential for the continuation of a sense of group-ness is a continuation of a sense of distinctiveness that allows perceptual boundaries to be maintained" (p. 9, emphasis in the original).

According to Smith's (1991) classification, Romania would be governed by an ethnic type of national identity, based around folklore, myths and vernaculars, while the United Kingdom and Belgium would fall under the civic national identities. Edwards (2009) provides a link between the two types of nationalism, saying that nationalism can be "broadly understandable as an extension of ethnicity" (p. 163). This understanding of the relation between nationalism and ethnicity, and more specifically, civic and ethnic nationalism, places them on unequal statuses, marking civic nationalism as the more advanced type, potentially having emerged from ethnic nationalism. Edwards (2009) also maintains that the concept and reality of nationalism materialised as a product of the French revolution in combination with the European romantic period. This suggests that although the ethnic nationalism could have been present in the European societies for a long time, the civic nationalism is a recent phenomenon and possibly a progressive development of the former. Wright (2004) explains how France was a very linguistically diverse territory, but after the French revolution "it became a patriotic and revolutionary duty for citizens to learn and use French" (p.31). Thus, the French revolution marks the emergence of the relationship between nationalism (or patriotism) and language.

This study is guided by the assumption that although the understanding and attachment to national identity might be different in each country, they are not fundamentally different as to require various models of investigating the research questions. The distinction between the two types of nationalism or national identity can be found in Bruter's (2005) classification of European identity as civic identity and cultural identity (see § 1.4.3.6.1). The present discussion on the forms of national identity was indeed essential for a better understanding of the European identity, its components and its relation to national identity.

For Smith (1991), language is not a vital element in the formation of national identity. He mentions the importance of vernacular languages for the ethnic national identity, but he seems to imply that these vernaculars would foster a sense of connectedness to the immediate family or group, which in turn would create the basis for the emergence of the ethnic national identity. Smith argues that language might play a significant role in societies outside of Europe, and that sometimes there are other consequential factors, such as religion, which play an important role in the formation of national identity. Another point, made by Risse (2010) is that Smith portrays national identity as a stable identity, grounded in the historical, mythical and mnemonic ties of the members of the collective group.

Although people renegotiate these ties constantly, they are still stable elements which lead to a stable, constant type of national identity.

Other researchers have put forth their vision and understanding of national identity. Anderson (1991), for example, described the nation as an “imagined community” (as discussed in § 1.2.7). It is in a way a leap of faith, through which one builds a sense of belonging to a community. National identity is based on such characteristics. Members of a nation tend to perceive it as a cohesive body, and attribute traits to all its members based on their mere affiliation with that particular nation. Risse (2010) argues that even in the case of an imagined community, the members of that community have to perceive the “psychological existence” of it as real, a trait that has been called *entitativity* in social psychology (Campbell, 1958, as cited in Risse, 2010). Caporaso and Kim (2009) define this trait as the degree of coherence of the group. Thus, combining these notions put forth by Anderson and Risse, the nation and one’s identification with it can be understood as the non-fictional, tangible and real feeling of belonging to a community that must be imagined because of the impossibility of knowing directly all the members that belong to it. It could be argued that accepting this national identity is taking a leap of faith and agreeing to identify with a community (and potentially traits of it) that is not entirely known to the individual member, but which s/he embraces as his/her own.

Deviating from Smith’s (1991) understanding on national identity, Block (2007) argues that “national identity is not fixed at birth and tied to one’s birthplace; rather, it is an ongoing project, recreated daily via actions such as flag waving and the invocation of historical events” (p. 32), making it clear that his view on national identity is social constructivist, rather than an essentialist one (see § 1.2.6). He also argues that the members of a nation show their affiliation to that nation through their discourse, rendering thus their identity as subjective and changeable, and tying national identity to language in an indisputable way. Wodak and her colleagues (2008) reach a similar conclusion in their study of the construction of national identity through discourse in the Austrian context. Interestingly, they note that the participants in the study often mentioned language as a differentiating factor between immigrant and non-immigrant Austrians, insisting on the specific character of Austrian German. The authors propose however, that although on a discursive level, the respondents declared language to be “an essential component of Austrianness (...) there was hardly any awareness of an independent standard variety of the pluri-national language German” (Wodak et al., 2008, p. 193). Thus, although they considered language as essential

in the construction of their national identity, the language they used was not necessarily specific to their national space.

Language seems to be an important factor in the construction of national identities, or at least it is perceived as being central to defining one's identity, even in cases when the language transcends the national borders. There are also many nations in the world, and some European ones as well, that have managed to build a national identity on more than one language. Other factors that are significant in the construction of national identity are historical or geographical in nature, as well as cultural and sociological - sharing a common history, a mythology, customs and traditions, a political system and others, all to various degrees, depending on the nation. The next section introduces a new concept - the transnational identity.

1.4.2. Transnational identity

The concept of transnationalism is attributed to Bourne (1916), who in his essay entitled "Trans-national America" argues against the development of America as a melting pot, and in favour of the idea of transnationalism. He argues that it is wrong to fight against the hyphenates (referring to the new immigrants to America), as this fight might agitate their patriotism towards their spiritual country (that is, their country of origin). In the same essay, Bourne (1916) describes the advantages of a cosmopolitan nation, and of the international national character that America can come to embody.

Over the last century however, concepts like cosmopolitanism and transnationalism have taken many routes, but in the sphere of social sciences they came to be associated more with Europe than with America. From a political point of view, any individual who holds more than one citizenship, can be seen as a transnational; another example is the immigrant (legal or illegal) who moves beyond the borders of his/her country of origin, or the child born in a mixed ethnic family. Additionally, as will be discussed in this section, an individual can perceive their identity as transnational once s/he does not identify solely with one national or regional identity, but his/her identity transcends the geographical state borders.

In the field of social psychology, the notion of transnationalism can be paralleled to concepts such as the "universalist self" (Boski, 2008), "integrated biculturalism" (Roccas & Brewer, 2002) or "constructive marginality" (Bennet & Bennett, 2004). Citing Sussman,

Roccas and Brewer (2002) argue that integrative biculturalism is “an identity in which the individuals define themselves as world citizens” (p.93), distancing themselves from their original culture, as well as the host culture. The constructive marginal individuals are said to be able to “move easily in and out of cultural contexts” (Bennett & Bennett, 2004, p. 157). All these concepts have at their core the fact the individuals they represent are not bound to one identity, cultural group, or nation, but rather they flow between two or more groups, maybe identifying with some elements or maybe just adapting to them to an extent that allows them to be functional members of the group(s). Thus, a transnational identity is a type of identity that is a step closer to an individual describing his/her identity as a “world citizen”, or on a slightly smaller scale, European.

The European project is unique in its way of trying to bring together countries which vary from a political, cultural, historical and economical point of view. In order to develop a stronger sense of a transnational identity, the individuals need to be open to the idea of the Europeanisation of their nation. Risse and his colleagues (2001) define Europeanisation as “the emergence and development at the European level of distinct structures of governance” (Risse, Cowles & Caporaso, 2001, p.3) and they argue that this process wears away gradually the national sovereignty, but without weakening the state. Thus, the Europeanisation of the national identities is based on a steady transformation of the understanding of the national identity from a European perspective. Risse and his colleagues (2001) suggest that this process takes various forms depending on the understanding of nationalism and national identity of each state, making thus the process of Europeanisation quite diverse depending on the nation. The transnational identities become stronger not by undermining the national identities, but by incorporating the Europeanisation elements into them. The motto of the European Union, “unity in diversity” seems to fit effortlessly with this understanding of the formation of transnational identity through Europeanisation. Without renouncing the national identity, a European individual can mould his/her identity to incorporate the European element. This element in turn will lead to a Europeanised national identity, that is, a transnational identity, and potentially to a European identity. In the next section, the relations between European and national identity will be discussed, as well as whether the European identity should be viewed as a supranational identity (formed in the basis and principles of national identity) or a different type of collective identity altogether.

The conceptualisation of transnational identities has also met some criticism in the literature. Breakwell (2004) argues that it is almost impossible to develop a sense of transnational identity as European identity mainly because of the lack of definition and common understanding of identity at the European level. She argues that the various ways in which people will internalise this identity reduce its possibility of becoming a common identity for the European citizens, even if people will self-categorise as Europeans (p.38).

As discussed above, Risse and his colleagues (2001) agree that various understandings of national identities will lead to different conceptualisations of Europeanisation, but they do not consider this diversity of understandings to be a hinderance in the development of European identity. They maintain that the pressure to adapt will be greater if the understanding of national identity is further from that of European identity.

Europeanisation, they suggest, was accompanied by a process of domestic change in the nuances of each national context (p. 1). Börzel and Risse (2003) suggest that there are different routes that a nation can take to overcome the pressure for adaptation and arrive at a suitable domestic change at an institutional and state level (p.69). Depending on the degree of domestic change required by the Europeanisation process, a nation can go through transformation (drastic change), accommodation (modest change) and absorption (low change). Thus, Börzel and Risse (2003) propose that depending on the width of the differences between the national and European institutions and thus representation at a structural level, a nation-state would have to adapt with various intensity to the demands of the Europeanisation.

Consequently, Breakwell's critique presents a valid point, arguing that it is difficult to form a common identity if the members of that particular group have a different understanding of what that identity means to them, at an individual and collective level. However, accepting this theory can have implications on any collective or group identity. If the diverse national identities that Europeans possess lead them to develop a different awareness of their European identity, a similar case can be made for any other kind of identity, as it is impossible to prove empirically that individuals have the exact understanding of their national identity. For each one of them, the national or transnational or European identity might have a different meaning based on their experiences and personal choices or preferences. Nonetheless, this deterministic stance will not be useful in furthering the understanding of national or European identity from an empirical perspective.

The emergence of Europeanised transnational identities is evident at the level of communication in the European public spheres, argues Risse (2010). Rather than considering the lack of a common language an impediment, he argues that the public spheres have become in recent decades the facilitator of the creation of transnational identities and need to be understood from a social constructivist perspective (rather than an essentialist one), such that they are not necessarily actual spaces to be used and discovered, but they are common themes and issues debated in public, regardless of the level (local, regional or national). These transnational public spheres are constantly constructed and negotiated by the people involved in the communication process, and through this process, the continuous interaction in a transnational space gives form to the transnational identities; they, in turn, help to reinforce the transnational public sphere (Risse, 2010, p. 126). The characteristics of this European transnational community of communication are that:

- (a) European or other national speakers regularly participate in cross-border debates, (b) speakers and listeners recognise each other as legitimate participants in transnational discourses that (c) frame the particular issues as common European problems. (p.126)

These features presented by Risse (2010) as fundamental for the creation and maintenance of transnational public spheres reiterate the intrinsic relation they have with the transnational identities. As discussed earlier with regards to identity and language, the two are used to reinforce, recreate, construct and negotiate each other. Similarly, transnational public spheres and identities are intertwined to the degree that they define and construct each other. The social constructivist perspective thus permits an understanding of the identity and the public sphere as a reflection of each other. Risse (2010) suggests that based on the characteristics named above which shape the transnational public spheres and identities, there are different degrees of Europeanisation. Again, this notion resonates with the discussion above, suggesting that depending on the understanding of national identity, the transnational identities and thus, European identities might take various forms.

1.4.3. European identity

In the previous sections, I have touched upon some aspects of European identity. This section aims to bring all those discussions together and to elucidate the nuances that the concept of European identity will take in the present study. Initially, I will present a brief

historical background of the EU and give a short account of the situation today, making use of the public opinion surveys, the Eurobarometers; I will discuss the relation between the geographical space and the European Union; I will then elaborate on the meanings of European identity and the prototypical European. The next subsection will cover the relation between European identity and national identity; I will then present the different subcategories European identity has been posited to have, with an emphasis on one of the very few empirical studies looking at the components of European identity; I will discuss the potential new understandings of European identity in the context of the European crisis and argue that although there are signs that the European Union and the European identity cannot stand up to these challenges, some researchers suggest that a closer union and a stronger European identity can potentially assist in overcoming the crisis and strengthening the European Union. I will end this section with a brief description of previous work done on the relation between multilingualism and European identity.

1.4.3.1. European Union - historical background and the state of affairs today

The beginnings of the European Union and of the formation of European identity can be traced back to post-World War II Europe. After the devastating effects of the war, the leaders of the European countries understood that in order to protect themselves and prevent another conflict of such proportions, they needed to cooperate economically and politically. The first attempt to bring the European countries together was the creation in 1949 of the Council of Europe. The Statute of the Council of Europe was signed in the first instance by 10 countries, but it now counts 47 member states. Although it shares some symbols with the European Union, the Council of Europe is an entirely different organisation. In its 1949 statute, the first article reads:

The aim of the Council of Europe is to achieve a greater unity between its members for the purpose of safeguarding and realising the ideals and principles which are their common heritage and facilitating their economic and social progress. (Chapter I, Article 1a, The Statute of the Council of Europe)

Notably, all the states that join the Council of Europe accept the principles of the European Convention on Human Rights. Thus, the Council, although a separate entity from the European Union, works together with it and other European institutions to support human rights and prevent conflicts between its member states.

Apart from the Council of Europe, after WWII there was a need to ensure that the European states can monitor each other and verify that none of them are building armaments that could start another armed conflict. In 1950, the French foreign minister Robert Schuman proposed the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in order to promote economic development and avoid further conflicts between France and Germany, two of the European nations which have traditionally been opponents. The Declaration posits that the common economic and material interests will lead to the development of stronger ties between France and Germany and any other states that might decide to join them.

The establishment of this powerful productive unit, open to all countries willing to take part and bound ultimately to provide all the member countries with the basic elements of industrial production on the same terms, would lay a true foundation for their economic unification:

This production will be offered to the world as a whole without distinction or exception, with the aim of contributing to raising living standards and to promoting peaceful achievements (...) this proposal will lead to the realisation of the first concrete foundation of a European federation indispensable to the preservation of peace.
(The Schuman Declaration)

The declaration proposed by France and signed also by West Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg on 9 May 1950 is regarded as the first official document of the union of countries that later became the European Union. Although the declaration clearly stipulates the fact that it is a union based on economic interests which determines its signatories to make every effort to maintain peace, it contains some passages that are intriguingly prophetic:

World peace cannot be safeguarded without the making of creative efforts proportionate to the dangers which threaten it (...) Europe will not be made all at once, or according to a single plan. It will be built through concrete achievements which first create a de facto solidarity. (The Schuman Declaration)

Talking about world peace and the making of Europe reveals the visionary spirit that Schuman put into this declaration. The mention of the “de facto solidarity” might be one of the earliest indicators of the need for the development of a European identity. This excerpt

of the declaration suggests that solidarity between the people of Europe will lead to more tangible results, which in turn will “make Europe”.

Other treaties have taken this vision further and built upon the ECSC precedent. In 1957, the signatories of the ECSC, signed another agreement, the Treaty of Rome, also known as the “Treaty establishing the European Economic Community”. Through this treaty, the original member states agreed to facilitate a common European market, common policies regarding agriculture, transport and social issues, as well as to establish the European Commission. As Burgess (2002) maintains, the Treaty of Rome “begins not from de facto division, but from presumed unity” between the signatory states. Although these countries have already had a history of armed conflict at the time of the treaty, its formulation maintains the unity, rather than the diversity between the signatory states. Burgess (2002) also argues that the language of this treaty suggests a unity of Europe, rather than just the six member states that signed the original treaty, while also underlining the European solidarity, which he argues is not used in economic sense, but as a “transcendental European solidarity that ‘binds’ Europe in the global community” (Burgess, 2002, p. 478, quotation marks in the original). Consequently, by this point the signatory states were already aware of the importance of solidarity between the member states (and possibly other European countries), as well as valued the unity between them without undermining the diversity. These initial formulations form the basis of the current understanding of the relation between the European states and set the stage for the future treaties that will formalise these relations.

A few decades later, the Treaty of Rome underwent some revisions and in 1993 was put forth as the Maastricht Treaty, which marked the creation of the European Union. It also established the common currency, the euro, and various elements of political unity, such as the European citizenship, as well as European-level guidelines for common foreign and internal affairs policies. This treaty is the first one to ensure the cultural sovereignty of all of the European Union member states (Wright, 2004, p. 127). Following treaties signed in Amsterdam, Nice and Lisbon have provided various amendments to the Maastricht Treaty, but the birth of the European Union as it is today was decided in Maastricht. By that time, the European continent was again in turmoil, with the unification of Germany and the emergences from under Communist rule of the Eastern European countries. In 1995 the European Union already comprised of 15 member states, and in 2004 another 8 countries from the Central and Eastern bloc joined the Union, together with Cyprus and Malta,

finally marking the expansion of the EU eastwards. The final waves of expansion came in 2007, with the accession of Romania and Bulgaria, and in 2013 with Croatia joining the EU.

It is worth noting here that in 1973, the nine member states of the European Commission at that time, have drawn up and signed a Declaration on the European Identity with the purpose to “affirm their determination to introduce the concept of European identity into their common foreign relations” (Declaration on European Identity). The document posits that defining the European identity rests on three main concepts:

1. The unity of the Nine member countries of the community (reviewing here the common heritage, interests and obligations);
2. The European identity in relation to the world (specifying that the unity between the member states is not designed to gain power or go against any other country, but rather to provide a balance point in international affairs); and
3. The dynamic nature of the construction of a Unified Europe (Declaration on European Identity).

The concept of a unified Europe seems to be taking shape at this point, and with it, the importance of constructing and defining the European identity. Although this declaration was only signed by nine countries and did not progress any further than that, the concepts of European identity were for the first time made clear and recognised as an important factor for the development of the unified Europe. The next treaty to mention European identity is the Maastricht Treaty, and as Burgess (2002) points out, this time the concept of European identity shows up under the discourse on common security and foreign policy. Burgess (2002) seems to decry such brief mention of the European identity:

Maastricht reduces the concept of identity in the best case to a basis for international diplomacy or, in the worst case, to a quasi-militarised kernel, a celestial fix from which to navigate a defence policy in an increasingly complex global battlefield. (p. 479)

Burgess (2002) argues that the reason we can reflect on and grasp the concept of European identity is because Europe and the European Union are not one and the same thing; if they were identical, it would be inconceivable to define degrees of European identification or formulate the otherness vis-a-vis European-ness. This philosophical argument for the existence and justification of the European identity does not rely at all on notions of

national identity. Other scholars have attempted to define European identity in relation to national identity, as well as other, more tangible European symbols (see § 1.4.3.5).

Today, the European Union gathers together 28 member states and more than 500 million people. The European Union project brought together these European countries in a political and economic entity, governed by a number of institutions, which can be grouped into executive, legislative and judiciary branches, as well as the financial branch. These bodies and institutions are comprised of representatives of the member states, some elected, others appointed. The capital of the European Union is in Brussels, where many of headquarters of these institutions are located. Depending on various factors, such as the economic and political situation, some of the member states of the European Union have joined the eurozone, renouncing their currency and adopting the euro. The European Union operates as a single market, ensuring the free circulation of goods, capital, services and people. The Schengen area is comprised of 22 member states of the European Union (and 4 others which are not EU members) and represents the agreement on open borders and the abolition of passport controls within its borders. The European Union has its own flag, anthem, day and motto. With some restrictions, the citizens of the European Union are free to travel, study, work or live anywhere in the European Union. In 2012, the European Union received the Nobel Peace Prize for its role in the maintenance of peaceful relations between the European countries and in the promotion of democracy and human rights in Europe.

It is also important to note here that the European Union recognises as official languages all the languages of its member states, bringing the number of EU official languages to 24. This means that for the European Union, all languages and their speakers are seen as equals. The EU has also made provisions for the protection and maintenance of the minority and regional languages. Although the EU cannot impose any regulations at the national level, the Commission for Multilingualism supports language learning and language diversity in all member states, recommending that all European citizens should be able to communicate in their mother tongue and two other European languages. This recommendation came in 1995, under the French presidency of the European Union, and some have suggested that it was designed in such a way as to promote the learning of other former *lingue franche* of Europe (mainly, French) apart from English (Wright, 2004; Mamadouh, 2002).

The debate on whether the European Union should adopt a common language has proven to be a very complex one, eliciting heated reactions on both sides. Some have argued that the European Union should adopt a common language and promote the learning of that language as a *lingua franca* at a European level. Those who have argued against this point suggested that such an action would place the native speakers of that language at a clear advantage on the European job market, or in any interactions with other Europeans (see Van Parijs, 2011). Wright (2004) enumerates some of the advantages that native speakers of a *lingua franca* have: they do not have to struggle to acquire it in order to be able to participate in multilingual contexts; “their society is economically advantaged as it has no translation, no interpretation, no acquisition costs” (p.127); they also have a political advantage as they do not have to deal with any communication barriers; and, ultimately, their language gains the prestige, which will lead to the “tacit acceptance of the dominance” of the group speaking it as a mother tongue (Wright, 2004, p.127). It is thus self-evident that a supranational institution like the European Union could not easily agree on a single *lingua franca* to be used within its institutions and in communications with the European citizens, and impose it on them.

There is a matter that requires clarification at this point: the practices, recommendations and policies of the European Union at an institutional level, and the practices that might occur in an ordinary interaction between European citizens. In the former case, the EU needs to maintain a respectful position towards all European member states and that implies holding their languages in the same regard. The latter, the interactions between European citizens, whether in an official capacity or just personal contact, will always resort to the easiest communicative practice, that is, using a language that is known to both interlocutors at least to some extent.

In order to avoid issues of linguistic injustice, Wright (2004) suggests three solutions: social bilingualism (impossible at the European level), artificial languages (Esperanto never gathered enough support) and machine translations (an interesting solution, but not yet achievable). The three proposed solutions to fight linguistic injustice are discarded one by one, and Wright (2004) concludes that the optimal solution would be the adoption of a *lingua franca*. As discussed above, this solution is considered unjust. Therefore, the European Union and its institutions have come up with another solution to reduce the cost and difficulty of translations: if a document is elaborated in one of the lesser known languages of the European Union, it is first translated into the pivotal languages (English,

French and German) and these translations are used for translations into all the other languages. Thus, the difficulty of finding translators for the less used combinations of languages (such as Romanian to Maltese, or Estonian to Bulgarian) is bypassed (*Speaking in Europe*, 2008).

The critics of this strategy argue that after all, the pivotal languages act like *lingue franche* of the European Union, but others disagree with this assessment, saying that it is just a way of easing the work and a cost of the translations. Critics of the 24-official-languages-policy of the EU have also argued against the high cost of the translations and interpretations required at the European level for the smooth functioning of the various institutions and for the translation of all documents elaborated at the EU level in the 24 official languages. A document released by the European Union in 2008, '*Speaking in Europe - Languages in the European Union*', calculates that the cost of the yearly translations required at the European Union level at 2.20 euros per European citizen per year (Gazzola & Grin, 2012), a cost which is considered negligible if it represents the equality of the European languages.

Many have dealt with the European Union multilingualism issue and tried to find the best option for the EU and for its relationship with its citizens (Wright, 2004; Grin, 2008; Kraus, 2008). Kraus (2008) suggests that the language issue at the EU level needs to address two goals: to develop the communicative basis of the European integration and to maintain the language diversity. He proposes various strategies, each with their own advantages and disadvantages: the adoption of a marginal European language with few ties to other European languages, Latin, an artificial language (possibly Esperanto), Europanto (a language created by Diego Marani, a translator for the EU and novelist), and lastly English. Kraus (2008) discusses the various issues which the latter option would bring about and concludes that a feasible solution is the support for "converging multilingualism (...) a model which, in creating shared contexts of communication, attempts to find a necessarily precarious balance between pragmatism and respect for diversity" (p. 176). He rejects the demonising of English or any other *lingua franca*, which serve an important communicative purpose at the European level (both personal and institutional), but that should not preclude us from preserving the linguistic diversity of Europe and supporting learning of languages other than English. Kraus (2008) draws attention to the potential diglossic situation that might arise from this model, which many times also indicates a societal hierarchy and potential schism - English could become the language of the elite, education, finances, institutions and so on, while the other European languages would

maintain an identity and personal communication function. Nonetheless, converging multilingualism can be a viable option against a European diglossic scenario. Kraus (2008) suggests that within the European Union, countries could form clusters based on linguistic affinities, mutual understanding and passive bilingualism, such that there would be a Latin cluster, a Teutonic one, a Scandinavian one and so on. This will encourage communication between Europeans. Evidently, learning a language from a different cluster than one's mother tongue would increase the communication potential between the citizens of Europe.

Grin (2008) provides a review of the different policy regimes that can be chosen for the official and working languages (OWL) of the European Union. He suggests that each one of them has advantages and drawbacks, depending on whether the point of interest is fairness, efficiency, speed or accuracy. The regimes he describes are: monarchic (English as OWL); synarchic (Esperanto or any other non-European language as OWL); oligarchic (English, German and French - OWL); panarchic (all languages are OWLs); hegemonic (all languages are official, but English is used as a pivot language); technocratic (all are official languages, but Esperanto or another artificial language is used as a pivot language); and lastly, triple symmetrical relay (all are official languages, and three are pivotal languages used for translation and interpretation) (p. 77-78). Grin (2008) is keen to mention that these are the options available on a policy level, and although some might seem more cost effective or fair than others, they are laid out as possibilities and not recommendations.

The relevant argument in choosing one of the options over another needs to take into account issues of linguistic justice and fairness, as well as convenience and feasibility. Some calculations reveal that the cost of any of the seven regimes does not even come close to the heights sometimes described in the media (Grin, 2008). Although officially, the regime that is currently embraced by the European Union is the panarchic one, there is evidence that in practice, even at the institutional level, the participants in a communication act choose various strategies to facilitate dialogue or to make a statement (Wodak, Krzyzanowski, Forchtner, 2012). As Wodak and her colleagues argue when discussing the linguistic practices of the EU officials (2012), it is not just a matter of multilingual versus monolingual practices, but there are a multitude of linguistic practices, depending on the topic, context and genre of the exchange.

At an official policy level, the European Union adopts a policy of fairness and justice towards all the official languages of the member states, providing translation and

interpretation for all possible combinations. Since in the European Parliament, documents need to be translated fast and accurately even in preliminary forms, a system of six pivotal languages has been implemented: English, French, German, Italian, Spanish and Polish (Grindheim & Lohndal, 2008). This system makes the translation process faster and more efficient, however, it can be regarded as unjust by the native speakers of the other European official languages. For this reason, the final documents are translated and made available to the European public in all the 24 languages. There is also evidence that at the conversational or debate level, the EU officials use their multilingualism as an asset to facilitate easy communication (Wodak et al., 2012). The issues discussed here present the official stance of the European Union with regards to multilingualism and language use within the European institutions, and the actual practices of the EU officials. The following section will present the opinions of the European citizens with regards to languages and multilingualism, as revealed by Eurobarometers.

1.4.3.2. Eurobarometers on languages in Europe

Since the beginning of the 1970s, the European Commission has been ordering at regular time intervals public opinion surveys to investigate scientifically the views held by the Europeans on certain topics or proposed changes within the Union (Kraus, 2008). In 2012, a Special Eurobarometer was commissioned to explore the Europeans' views on languages. The results include for the first time the two new member states, Romania and Bulgaria. The report (Special Eurobarometer 386, 2012) specifies that the Commission has a threefold agenda with regards to multilingualism in Europe: develop and emphasise the role of multilingualism in the European economy, motivate Europeans to improve their knowledge of languages in order to stimulate communication, and making the necessary provisions for all Europeans to be able to access the EU legislation, procedures and information in their own language.

The results of this large scale survey suggests that overall, Europeans have a very positive view on multilingualism. An impressive percentage of the respondents (84%) agree that everyone should be able to speak an FL, while 72% lend their support to the recommendations of the European Union that every European should be able to speak two FLs apart from their mother tongue. An interesting result of this Eurobarometer is that although 88% agree that all languages should receive equal treatment at the European Union level, 53% maintain that the EU institutions should adopt a single language to

communicate with its citizens. Other results suggest that the main barriers in learning FLs for the participants in the surveys are lack of motivation, time and money, which is also related to the fact that a mere 14% were actively learning a language at the time of the survey. Nonetheless, the reasons for engaging in learning a FL comprise abroad employment (61%), use of that language at work or for business travel (53%), for study (46%) and holidays (47%), to be able to understand people from other cultures (38%), to meet people from other countries (29%) and to feel more European (10%). The most remarkable result though is the fact that almost all respondents (98%) consider it is useful for their children to master FLs. These results translate into the fact that almost all European citizens taking part in this survey agree that although they personally might not have enough time, money or motivation to learn a FL, their children should learn at least one FL, since being able to communicate in other languages is beneficial for working abroad or in one's country, travel or study.

With regards to the daily use of languages, this Eurobarometer found that about 65% use their L2 at least occasionally (8% use it daily); similarly, the respondents declared that they use their L3 occasionally in proportion of 69%, often 13% and daily 6%. Naturally, a larger percentage used their L1 daily (23%), often 23% and occasionally about 50%. With respect to the particular languages found to be useful, about 67% consider English to be the most useful language, but this percentage increased when the respondents were asked which languages would be useful for their children to learn (79% said English, while 20% declared French or German, respectively). The high support for English both for themselves and their children suggests that within the European context English has the strongest ethnolinguistic vitality, followed by French and German. These statistics are also mirrored by the languages spoken by the respondents in this survey: 38% revealed that they spoke English as an FL, 12% French and 11% German; furthermore, 54% of all respondents maintained that they were able to hold a conversation in at least one FL, suggesting they were bilingual, 25% trilingual and 10% quadrilingual.

These results are presented here in order to give a glimpse about the current linguistic landscape in Europe and the statistics used by the European institutions responsible for matters of language and multilingualism. They suggest that Europeans do place a strong value on multilingualism and recognise its advantages for personal and professional development. The inferred consequence could be that overall Europeans have positive attitudes to FLs and multilingualism, but are somewhat reluctant to engage in language

learning actively. One of the questions in this study asked whether the participants would learn a FL to feel more European, a question pertinent to the present study. The results indicate that only an average of 10% of participants responded positively to this question (the Danish respondents scored highest - 18%, while Ireland was 4%; participants 20 years old or older - 13%, while below 15 year-olds scored 6%). Albeit a rather low score, this particular question relating to the relation between feeling European and speaking more FLs or at least having a positive attitude to multilingualism will be investigated in more depth in this study.

Eurobarometers have been used by many researchers looking at Europeans and their attitudes to various events in the European Union (Bruter, 2005; Frogner & Duchesne, 1998; Kohli, 2000; Caporaso & Kim, 2009; Fligstein, Polyakova & Sandholtz, 2012 and many others). These large scale surveys offer a snapshot of the European public opinion at various points in time and allows for comparisons over time and between countries. The data collected becomes available in the public domain and can be used freely in research investigations. With regards to Europeans' identification with their region, nation or Europe, some researchers have argued that the way in which the question was formulated influenced the respondents (see Kohli, 2000, for a description and critique of the evolution of the question regarding national and European identity). Although these changes make it difficult to compare the results from various Eurobarometers, they also signify an alignment with the rules of questionnaire design, which in time have led to potentially more reliable results.

The Eurobarometers under their various forms (standard, special, flash, qualitative and so on) have historically included questions about the feelings of identity. I will briefly present now the results from another recent Special Eurobarometer (no. 346, 2011), which looked more closely at issues related to identity, both national and European. This survey called "The New Europeans" aimed at assessing the feelings of connectedness and identification to Europe and the nation. I will discuss in brief the results pertaining to the overall findings of this study, looking in more detail at the contexts which are of interest to this study: United Kingdom, Belgium, and Romania.

The results of this Special Eurobarometer (2011) show that across the board, Europeans have a very strong connection to their village, town or city, region, and country. The local identity reached an impressive 87% for the overall sample of Europeans participating in this survey. There was some variation at the national level, with Romania reaching one of

the highest percentages (95%), while Belgium recorded one of the steepest declines since the previous survey in 2007, currently being at 76%. The identification with the native region was also high, averaging 88%, and again Romania scored among the highest, with 94%. With regards to national identification, the overall European score was 93%, having increased 2% since the previous Eurobarometer. The country with the strongest increase was the United Kingdom (from 84% in 2007 to 91% in 2011), while Belgium recorded one of the lowest scores, 82% (Special Eurobarometer 346, 2011). These results indicate the strong attachment to local, regional and national identities that most Europeans feel. Although these scores are in constant change, sometimes relating to political or social events developing at the various levels of governance, the high percentages indicate a very strong affiliation with these identities.

The participants were also asked about their feelings of identification to Europe. The results indicated that the European identity was much lower than the local, regional and national identities, but pointed to the fact that more than half of the respondents do feel European (average score was 53%, increasing 4% since the previous Eurobarometer in 2007). The break-down of the results indicate that in some instances the feelings of European-ness have recorded a decline. Belgium, for example, recorded the steepest decline from 65% to 50%, while Romania declined from 56% to 46%. One of the lowest percentages was registered in the United Kingdom, 29%. On average, the younger participants scored higher than the older ones. Also, the differences between more educated and higher social status respondents, and less educated, lower social status was approximately 10%. These results are not surprising and they are consistent with previous research which points to the fact that the feelings of European identity are more prevalent among the so-called elite Europeans (Risse, 2010) or the Eurostars (Favell, 2009) than the rest of the European citizens.

The next section of the report (Special Eurobarometer 346, 2011) attempts to pull apart the various elements that make up a sense of European identity and to determine what percentage of the respondents consider these factors in their personal feelings of European identity. The two elements strongest endorsed were the common currency, the euro, and the democratic values of the European Union (the latter was endorsed by 32% of the respondents as a significant element of European identity). A break-down by country with regards to the importance of the euro shows that the country which hosts the capital of Europe, Belgium, is a strong supporter of it (55% of the respondents from Belgium

considered the euro to be an important element of the European identity). Romania recorded a lower score, a bit below the European average (29%), while United Kingdom scored a mere 12%. It is important to note here that Romania has not yet moved to the common European currency, while the United Kingdom decided not to join the Eurozone after the Maastricht Treaty. Other elements that were deemed consequential for the European identity were geography (22%), a common culture (22%; the United Kingdom endorsed this element the strongest, with a support of 26% of the respondents), common history (17%), higher social protection (13%), symbols (11%) and a common religious heritage (5%).

The beginning of the new millennium was marked by one of the most ambitious projects: the unification of the European Union under one currency - the euro. In 2002, 12 members of the EU gave up their national currency and ascribed to the euro. The bills and coins are the same in the whole of Europe, but one face of the coins bears national symbols. Nonetheless, any euro coin or bill can be used in the eurozone. Only a year after the introduction of the euro, Risse (2003) presents research from Eurobarometers suggesting that the common European currency influences the identification of the Europeans with the European Union. Risse (2003) argues that "money has always been a symbolic marker in nation-building efforts" (p. 487) and even only a year after the creation of the Eurozone, the surveys showed that the euro was as important as the freedom of movement and travel, both endorsed by about 50% of the people surveyed. The decline in endorsement of the euro from 2002 to 2011 can be explained by the fact that in 2002 there were only fifteen EU member states, while by 2011 twelve more countries from Central and Eastern Europe had joined the EU, and not all of them have joined the Eurozone. Another explanation could be the economic crisis that has been affecting Europe for a few years, which might have weakened the Europeans' trust in the common currency.

The Special Eurobarometer discussed here (no. 346, 2011) also describes the elements that Europeans consider important for building strong socio-cultural connections to other countries. The factors presented in the survey were subscribed to by the participants as follows: more than a third indicated that the food, news, sport and cultural events, and knowledge of foreign languages played an important role in developing stronger ties to a country, while 20% declared that they feel a connection to a country in which they regularly travel on the weekend or for holiday. Thus, becoming better acquainted with a country leads to feelings of connectedness to it and an important element is knowledge of

foreign languages, presumably the language/s of that particular country. In this regard, the authors of the report conclude that “having foreign language skills may be the cause or the result of feeling connected to another country” (Special Eurobarometer 346, 2011, p. 46).

The initiative to monitor the perceptions of European and national identity is commendable, and over time it will bring about a large body of data which will be available to researchers. These Eurobarometers were discussed here in order to provide a background against which the present study was conducted. It seems that overall the national identity is strongly endorsed in most European countries, although in some cases it appears to be diminishing in strength. The feelings of European identity, although significantly lower than national identity, have been increasing steadily over time. The public opinion surveys suggest that people associate not only the economic aspect of the EU with feelings of European identity (i.e., the common currency plays an important part in the feelings of identification to Europe), but also the democratic values and human rights advocacy. Thus, it seems that the EU has shifted its representation in people’s minds from an economic community to a community connected through social and cultural ties. The next section will discuss these changes in light of the expansion of the EU.

1.4.3.3. Europe and the European Union

In 1957, which is considered the birth year of the European Union (called until the Maastricht Treaty, the European Commission), there were six member states. This number has increased gradually over the years to reach 28 countries in 2013. Thus, the meaning of the term European has shifted in the past six decades, from a more geographical concept to one which today includes features connected to the European Union. The geographical borders of Europe are considered somewhat arbitrary, since there are European countries outside of these borders, such as Cyprus, while others span between two continents, such as Russia. Today, more than half of the countries belonging to the continent of Europe are also part of the European Union. Guibernau (2011) describes the boundaries of Europe as follows:

Europe is generally understood to include the western portion of the Eurasian landmass, together with a number of islands not far from the mainland (Iceland, Corsica, Malta, Sardinia, Sicily, Crete, and Ireland, as well as Great Britain), however this does not provide a clear-cut idea of where Asia stops and Europe begins. (Guibernau, 2011, p. 32)

Guibernau (2011) goes on to argue that the reason why it is so hard to define Europe geographically is the fact its borders have been shifting since the ancient times, with dramatic changes in the past century. Not only have the countries of Europe changed their own borders due to various historical events, but these events have translated to a somewhat ambiguous understanding of the boundaries of Europe in general. To give just an example, the dissolution of the Soviet Union meant that countries such as Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia are now “in an uncertain relation with regard to Europe” (Guibernau, 2011, p. 32). Another country that seems to be outside of the geographical borders of Europe, but which has historically been closely associated with Europe and which is now in negotiations with the European Union for a potential adhesion to the EU is Turkey (much attention has been given in recent years to the feelings of European identity in Turkey, but it is not the scope of this project to describe this research in detail).

Guibernau (2011) argues that apart from the unreliability of geographical boundaries in the construction of a sense of European identity, the argument which states that the feelings of European identity can be rooted in the common European history should also be disregarded. She argues that the historical events in Europe have mostly lead to conflicts and wars, and thus history cannot be a catalyst for European identity. Elaborating on Guibernau’s argument, it is specifically this history of conflict and wars which has determined the forward-thinkers after the WWII to establish an entity at a transnational level which would ensure that the European countries cannot develop weaponry in secret, and thus prevent further armed conflicts. In actuality, the European Union was initially created in an attempt to draw to a close long years of war between the European countries. Therefore, it may be that European identity is tied to the history of the continent through a mediating event, which is the creation of the European Union.

Culturally, the concept of Europe is also debated. Risse (2010) makes a case for two understandings of Europe: a modern, secular, cosmopolitan Europe and a white, Christian Europe (Kumar, 2003). Guibernau (2011) also argues against building the foundations of European identity in Christendom, maintaining that there have always been religious minorities (such as Muslims, Jews or pagans) in Europe. She also points out that the secular understanding of Europe was born “in opposition, debate, confrontation, and/or dialogue with prevailing religions in different European countries” (Guibernau, 2011, p.34) and only came about during the Enlightenment and Industrial Revolution periods. And again,

because of the discrepancies in the development that took place during these times in various countries in Europe, the understandings of Europe in the Europeans' minds evolved differently. A similar point is also supported by Patel (2013) who suggests that the division 'us' and 'them' has historically reflected the religious divide in Europe, rather than the racial categories.

Europe then seems to be quite difficult to define accurately from a geographical, historical or cultural point of view. However, the European Union today is a much clearer notion, pointing to the economical, social and political relations between the various member states. In order to be able to understand the meanings attached to European identity, it is of utmost importance to understand that Europe is an "evasive, pluralistic and vague" (Patel, 2013, p.23) notion, as well as a "large, diverse and complex place" (Caporaso & Kim, 2009). The emergence of a European identity coincided with the beginnings of the European Union. Kohli (2000) states that European identity should not be seen as a prerequisite for the development of a European society, but rather as a consequence of the European institutional development. That is not to say that people understand European identity as solely related to the EU and its institutions, but rather that the concept of an identity characteristic to all Europeans is more likely to have arisen once the political and economic institutions aimed at connecting them were in place. It has been proposed that the emergent European identity as related to the EU might lead to a self-fulfilling prophecy of equating Europe with the European Union, and European-ness with European identity (Patel, 2013). Although this discussion should have informed on the differences between Europe and the EU, it may be possible that Europeans, under the right circumstances, will develop stronger feelings of European identity. The following section will delve more into the various meanings attached to European identity.

1.4.3.4. Definitions of European identity

In previous sections I have attempted to explain the terms "European" and "identity" as individual concepts. To summarise briefly, I have described the relevance of concepts such as social and multiple identity, collective and individual identity, as well as how national identity is constructed and negotiated, and the role played by language in a discussion about identity. Therefore, I understand identity to reflect a dual relationship between the individual and the social group, both borrowing and lending traits to each other, in a reflective interaction. This negotiation is most often articulated through language, which

represents the vessel for the negotiation and a marker for the relation between the individual and the group. The term European will be used openly, to allow participants to assign the characteristics they consider appropriate to it. This section will give a few examples of how European identity and its components has been understood and described in previous research, and has no claims to be an exhaustive list of definitions. The terms European identity, feelings of belonging to Europe and European-ness are thus considered interchangeable and will be used as such, since the present study understands identity to be developed and negotiated in a social context, and thus a social construct.

Other researchers (Duchesne, 2008) suggest that a more appropriate term would be *European identification*. She regards this concept as a process and not an a priori notion, thus the preference for the term identification rather than identity. She argues that using the concept of European identity implies that the researcher has started off believing that there is such an identity, and thus would be prone to the researcher's bias. Duchesne (2008) also suggests that since Europe is a political unit, one's identification would need be fall along the lines of citizenship, and she argues these are currently reserved for national citizenship. Nonetheless, the European identity can and most probably does include an element of political identity at least for some people, especially since the establishment of European citizenship. Although until now the EU has not yet formed cohesive foreign policies, the passport of a citizen of a country which is part of the EU does guarantee its holder some rights at least within the EU. Checkel and Katzenstein (2009) argue as a conclusion to their edited volume on European identity that:

These identities can be conceived both as social process and political project. Understood as process, identities flow through multiple networks and create new patterns of identification. Viewed as project, the construction of identities is a task of elites and entrepreneurs, operations in Brussels or various national settings. (p. 213)

This conclusion brings together the discussion of whether European identity should be regarded as a process, and as such, a work in progress, evolving as a bottom-up identity, or a project developed and enforced as a top-down operation from the European elites onto the masses. This study is concerned with the European identity as a process and how it is understood by people who are not necessarily related in a direct way to the European Union institutions.

I would also argue that using the term European identity instead of identification is in fact correct and appropriate for this study, given the definition provided by Turner (2010): “[t]he sum total of social identifications used by a person to define him- or herself will be described as his or her *social identity*” (Turner, 2010, p. 18, emphasis in the original). This definition can be transposed to cover the concepts of European identification and identity. European identity does actually encompass quite a wide variety of social identifications, as will be described below. For example, some argue that the European identity concept is formed by three dimensions - a civic, a cultural and a general one (see Bruter 2005, Burgess 2002, see § 1.4.3.6). These dimensions can be viewed as the identifications Turner was referring to in his definition; the various degrees of these dimensions combined form the European identity of an individual. These dimensions of European identity are rooted in the national identity concepts discussed earlier and their evolution will be discussed here.

More than two decades ago, Smith (1992) drew parallels between his work on national identity and the European identity. He argues that the cultural aspect of European identity might not have developed yet a political counterpart, since each European member state places its political interests above the European ones. He goes on to list a number of characteristics that he attributes to the European cultural identity. The first one would be linguistic, as he suggests that most languages in Europe (although not all) are of Indo-European origins, and that provides ties that are both modern and prehistoric. Another characteristic is “cultural geography and territorial symbolism” (Smith, 1992, p. 68) by which the author suggests that there are very few geographical obstacles (such as high mountains or big rivers); a religious divide, suggesting that Christianity seems to be the European religion, although historically some countries have embraced Judaism and Islam (for example, Spain); the last characteristic Smith (1992) mentions is a rudimentary sense of the other, which he argues could be brought about by immigrants and guest-workers. Díez-Medrano (2010) develops this position by arguing that for some Europeans, the EU has not yet achieved a political reality, and thus they might identify more with the cultural, rather than the political or civic aspect of European identity. Nonetheless, there is evidence in the Eurobarometers and other research in the realm of European identity that for some the political reality of the EU has had a significant influence on their European identity.

Smith (1992) identifies the issues that each one of these characteristics might bring to the development of a European identity at a mass level. Although the elites in urban cosmopolitan areas might be better suited to overcome these problems, the working class

could become disengaged with the project of building Europe. Education and mass-media are means through which the European message can reach the masses, but evidently, they are controlled by national interests (Inglehart, 1970; Smith, 1992). Even from a time when the European Commission was comprised of just the original six members, research conducted through public opinion surveys suggests that these two factors, education and mass media, have a strong influence in shaping the Europeans' attitudes to integration. An analysis coordinated by Inglehart in 1970 was among the first studies to spell out the theory that through cognitive mobilisation and internalisation of values, the European educated group will form an opinion regarding European integration and that opinion will most likely be a positive one, because of the positive messages received through the mass-media. "Cognitive mobilisation" (p. 47), Inglehart argues, is the process through which "one must become aware of it [the European community] before one can develop a sense of commitment" (p. 47) and this awareness is much more readily available to the educated group.

Since the days of the study conducted by Inglehart (1970), there have been many efforts to establish European institutions and agencies, and although it is a slow process, they do seem to aid the development of a European identity (Bruter, 2005). The European Union attempts to make information regarding its organisation and functioning available on its portal, information available in all official languages of the EU. The technological developments make the information and news much more readily available to everybody, regardless of whether they are highly educated Europeans or not. Similarly, the positive news regarding Europe seems to foster a development of European identity (Bruter, 2005), but the channels through which the news is transmitted have widely expanded.

More recently, Risse (2010) proposed two ways of understanding European identity, which have been briefly mentioned above. He maintains that when Europeans describe themselves as such, they could mean one of two things. One way of understanding this identity incorporates ideas of cosmopolitanism (Schlenker, 2013) and universalism, and it "embodies the values of enlightenment, such as human rights, democracy and the market economy" (Risse, 2010, p. 245) and Risse names it the modern, liberal European identity; this type of European identity is the governing principle of the European project for the last five decades.

The second type is the nationalist European identity, and the people who ascribe to this type of identification with Europe believe in an essentialist white Christian Europe to

which they oppose the newer waves of immigration from Asia, Africa and the Middle East, or adhesion of countries that are not traditionally Christian, such as Turkey, Albania or Bosnia. In this latter case, 'us' incorporates the white Christian Europeans whose ancestors inhabited this space, while 'they' are the newer European immigrants with non-Christian and/or non-white European background. Depending on the political situation, 'they' can also mean other members of the European Union, such as citizens from the Eastern European countries, which joined the Union in recent years. Schlenker (2013) looked at Eurobarometer data and found that when it comes to accepting immigrants, the EU immigrants from the Eastern European countries are slightly more easily accepted than immigrants from outside of the EU. She also concludes that there are great differences between various EU countries and it is thus very difficult to draw conclusions that apply to all of them. Rather, she suggests an approach of looking at national particularities.

The extremes of the notion of 'us' versus 'them' in the case of nationalist Europeans are clearly exemplified by the massacre carried out by Anders Behring Breivik in Oslo and Utøya against those he believed were the supporters of a multicultural Europe. In July 2011, he carried out a bomb and gun attack on government buildings in Oslo and on a youth camp of the Norwegian Labour Party in the island of Utøya. Breivik justified his actions in a manifesto released before he carried out the attacks, by saying that European values and lifestyle were threatened by the non-White non-Christian immigrants and by the acceptance of multiculturalism in the European space. Clearly, this is an extreme view of national European-ness, but ideas present in his discourse can also be found in the platforms of various extreme right-wing nationalistic parties within European countries. As Guibernau (2011) warns, the rise of the right-wing discourse within European politics is one of the challenges to European identity. Even the moderate advocates of this view, which incorporates the belief that the European space should continue to be inhabited only by white, Christian, usually Western Europeans, contribute to the opposition 'us' and 'them', which can easily lead to ethnic conflicts and social unrest.

Following the discussion about the insufficiency of grounding European identity in history, geography or cultural traditions, Guibernau (2011) suggests that unlike national identity which is a deeply emotional type of identity, European identity is and should be considered a non-emotional identity. Smith (1992) goes even further to say that European identity does not have a past which can provide the emotional dimension to the concept, and thus also lacks "historical depth" (p.62). Nonetheless, Guibernau (2011) argues that European identity

is an emergent type of identity, formed around a novel political structure, the European Union, and around economic interests that connect the member states of this union, something that Duchesne (2008) calls “a work in progress” (p. 402). Thus, Guibernau (2011) suggests, European identity is not expected to “arouse feelings comparable to those inspired by national identity” (p.41), primarily because the author cannot imagine a cause that would unite the Europeans with such an intensity. She argues that the European identity can emerge as a rational (that is, non-emotional) identity, based on common political, social and economic interests, and that the driving force for the creation of this identity would be the economic prosperity brought about by the membership in the European Union to each one of the member states.

Certainly, such a young identity, built on economic interests and without an emotional past or history will take some time to become internalised, and thus threats to the economic wellbeing of the individual and the group will bring challenges to the newly developed identity. Guibernau (2011) presents data from Eurobarometers which seem to indicate that the economic crisis that has engulfed Europe in recent years has affected the levels of European identity and the connectedness people feel with Europe (more research related to the effects of the economic crisis on Europe and European identity will be discussed in § 1.4.3.7). Other challenges to European identity mentioned are the vast discrepancy between the views on European identity between the elites and the masses, the weak political determination to work towards the development of the European Union rather than the nation, and the rise in recent years of right-wing nationalism (Guibernau, 2011). Nonetheless, the European identity as a concept and a feeling is taking shape and becoming an integral part of at least some Europeans’ lives.

A strong sense of ethnic-based national identity translates at a European level into an adversity towards non-white, non-Christian and non-European migrants (Fligstein et al., 2012). Similarly, the civic national identity is related to the cosmopolitan European identity. This understanding of national identity will most likely be congruent with aspects of European identity. National identities in the European countries have been encouraged and nurtured by politicians in these countries for centuries now. It is thus not surprising that Europeans feel a strong sense of belongingness towards their nation; but it is important to stress that the Eurobarometer reports of the past two decades have shown a somewhat stable picture. Except for a few years towards the end of the 1990’s, feelings of identification with the nation and Europe have always been higher than just national

identification (for a detailed description, see Caporaso & Kim, 2009). If the sum of respondents who said they felt both national and European, European and national, and only European is considered, the total is always higher than the respondents who feel that they are only national. In conclusion, at least to some level more than half of the respondents feel that they have a sense of European identity. Fligstein and his colleagues (2012) call them “situational Europeans” - people who feel at least in some situations that they are European.

Fligstein and his colleagues (2012) make the argument that if the respondents who declare that they do not feel European at all and identify only with their nation are eliminated, the other respondents will probably have a sense of cosmopolitan, liberal European identity. This can mean that only under circumstances in which the nationalistic Europeans feel that they have to identify as Europeans (for example, as opposed to being from another continent), would they declare themselves as such. In the Eurobarometers, where they have the options: only national, national and European, European and national or only European, they would most probably opt for the first category. Schlenker's (2013) research argues that “a majority of Europeans are cosmopolitans, and at first sight no partisans of fortress Europe” (p.48), however she calls for more in-depth research to be done in order to investigate the identities of Europeans beyond the borders of their nations. That is not to say that the nationalistic European-ness is not a category that needs to be addressed, but it does not necessarily represent the archetypical European identity.

The two different types of European identity might have emerged from the two types of national identity. Smith (1991) argues that the civic national identity might be more in line with Western Europe, and ethnic national identity with Eastern Europe. Similarly, cosmopolitan European identity seems to be closer to the Western world, while ethnic European identity can be more typical of the Eastern side of Europe. Can we assume then that Western Europe is more European than Eastern Europe? Pichler (2008) investigated various sociological variables and their relation to European identity by looking at Eurobarometer data. He found that there was no difference between Eastern and Western European identity. Nonetheless, there is no evidence based on Eurobarometers that the respondents from Eastern and Western Europe have a similar understanding of European identity, since no questions regarding the civic and /or cultural European identity were included.

Many researchers have been concerned with the discrepancies between the feelings of European identity at an elite level and the masses. Some have noticed that there is a correlation between educational level, social class, age, gender and area of residence, and degree of European identity (Inglehart, 1970; Fligstein, 2008; Fligstein et al., 2012; Pichler, 2008; Díez-Medrano, 2010; Duchesne et al., 2010; Favell, 2009 and others). The study conducted by Inglehart (1970) suggests that educational level and access to mass media are two of the most important factors in the creation of pro-European attitudes. The same study also indicates that income is only related to positive attitudes towards Europeanisation if education is a mediator, and that media has a stronger effect among the less educated, in which case it could function as an alternative for cognitive mobilisation through education. Inglehart (1970) also found a gender difference with regards to pro-European attitudes, but he attributes it to a potential lack of awareness rather than a real aversion towards European integration.

Other indicators for a stronger support for Europe are age (younger respondents endorsed it more than the older ones) and foreign travel (Inglehart, 1970). Pichler (2008) also found that the demographic characteristics of people who have a stronger European identity are: “men, people under the age of 60, the better educated, people living in urban areas and members of the higher social class” (p. 392). He also draws attention to the fact that more research is needed and that it is possible to encounter differences across European nations.

The European nations are quite distinct when it comes to feelings of European-ness and these differences are in part given by the various understandings of the nation-state in Europe. This is one of the conclusions of the study conducted by Duchesne and her colleagues (2010). It was based on focus groups in France, Belgium and the United Kingdom and their report of the results indicates that there is a widespread lack of interest among the people interviewed with regards to Europe and European identity. They argue that there are differences at the national level, as well as the social class level with regards to attitudes towards European integration. Their focus groups were aimed at four different social groups: workers and unemployed, employees, managers and party activists. The results of the focus groups suggest that the managers and party activists were at both poles of the spectrum of attitudes towards European integration, while the other groups, the workers and the employees, lacked any interest in the European project. Duchesne and her colleagues (2010) maintain that these people should not be considered Euro-sceptics, but rather Euro-indifferents. The British sample seems to represent an exception, the

respondents being dominated by misconceptions about the European Union, which the authors attribute to “an absence of interest” (p. 101), while in the case of the two other countries the indifference towards the European Union appears to stem from “an absence of salience” (p. 101) and the belief that their opinion cannot influence European politics in the slightest.

Fligstein (2008) coined the term “Euroclash” (p.217) to mark the potential conflict that can arise between two groups, which he suggests are delineated by class membership. Based on analysis of Eurobarometer data, Fligstein argues that people who are young, educated, with higher incomes, “owners, managers, professionals, and other white-collar workers” (p.145), men, and with a left-wing political inclination are more likely to have some European identity, to consider that the European Union is good for their country and to say that the EU has a positive image. These are also the people who have the opportunities and the interest to travel, learn and speak a second language for leisure or work, that is, to interact with people from other European countries. Fligstein (2008) contrasts this group of people with the blue-collar workers, less educated, older Europeans, with a lower income, who are not very likely to travel or speak another language. These are the people who most strongly identify with their national identity. The clash between these groups might arise because the first group has taken advantage of the opportunities that arise from their country’s membership in the EU and they will continue to do so, thus continuing to gain economic advantages and reinforcing their sense of belongingness to Europe. The latter group on the other hand has not benefited economically from the union, but has continued to live very locally. The economic disparity between the two groups, warns Fligstein, can easily lead to a clash between them, which can be translated at an ideological level into a clash between the European and the national identity.

The positive aspect of Fligstein’s conclusions is that with the passing of time, the shift in Europe will be towards feeling more European. As the younger generations today grow up, they will continue to seek opportunities to interact with other Europeans, they will also be able to communicate with them due to their higher proficiency in foreign languages and they will be more eager to benefit from the economic opportunities that the European Union can provide. Although currently, the gap between the individuals who identify with Europe and those who identify with the nation more can be considered a class difference, Fligstein (2008) argues optimistically that in time this gap will diminish.

Education appears to be a significant predictor of identifying with Europe, being proficient in an L2 and willing to use it in order to communicate with people from other cultures. Rather than considering this a hindrance for the development of a wider European identity, Fligstein (2008) argues that “the educated elites are at the forefront of European society-building, because in many ways the European identity project is theirs” (p. 166), and consequently they can take a leading role in forming new Europeans. Through educational and vocational programmes the European Union is striving to provide people with the opportunity to work or study in another European country, thus encouraging personal and professional interactions between people from various European backgrounds. This interaction can only take place when there is a common language which can be used for communicative purposes between Europeans from different backgrounds. Therefore, the language policies suggested by the EU which encourage each person to learn two European languages apart from their mother tongue are aimed not only at supporting the linguistic diversity of Europe, but also at providing people with the necessary tools for engaging in interactions at the European level. The European identity project as Fligstein (2008) calls it can therefore benefit both from the top-down initiatives rooted in the European Union institutions and policies and from the bottom-up ambitions of the young, educated Europeans who identify with and benefit from the European project.

Favell (2009, 2010) researched the group which seems to benefit from the rules and regulations of the European Union. He calls them the Eurostars and identifies their main characteristic as being free movers in a unique “politically constructed post-national space” (Favell, 2009, p. 177), they move abroad to work or study and could potentially lead to the creation of a dramatically different European space. They are the educated, skilled and professional segment of the European society, which can circulate their skills within Europe and potentially help the development of European identity in the process. Both Fligstein (2008) and Favell (2009) agree that this group of highly skilled, highly mobile people tend to identify less and less with their nation of origin and more with Europe. The irony pointed out by Favell (2009) is that although most European citizens are free to move to a different country to work or study, the number of people who actually do so is rather small. Although the mechanisms for the emergence of a larger segment of the European population who could be described as Eurostars is in place, it is not being utilised extensively.

Following extensive research in various urban environments, Favell (2009) suggests that one reason would be that Europeans are deeply rooted in their own culture and language, and therefore could potentially find it difficult to accommodate to a new culture and language on a permanent basis. Another reason can be the fact that although the European regulations regarding the free movement are in place in all the European member states, the Eurostars would most probably prefer to move to Eurocities, the urban cosmopolitan areas, which are surprisingly similar from a life-style point of view all over Europe. Often the Eurocities possess “semi-detached identities from the national societies in which they are situated” (Favell, 2009, p. 178) and the examples provided are London and Amsterdam. These urban cosmopolitan areas tend to be consistently more similar with each other than even with other towns in the same country. Nonetheless, the host culture is not necessarily eager to receive new Europeans, not even the Eurostars. Maintaining complicated and convoluted bureaucratic systems which require for example almost native fluency in the language of the host culture is just one way of ensuring the migration to a particular city is directed mostly to the highly skilled Europeans who have the resources and abilities to navigate these complicated networks, making it thus “exclusive for the elites” (Favell, 2009, p. 181). Thus, as Cerutti (2008) suggests, European identity should be studied by looking at “the elites, opinion leaders and bureaucracies as well as at common citizens” (p. 9) in order to get a full picture of the views and understandings of European identity. The elites or the Eurostars feel a closer connection to the European Union, its institutions, or its ideals, and they can be agents in shaping the identity of others who might be apathetic or even opposed to the European project.

It appears that in Europe there are three types of people when it comes to European identity: those who declare themselves as only European (which is a very small group, consisting most probably of the Eurostars - educated, young, mobile, professional individuals, knowing and using foreign languages to communicate with other Europeans, and taking full advantage of the provisions put in place by the European Union and the opportunities that might arise from them); those who declare themselves as only nationals (which is a considerably large group of people who might be older, less educated, not interested in travelling abroad for holidays or work, most probably on the right-wing of the political spectrum); and those who feel that they are both nationals of their country and Europeans (which is also quite a large group, sometimes called the situational Europeans, since their identity might change depending on the context; they are also the potential hyphenated Europeans, whose identities might be a melange of national or cultural

characteristics with European ideals). The three groups are likely to cover very different demographic strata of the society, which can eventually lead to a clash between them. Based on the research covered above, there are arguments for an optimistic view of the present and future situation. The two groups who identify at least occasionally with Europe are younger, thus in time they might become the majority. Although some might believe that it is not politically correct to argue this, the European and national politics often happen at the elite political level. Apart from being in favour or against the EU, or feeling European or national, Europeans can also be indifferent, which allows the elite politicians to model the European project as they see fit. This apathy can be combated through education and with the help of the mass-media, which have been shown to influence the levels of European identity. Some efforts have been made at the European level to introduce notions of European-ness in the school curricula, to promote multilingualism and to encourage exchanges with other educational institutions in Europe. It has also been shown that positive media coverage of the European matters is related to stronger support for the European project, while the reverse is also true (Bruter, 2005).

European identity at a group level can be regarded as a changing identity, influenced by various societal factors, including the incorporation of new member states into the European Union, thus redefining the concept constantly, but also evolving in time, as the young Europeans grow older and engage and benefit progressively more from the European institutional framework. At an individual level, as a person becomes more educated, skilled, travelled, or as they move across the class divisions, they might regard the European Union provisions for free movement as useful and beneficial for their personal development. The studies presented here reviewed the characteristics of a prototypical European and the circumstances which can promote a sense of European identity. All these features provide the structure for a better understanding of European identity.

It is unexpectedly difficult to find exact definitions of European identity in the literature. Most research reviewed here presents characteristics of it, elements that it consists of, its variability among various population groups, its relation to national identity, but very few researchers present an exact definition of it. This is not only because it is such a complex term, but also because it brings together two other intricate concepts: identity and European. Since the expansion of the EU and its proposed strategy for further enlargement, at least from a geographical point of view the term European will soon come to bridge Europe and European Union. On all other levels, that is, social, political,

economic, cultural and so on, it will probably be a while until the term European will be an encompassing term for all-things European. But as some have noted (Patel, 2013; Schlenker, 2013) it is possible that in time, the difference between the two will diminish and will lead to a self-fulfilling prophecy, making thus the term Europeans incorporate all these meanings. The view adopted in this study is that European identity is part of the multiple social identities that an individual and/or a group have, it is a collective identity, but it can have different meanings for different groups of people, mainly differentiated by their national identity perception. Unlike others who see it as devoid of meaning or empty (Breakwell, 2004; Duchesne et al., 2010), European identity seems to be a complex idea, with a myriad of elements connected in intricate ways. It has nonetheless been suggested also that, at least at an individual level, it is an unexamined concept (Grundy & Jamieson, 2007).

Other researchers have argued against the concept of European identity. Breakwell (2004) considers that since the European Union is in constant change and “new member states have been allowed to join” (p. 34), which brought along with them their cultural heritage, it is impossible to obtain a representation of the EU identity that is not “something bland or even vacuous” (p. 35). She also criticises the EU for not attempting to build such an identity in a consistent manner by providing the public with the necessary elements for the development of an EU identity. These critiques seem to be unfounded since, as will be discussed later, the EU has generated a constant stream of elements around which the European identity can form, such as the flag, the European day, the European anthem, as well as the common currency. As indicated in the public opinion surveys, the emergence of these symbols has coincided with increases in the feelings of European identity (see Caporaso & Kim, 2009; Fligstein et al., 2012 for data on Eurobarometers). The European Union purposely does not attempt to replace the national identity or impose a European identity, but rather to allow it to develop side by side, or as another layer if identities are to be understood as nested (Risse, 2010). Given the high levels of identification with the nation at a European level, such attempts would most certainly be received as an imposition and rejected quite vehemently.

Another critique of the European identity comes from Duchesne and her colleagues (2010), who proclaim it to be a “pseudo-concept” (p. 101), suggesting that it “limits our apprehension of what the phenomena in play must be, notably by lumping them together without differentiating between categories of citizens according to the diverse ways they

experience and apprehend the processes under way” (p. 101). This argument, apart from being circular, presents the research conducted to date in an unfavourable light. As discussed above, and I hope I will contribute to this discussion with the present study, researchers have looked at European identity from many angles, trying to related their findings to demographic information obtained from their respondents, such as profession, age, gender, nationality and so on. Some studies have looked at individual nations and compared their findings from different contexts. Some other studies have used data from the Eurobarometers, other have collected their own interviews, and to a lesser extent, questionnaires, while others have investigated the concept of European identity from a more theoretical point of view. Taking into consideration all the research conducted to date, it would be oxymoronic to proclaim that European identity is a pseudo-concept and it would be somewhat offensive towards the many academics and respondents who endeavoured to study and provide insight into what can now be called the concept of European identity. Admittedly, the term European identity has been used to reflect many different theories and ideas, but this is a common occurrence in the case of widely pursued topics.

I will thus use the term European identity to refer to the sum total of identifications that reflect the individuals’ adherence to a specific constellation of characteristics and associations with Europe and the European Union. Checkel and Katzenstein (2009) conclude their volume by saying that the European identities as they exist right now should not be constrained by fixed definitions, as they “remain plastic and open to multiple interpretations” (p.226). This study will attempt to allow participants to provide their understanding of European identity and draw together the common themes that arise from this pursuit.

1.4.3.5. The relation between national and European identity

European identity is a much more evasive concept than national identity. When it comes to national identity, every individual can describe what it is, what it means to them personally, and what it represents at a group level. The significances attached to national identity by various individuals or groups may vary, but as discussed earlier, relativism should be avoided, and the focus should rather be on the commonalities between these different significances. Although from a political and sociological point of view, the concept of national identity is complex and dynamic, from a non-expert perspective it is an idea that

can be easily grasped. Nonetheless, European identity is a more difficult concept. Non-experts may have an understanding of it at an individual level, but it designates a concept still in the process of formation at a group level. One can argue that national identity has been around at least since the emergence of nations, although elements of national identity have been present long before. Similarly, the emergence of European identity as it is understood and promoted today might have its roots many centuries ago, but it has become part of the everyday life and discourse of the Europeans only in the past few decades. It is a controversial notion, some even suggesting it does not exist yet. This section will attempt to explain whether the European identity is a type of identity forming on the same patterns as the national identity, or whether it is an entirely different concept from a structural point of view and should be studied as such. I will also discuss whether the two are hierarchical nested identities, meaning that the European identity encompasses the national identity as well as other elements, or their relation is better exemplified by the marble cake (Risse, 2010), intertwining elements from one identity into another.

From a geographical point of view, the national identity of any European country will always be circumscribed to the European identity, since any member state is geographically located in Europe. It is thus easy to fall into the fallacy of considering the European Union as providing an overarching identity, somewhat similar to the relation between national and local or regional identities. Of course, geographically, a city or village is located in a region, which is located in a country, which is part of Europe. Thus taking these identities at face value, a person who identifies with that particular city will also possess the other identities to some degree. But this view ignores the emotional connection that people attach to each of these identities. Studies show that people living in cosmopolitan urban areas might have more in common with others living in the same type of cities in other countries than with people from the rural area a few kilometres away (Favell, 2009).

Considering the relation between European and national identity as nested identities, Díez-Medrano (2010) illustrates it by looking at Spain and Great Britain in relation to Europe. He argues that in countries like Spain, these identities are nested and are perceived as being compatible and they even correlate positively. Conversely, the British consider the two identities to be incompatible: if one identifies as European within the British context, that person is implying that they do not possess a strong national identity (Díez-Medrano, 2010). In this case, Europe and the European Union is perceived as threatening to the national identity and potentially trying to impose itself over the national sovereignty.

Guibernau (2011) suggests that although the European Union is formed by the various nation-states members, it is not in the interest of the respective countries to promote the EU and foster a sense of European identity, as the EU is quite often used in national politics as a political scapegoat or “an excuse of action or inaction within the domestic arena” (p. 36). This in turn leads to stronger feelings of nationalism and a distancing from the European project. Thus from her perspective it is wrong to suggest that European identity is formed on the same patterns as national identity because Europe has a completely different character from the nation-state, and the European Union has a different agenda in promoting feelings of European identity than the member states have to promote national identity.

National identity is also a territorial identity and some see it is an essentialist concept (Kohli, 2000), while the EU with its changing borders is constantly reshaping its map, making it difficult for one to identify with it territorially, as discussed earlier. This is also the reason Kohli (2000) argues that Europe is held together by a “symbolic temporal boundary”, rather than a territorial one, pointing to the positive outcomes it may bring to its members, and distancing itself from a conflictual past. He suggests that in the construction of European identity, one need not look for ‘the other’ in the construction of an identity outside of Europe, but rather the war-ridden past can be the antithetical point against which European identity should be built. The European identity in this case can consist of elements of national identity or any other territorial identities (regional, local - as argued by Díez-Medrano, 2010, or universalist and cosmopolitan, as suggested by Schlenker, 2013) and can thus be considered a hybrid identity. As a hybrid identity, it can draw elements from other identities which can potentially be conflictual identities. The argument presented by Kohli (2000) suggests that the European identity cannot be modelled after the national identity primarily because European identity is a much more hybrid type of identity, gathering elements from various other sources, and bringing them together into a new identity, while national identity is bound to territoriality and language. For Kohli (2000), the people that are most likely to develop a sense of European identity are the ones “with conflicting and fuzzy territorial attachments” (p. 131) due to living in different countries, or at the intersection between two countries (and thus two national identities), having multiple citizenships, or living in mixed marriages. Although this group of people might have increased in recent years, they are a particular group of Europeans, which can only grow at a very limited speed. It would be worrying if these were the only people who felt they had a European identity.

National identity usually forms around a territory and a language, guided by a top-down approach, and leading the members of that group (i.e., nation) to identify with it to such a degree that they would be willing even to give their lives to defend it from external threats. Citrin and Sides (2004) discuss how even if a nation is multicultural or multiethnic, it still has a culture that is dominant (sometimes representing the dominant group, other times being a combination of elements from various groups within its territory). Similarly, language, ethnicity or religion can aid the construction of a national identity. In the case of European identity, all these elements are so diverse that they could not possibly be used as the basis for the formation of a common identity (Citrin & Sides, 2004). It follows then that the European identity should aim to be built around civic rather than ethnic elements at a group level (p. 183), and promote democratic and human rights values at an individual level. They also agree that the meaning and construction of European identity will vary depending on the recent history and cultural make-up of the European nation, citing studies that suggest that the German European identity marks a distancing from their historical past, while the French European identity is closely related to the political institutions of Europe.

In a paper which critiques the concept of European identity, Duchesne (2008) suggests that much of the literature in this field has been concerned with the relationship between national and European identity. She chooses three visions of this relationship, based on Anderson's imagined community, Inglehart's cognitive mobilisation and Elias' survival units. She argues that if European identity is understood as an "imagined Europe" (p. 405), there would be a competition for people's loyalties between national and European identity and thus they will be negatively correlated. On the other hand, if Inglehart was right in suggesting that the cognitive mobilisation will give rise to a more educated population in Europe, that in turn will lead to stronger feelings of identification with Europe, which will be congruent and compatible with national identity. And lastly, Duchesne (2008) describes how the survival units postulated by Elias have the potential to evolve from local to national and further on to the European level, thus leading to an increased sense of cohesion for the Europeans and stronger feelings of European identity, which can co-exist alongside national identity. This review of literature presented by Duchesne (2008) points to the fact the national and European identity can be compatible, sometimes even form a hybrid identity. Although she argues that in the case of "imagined Europe" the European identity will correlate negatively with national identity, the argument still holds that the two identities can exist simultaneously. Risse (2004, 2010) argues that the relation between

the two identities can be represented not only by the nested identities metaphor (or the Russian dolls), but also by the marble cake.

The marble cake disposition of the national and European identity would translate into a potential hybrid identity bringing together features of both. This blend can result in a third identity altogether, or in a hybrid which maintains elements from both in a more or less intact state. Risse (2010) argues that the intertwining of elements from both types of identities can make it harder to determine which feature comes from what identity. However, there are cases in which it would be an achievable task, such as for example, if one would identify as Romanian, eating Romanian food on a regular basis, having contact with other Romanians, but also believing in the human rights and European principles of law and environmental standards put forth by the European Union. Each of these elements can be traced back to its original identity, but the person might perceive them as intertwined within his/her self.

Another idea presented by Risse (2010) is that the development of European identity does not necessarily need to be come as a new emergent identity above and beyond national identities, but from the Europeanisation of the national identities. The national identities characteristic of the Western nations have already come to incorporate many elements of European-ness, such as the belief in human rights, equality, the benefits of education, the need for active environmental efforts and so on. The unification of Europe brought about many benefits for the citizens of Europe, and profiting from these benefits can also be an element that links national and European identities. When a European citizen decides to go abroad to work, study or just for leisure, that person is exercising their rights as citizens of their nation, as well as of the European Union. Even though a sense of European identity might not be at the forefront of their consciousness when they pursue these rights, the ease of the action is actually ensured by his/her nation's membership in the EU.

The European Union does not try to impose a European identity, but it went to great lengths to provide elements that would aid its creation and/or development. The EU has a flag, an anthem, a day, a motto, a constitution, the euro, a common passport, as well as institutions that parallel the national ones. All the symbols that represent the EU have been shown to have an impact on feelings of identification with Europe (see Bruter, 2005; Risse, 2003) and they are all mimicked after symbols that helped in the creation of national identities. The EU prefers not to impose by force any of these elements. The motto of the EU, *United in diversity*, aims to express the EU's view of the relation it should have with the

member states. Quite often, EU officials emphasise the need to support this diversity, be it cultural, linguistic, ethnic, religious and so on. It is absolutely vital that they do so, such that the politicians at the national level, as well as the citizens of each nation do not feel that the EU is a threat to their national sovereignty and freedom. Their task is quite difficult: to encourage the development of a common identity for all Europeans, without threatening the national, regional or local identities. Any potential threat to the national identity and sovereignty is likely to have an adverse effect, and thus alienate the very people it is trying to unite. Furthermore, the EU requires the national governments and politicians to aid in this effort to unite the citizens of Europe under a common European identity, which is not always in the best interest of the respective politicians since they might perceive it as undermining their power.

The national identity has another anchor which European identity lacks: quite often, although not always, the majority language is used to unite people and promote national(istic) feelings. One of the following sections will discuss how the EU's lack of a common language is not necessarily an impediment in the development of a European identity, but it can be used as an asset (see § 1.4.3.8).

The various studies presented here discuss the potential structure of European identity in relation to national identity. Some have argued that they can be nested identities, other that they might blend and form a hybrid. Some suggest that the European identity is modelled after the national identity, and I have presented arguments that at least on a symbolic level and following a top-down approach, it does indeed have the elements that are historically used to increase levels of national identity. Nonetheless, the bottom-up understanding of the development of European identity might present a different conceptualisation of this new identity, that is, regardless of the efforts made by the EU officials, the European citizens might perceive and define their European identity in other terms as well as the ones instilled by the EU. The following section will discuss briefly the different subcategories that the European identity has been posited to have.

1.4.3.6. Components of European identity: civic and cultural

As discussed earlier, if European identity has been modelled after national identity, there should be different types of European identity, or it might be composed of various subcategories. Thus, as discussed ethnic European identity follows on the steps of ethnic national identity; and civic or cosmopolitan European identity is modelled after civic

national identity. These types of European identity have been posited to be related to the geographical location of the nations, such that the Western nations would be inclined to be more civic, cosmopolitan, while the Eastern countries would adopt a more ethnic European identity. As discussed earlier, Pichler (2008) found no support for these claims in his study of Eurobarometer data.

It is possible nonetheless for the European identity of an individual or of a country to include elements from both the ethnic and the cosmopolitan European identity. These terms have been occasionally used interchangeably with cultural and civic European identity, notwithstanding the fact that they might have different nuances. Burgess (2002) argues that the EU represents the relationship between the cultural and the civic aspects of European identity: the cultural is based on the European heritage, while the civic is represented by the institutions of the EU, and these two aspects are in constant negotiation:

The institutional Europe that seeks to legitimate itself through a reference network associated with the 'culture' of the real Europe is in constant negotiation with it. Institution and identity are in constant historical reciprocal determination. (p. 480)

The cultures of Europe are numerous and heterogenous. Although it can be argued that some elements transcend borders, one of the most alarming nationalistic discourses is that the EU can and will neutralise the diverse cultural elements of Europe and transform the continent into a melting pot. Kraus (2008) argues that the project of building an integrated European Union was meant to create a cultural European identity without a culturally homogenous space, which was the tactic adopted in the creation of the nation-states. The cultures and ethnic elements of Europe represent the *diversity*, while the civic and institutional elements are the *unity* of the European Union (Sassatelli, 2002); *diversity* has a liberal connotation, while *unity* has essentialist elements (Sassatelli, 2009), just as civic national identity is a social constructivist concept in nature, while ethnic national identity is essentialist.

The threat of globalisation or Europeanisation of the cultural elements prompted the EU to promote various cultural programmes at the European level, aimed at advancing the diversity of specific places of Europe. Sassatelli (2002, 2009) talks about the benefits of the three-decade long programme of declaring a European Capital of Culture (or more) every year. Her work suggests the importance of building on the existing cultural heritage of

Europe and of developing new cultural ties between the EU member states. Although very critical of previous work on European identity, both quantitative and qualitative, Sassatelli (2009) concludes that “within the current reconceptualisation of identities and cultures, Europe’s narrative of unity in diversity is becoming less of a smokescreen and more of an asset” (p. 193). The European Capital of Culture is only one of the many initiatives promoted by the EU in an effort to encourage cultural cooperation and awareness between the European countries. Through these programmes, the EU indicates that it recognises the importance of not only an institutional framework which will lend support to advancement of a civic European identity, but also the promotion of cultural elements (Sassatelli, 2002). Kraus (2008) argues that the development of educational and cultural programmes is one of the strategies employed by the European Union in the construction of European identity. He suggests that the others are the common EU citizenship and the European political symbols (as will be discussed in the next section).

Kraus (2008) brings together both elements, the cultural and the civic, by supporting the idea that cultural identity is “the manifest expression of politically institutionalised cultural practices” (p.38). He argues that cultural patterns of identification encompass “collective memories, codified everyday knowledge, ethnicity, language and religion” (p.39) and these aspects of cultural identity define it by their role in the formation of civic identity, as an “institutionally entrenched cognitive and normative template for political communication” (p. 40). Kraus also emphasises the importance of the social interaction in the emergence of a cultural identity. The relationship between cultural and political (or civic) identity proposed by Kraus (2008) suggests that the two aspects of European identity are intertwined and emerge together. Nonetheless, as discussed later, these two components can be analysed and tested separately, although undoubtedly they form together the concept of European identity.

1.4.3.6.1. Civic, cultural and general European identity - Bruter (2005)

One of the first and very few empirical studies to look at the components of European identity has been designed and conducted by Bruter (2005). He discusses how European identity is a bi-dimensional concept, incorporating a *civic* dimension and a *cultural* dimension. He also briefly discusses the notion of *general European identity*, which in his opinion is a “self-attributed and spontaneous” (p. 20, Bruter, 2005) complement of the other two dimensions.

In his book, *Citizens of Europe? The emergence of a mass European identity* (2005), Bruter proposes a theoretical model for the emergence of European identity, both cultural and civic. He goes on to test this model empirically, compares the results to data from the Eurobarometers collected over three decades and uses focus groups in various European contexts to discuss with people the exact meaning and interpretations they associate with these concepts. In the following pages, I will present these studies more in depth, because the instrument that Bruter created to measure the civic and cultural components of European identity was also used in the present study to assess the two dimensions of European identity and how they might relate to various measures of linguistic variables, as well as with other European identity measurements. Apart from the instruments used in the Eurobarometers (which have been consistently criticised by social scientists), there are to my knowledge no other scales to assess European identity.

As a political scientist, Bruter's proposed model was intended to better understand the institutional factors that have an influence on the emergence of a mass European identity within the European Union. *Figure 2* below represents the model as proposed by Bruter. His rationale and findings will be described next, followed by a discussion about the dimensions Bruter puts forth as characterising the European identity.




Figure 2. Bruter's (2005) proposed model for European integration

Briefly, the model proposed by Bruter and visually explained by the figure above is formulated on two different levels, the individual level and the collective, or "aggregate level", as he names it. Bruter maintains that at the individual level, at a specific point in time, one's European identity is influenced by awareness of news on European integration,

regardless of whether they are good or bad news, symbols of integration (the European flag, anthem, day etc.), but also their personal experience with Europe, and the importance associated with it by the institutions of the State that the individual belongs to. In turn, at a group level, Bruter suggests, the European identity emerges and evolves over time. The same factors, and possibly others, influence the development of a European identity and thus the support for European integration on a mass level.

Bruter supports the idea that the individual and the general level are intrinsically connected and influence each other, and that they are brought together through the methodologies that he uses. He starts off by investigating the support for the model at an individual level by conducting a survey-based study in three European contexts (the United Kingdom, France and the Netherlands). The second phase is investigating the issues at an aggregate level by using data from the Eurobarometer surveys over a period of 30 years. Finally, he conducts focus groups with participants from the three contexts in order to better grasp what people actually mean when they talk about Europe and the European identity. In the following paragraphs, I will continue to describe these studies, focusing mainly on the survey results, since it is there that Bruter explains and exemplifies the concepts of civic and cultural European identity. Also, the present study will follow a similar methodology: the first part will investigate the relation between attitudes to multilingualism and other linguistic variables and the European identity through surveys conducted in the three contexts (Romania, Belgium and the United Kingdom), and then I will discuss the results of the surveys in interviews conducted with participants in the three contexts. In Bruter's work, the triangulation of methodologies provided substance, but also nuances to the results of the studies; following a similar methodology will give depth to this study.

The scale developed and tested by Bruter (2005) aimed at assessing participants' levels of European identity on three dimensions: general, civic and cultural. Bruter discusses how the previous instruments used to measure European identity, i.e. the Eurobarometers, the European Value Study, started off with the presumption that there must be a tension between the feelings of identification with one's nation and the feelings of European identification or that they should be hierarchical. He proposes a new instrument which addresses the relation between these two levels of political identification (nation and Europe), without necessarily asking participants to choose one or the other. Bruter proposes that a better way to look at these concepts is to split the European identity into its two components: the cultural component, referring mainly to feelings of a common

European heritage - a shared culture and values; and the civic component - referring mostly to the European Union and its institutions.

In general and not referring particularly to the European identity context, the cultural identity has a social nuance, alluding to “common values, language, religion, ethnicity, history, myths etc.” (Bruter, 2005, p. 103), while the civic identity refers to “a set of relevant institutional contexts that define the individual’s values and perceptions of freedom, rights and obligations as an individual” (Bruter 2005, p. 103). Risse (2010) draws attention to the fact that the cultural (or ethnic) European identity has a more negative connotation, referring to the traditional European landscape (white, Christian Europeans) and that people who endorse this dimension might have a preference for preserving that particular status quo of Europe. This type of European identity is emergent from the ethnic national identity discussed earlier (Smith, 1991). For Risse (2010), the civic or rather political European identity as he prefers to call it relates more to the development of an identity which incorporates the national and European dimensions and can be considered a successor of the civic national identity (Smith, 1991). Notwithstanding, the nuance that Bruter gives these two dimensions does not put one in a more favourable light than the other, rather, his intent is to capture the positive aspects of both.

The general European identity items used by Bruter with his participants aim at asking the direct questions of whether or not they feel European, not only to get a sense of how these participants relate to the idea of Europe, but also to be able to compare these results to other results obtained from previous studies (i.e., Eurobarometer). The relation between the cultural and civic components, and the general European identity also allows for an interesting discussion, as each combination might be stronger depending on the context. For the purposes of the present study, it can be hypothesised that the Belgian context has a better understanding and a higher familiarity of the civic identity. It can also be assumed that in the Romanian context the participants will identify stronger with cultural identity because it is a younger European nation and might be characterised by an ethnic national identity. The ethnic national identity in this case can function as a basis for the cultural European identity. As Bruter mentions, the British participants might feel a stronger cultural identification with Europe since this nation did not adopt many of the European symbols, such as a common currency, or the affiliation to the Schengen zone, which would be encompassed in the civic dimension. This British attitude is exemplified in one of the public opinion surveys mentioned above (Special Eurobarometer 346, 2011), where the

British respondents were the strongest endorsers of the common culture as an element of European identity, at 26% (the European average being 22%).

The two questions assessing the general European identity ask participants if they consider themselves citizens of Europe and how strongly they identify with Europe. The civic identity is assessed through questions referring to various European Union symbols (the passport, the flag, the anthem), but also asks participants to choose from a list of five options all those which mean something to them: the right to vote for the European Parliament, the common institutions, the symbols of the EU, and the right to travel within the EU without having to do customs or show a passport. The rest of the questions in Bruter's scale aim at pinning down the concept of cultural European identity. For this purpose, he devised a series of questions which should address participants' feelings of closeness to fellow Europeans as opposed to non-Europeans, as well as the belief in a common European heritage. One question also asks participants to choose which of the answers best represent the feelings of being European and here they can choose all options that apply, from the list: a shared heritage, history, ideals, and belonging to the European family.

One question proves to be problematic: Bruter asks participants to choose which of two countries they would prefer to win in the Women's Volley-Ball World Championship and he presents four dyads, each with one European and one non-European country. Bruter defends his choice by saying that this particular sport does not have a wide following and thus the participants would show their cultural European-ness by choosing the European country from the dyad. This particular question proved to be problematic in the Romanian pilot study (see § 3.1.2) and thus was eliminated from the main study. Also, the content validity of this question was assessed in the interviews in Romania. The results showed that some people were actually familiar with the sport and chose the team they supported from each dyad based on previous knowledge. Even in Bruter's empirical studies, the sports question was problematic, showing significant skewness, and thus being dropped from the analysis.

Bruter (2005) assessed civic, cultural and general European identity using the instrument he developed on a sample of $N = 212$ participants from three distinct European contexts: the United Kingdom, France and the Netherlands. Bruter reports that the scales showed good reliability in all contexts separately and together, with a Cronbach alpha value of 0.60 for cultural identity, 0.65 for general identity and 0.81 for civic identity. Although quite low,

these levels are considered acceptable for statistical analysis. The factor analysis was conducted separately for the civic and cultural identity items and based on the Eigenvalue, all items loaded on one factor for each of the respective analysis, although as expected the commonalities for the “games” items were very low.

For the purposes of the statistical analysis, Bruter created 0-1 indices for each variable in order to weigh them equally. Although for this particular set of analysis, Bruter’s technique was well implemented, slight changes were made for the analysis of the present study because of the need to compare the scores obtained from Bruter’s instrument with other instruments that measured responses on a 6-point scale (see § 3.1.2). All responses were transformed into 6-point scale responses, weighting them not as 0-1 indices, but as 1-6 indices. This statistical artefact does not hamper the analysis. On the contrary, it provides consistency and thus makes the analysis more reliable.

Bruter found that all three contexts presented with high levels of identity, both cultural and civic, thus skewing the identity variables towards the positive side. An interesting, but expected result was that the British sample presented higher levels of cultural identity, rather than civic, while in the other two contexts the civic identity was stronger. This is consistent with the Eurobarometer findings, that for the British the common European culture is a strong element of European identity. It can be explained by the fact that the United Kingdom has not adhered to many of the civic symbols of the European Union, such as the euro or the Schengen agreement.

The author draws attention to the fact that the two dimensions, civic and cultural, are highly correlated and thus could be evolving together, but insists that they are distinct factors. Of course, the sample used in this study was not representative of the entire population of the countries they came from and thus the results are not necessarily generalisable. However, Bruter (2005) states that it could be inferred that when people are primed to think of their European identity, they tend to think more along the lines of their civic identity, except in the case of the British participants. Another finding is that being able to speak foreign languages and having lived in other European countries are strong overall predictors of support for European integration. Knowledge of foreign languages was also significant predictor for cultural and civic European identity, while having lived in another European country predicted higher levels of civic identity. These results were obtained by looking at the three contexts combined, and Bruter does not present the

break-down by country. Nonetheless, the results obtained here are consistent with previous findings described earlier (Fligstein, 2008; Favell, 2009 and others).

Bruter continues his investigation by looking at the influence of good or bad news about the European Union and the symbols of the EU on the two forms of European identity. As discussed earlier, the media plays a truly important role in a population's identification with Europe (Inglehart, 1970 and others). Bruter's results indicate that the news, be it good or bad, leads to an increase in the feelings of cultural identity, while the increased visibility of the European symbols have a positive effect on the civic identity. The analysis of the Eurobarometer data from various European contexts over a period of three decades suggests, with some exceptions, that there is an overall increase in the levels of European identity across Europe, supporting thus the idea of "institutional inertia, which claims that increased length of membership automatically reinforces European identity" (Bruter, 2005, p. 148). It seems that key moments such as the introduction of various symbols of the European Union coincide or are closely followed by an increase of European identity in various contexts, consistent with other researchers' findings (see Risse, 2003; Caporaso & Kim, 2009; Fligstein et al., 2012 for data on Eurobarometers).

The last part of the study carried out by Bruter describes multiple focus groups he conducted with participants from the three contexts where the data was collected, i.e. United Kingdom, France and the Netherlands. The reason for conducting these focus groups was to better understand how people perceive Europe and the European Union, but also how their perception is influenced by news relating to Europe, symbols of the EU and the participants' personal experience with the continent. Interestingly, again at this stage, Bruter found support for his theory that the European identity has a cultural and a civic component. Many of the participants in the focus group discussions (a majority, as described by the author) talked about the ease of travelling in a Europe without borders, the free circulation of citizens, European policies and other topics which point to civic identity, while others mentioned ideas more in line with a cultural identity, such as peace, overcoming historical conflicts and cooperation between Europeans from different contexts. It is also worth noting here, that the continental contexts seem to favour the civic identity more than the British sample, and Bruter attributes this difference to the reasons mentioned earlier (not participating in the Schengen agreement, and not adopting the common currency) and to the lack of direct experience of the dissolution of the borders. An important point that was addressed multiple times in the focus groups seems to be the

experience of Europe, which Bruter says leads over time to the institutional inertia, which posits that levels of European identity increase over time even if only for the sole reason of belonging to the European Union. Here, the author connects the individual level of his model to the mass, or aggregate level, stating that the experience of Europe at the individual level is the equivalent of the institutional inertia at the aggregate level, an idea supported by the participants in the focus group discussions.

As part of the European experience, Bruter mentions a point of importance to the present study, which is the knowledge of foreign languages and its influence on the participants' feeling of European identity. The author stresses that the sample was split with regards to this topic, some emphasising the importance of knowing foreign languages for a better experience of Europe, others stating that it has no impact. In broad terms, this study will be concerned with explaining if and how proficiency in foreign languages and positive attitudes to multilingualism effect the emergence and strength of the feelings of European identity, both civic and cultural.

The studies conducted by Bruter (2005) provide an intriguing perspective on European identity - Europeans seem to internalise it in different ways, some showing stronger ties to the cultural aspect of the identity, some emphasising the benefits of its civic aspect. These studies develop and test an instrument for measuring civic and cultural European identity in three contexts. The results are promising, making this instrument a potentially useful and valid instrument for studying European identity.

The present study will further assess the validity of the instrument in three contexts, one which was also included in Bruter's studies - the United Kingdom, and two novel ones - Belgium and Romania. Based on his work, it can be hypothesised at this point that the United Kingdom will continue to show higher levels of cultural identity than civic identity. In the case of Belgium, the levels of civic identity could be either at the same level or higher than the cultural identity, since Belgium is the prime receiver of the publicity, the news and the symbols of the European Union. It is more complicated to make an assertion about the Romanian context: it could be that the younger generation will show higher levels of civic identity, since they are the prime beneficiaries from the last wave of enlargement of the European Union in 2007 (Ross, 2012), while the older participants might show stronger cultural ties to Europe. However, given that Romania is one of the newest members of the European Union, the levels of European identity should be lower than in the case of the UK or Belgium, given the lesser institutional inertia in this context.

Attitudes and practices of multilingualism could show a closer relation to the cultural identity (being proficient in more languages can allow for more cultural ties to Europe), or to the civic identity (proficiency in more languages can increase the potential for labour mobility). These issues will be addressed in this study.

1.4.3.7. The economic crisis

Recently, the media has been debating quite avidly the impact that the economic crisis will have on the trust in the European institutions and on the citizens' feelings of belongingness to the EU. Sometimes, the media discourse has been fuelled by various rightwing political parties and politicians, who use the economic crisis to incite feelings of nationalism and distancing from the European Union. As shown in Bruter's (2005) study and posited by others as well (Inglehart, 1970), the amount and type of media coverage that the EU receives has a great impact on citizens' levels of European identity. In a speech given in front of the European Commission, President Barroso warned of the dangers of the rise in nationalism:

But European unity cannot be taken for granted. European unity, democracy and respect for human dignity have to be fought for every day. And today the resurgence of populism, sometimes extreme nationalism, threatens to destroy the dream made real. And, let us be clear, the indifference of many pro-Europeans is also a risk (...) [W]e must put an end to the aberration of dealing with European issues at the national level as if they were external or foreign policy issues. This is I think enough reason to have the temptation to write a new narrative for Europe. (April, 2013)

Not only does President Barroso warn against the dangers of nationalistic discourses, but also against the lack of action and voice of the pro-Europe citizens. The phrase coined by Duchesne (2008) springs to mind: Euro-indifference is just as dangerous to the cohesion and sustainability of the European project as Euro-scepticism. As Guibernau (2011) argues, the European economical prosperity is intrinsically linked to the European identity, and thus in moments of economic crisis when the governments impose measures of austerity on their citizens, the EU is an easily targetable scapegoat. Bellamy (2013) suggests that the crisis showed that "the integration has not produced economic and social convergence between states", and has transformed the relation between the member states from an equal position to a power relation, because of the loans and bailouts offered by some

countries to others. This shift in the power balance between states might be detrimental to the EU, however there are institutional safeguards in place to ensure that the members have equal say in a European-wide debate, and as Bellamy (2013) argues, the lasting solutions to the crisis will only be the ones that are in line with the democratic and “demoicratic” character of the EU.

Other researchers (Fligstein et al., 2012) think that the crisis provides an opportunity for European member states to work together to solve the economic difficulties, which in turn should lead to strengthening ties between countries and potentially a stronger European identity. It is not yet clear if this is a potential outcome of the European economic crisis or whether the crisis came too early, at a point when the European identity had not taken strong roots in all of its member countries (Fligstein et al., 2012). Nonetheless, the various meetings at the European level showed that the political elite is interested in preserving the EU, although at a national level their discourse emphasises the national interests above the European ones.

In a recent Standard Eurobarometer (no. 78, 2012), the impact of the crisis is clearly visible, however, the trust of the Europeans in the EU is still higher than their trust in the national governments or parliaments (33% versus 28% and 27%, respectively). Also, the Europeans participating in this survey indicated that they believed the EU to be more capable to tackle the economic crisis than the national governments of their countries. A majority of the Europeans have a neutral image of the EU, while the positive image has been decreasing steadily (from 48% in 2009 to 30% in autumn 2012). The support for the monetary and economic union however has remained quite strong (53%), although the authors of the report suggest that there is a wide variation between the member states. One of the impressive results is that the Europeans strongly believe that the EU countries need to work together and cooperate in order to overcome the crisis (85%). Another indication of the trust of the citizens of Europe in the EU in the long run is their belief that the EU will come out stronger from the crisis (53%) and that the EU has the tools and power to defend the interests of Europe in the global economy (61%). These results suggest that although the national(istic) political discourses have tried to promote the EU as a destabilising entity for the national economies, the European citizens still trust and hope that the EU will play a positive role in the resolutions of the crisis.

The crisis has taken hold of the global and European economy since 2008 and the EU has been monitoring the public's perceptions through Eurobarometers ever since, there is still

little evidence of the effects that it will have on the European identity (Fuchs, 2011, p. 49). Although the percentage of people believing that their country's membership in the EU was a good thing has decreased drastically over a very short period of time in some countries (for example, in Germany by 10% and in Greece by almost 17% between autumn 2009 and spring 2010), this only points to the importance of European identity in the maintenance of a cohesive and unified European Union (Fuchs, 2011). Thus understanding this collective identity of the European citizens, what fosters it and what hinders it is of utmost importance for a positive resolution of the economic crisis.

As Edwards (2009) points out "times of transition, whether welcomed or imposed, are always times of renewed self-examination" (p. 16). The European and global economic crisis mark an important moment in the history of the European Union and of the European identity, and it will, without doubt, have an impact on that identity. Whether the crisis will lead to stronger economic, political and social ties between the European countries, or a reevaluation of the relationships between the member states and their relationship with the European Union, it will most probably change the Europeans' understanding of their identity and how it relates to the national and European levels. The effects of the crisis are to some extent coming to light, but they present in a contradictory fashion: Europeans trust the EU more than their national governments to solve the crisis, but the enthusiasm of their country's membership in the EU has declined. It is very likely that until the final stages of this crisis there will be no definite answer about its effects on European identity; it is nonetheless evident, as Fuchs (2011) suggested, that stronger levels of European identity can only provide assistance and support to the European project. Fligstein and his colleagues (2012) are more optimistic in saying that the current crisis of the European Union "will be resolved, as others have been in the past, with a wide, if shallow, sense of European identity" (p. 120). The next section will discuss one of the factors that can be regarded as controversial in the formation, enhancement and maintenance of European identity: language.

1.4.3.8. European identity and multilingualism

The motto of the European Union, *United in diversity*, represents the endeavour pursued by the EU to promote cooperation and peace between its member states, while providing a propitious environment for the preservation of cultures, traditions and languages. All official languages of the EU member states have the status of official languages of the

European Union. Simultaneously, the EU is keen on promoting and safeguarding the linguistic rights of the EU minority groups. All the official EU documents are translated into all the 24 official languages, the European citizens are guaranteed the right to be able to use their native language in any communications with the EU, the members of the European Parliament have the right to use their own language while giving a speech in the European Parliament and there is even a European Commission in charge of matters of multilingualism, among other things.

In 2007, after Romania and Bulgaria joined the European Union, the post for Commissioner for Multilingualism was created in order to manage the language and multilingualism matters in Europe. This post was occupied by Leonard Orban, the first and only Commissioner for Multilingualism between 2007 and 2010, when the role was reassigned to the European Commissioner for Education, Culture, Multilingualism and Youth, fulfilled by Androulla Vassiliou. Some have pronounced this to be a sign that the European Union does not view multilingualism as an issue important enough to have its own Commissioner, while others suggested that it is merely a way of saving money from the European budget, and that the programmes which were designed to support multilingualism in Europe will continue to function as before and will benefit from the funding allocated to them.

With regards to the European Parliament, Wodak and her colleagues (2012) found that the European officials use various linguistic strategies employing their own multilingual abilities to facilitate communication, to emphasise a point, or to provide a transition from the previous speaker. Also Grindheim and Lohndal (2008) found that the drafts of the official documents are not translated into all languages at once, but rather use a technique of employing six pivotal languages. As for the official EU policy for multilingualism, the EU recommends that all European citizens should be able to communicate in their mother tongue and two other European languages (Wright, 2004; Mamadouh, 2002; Oakes 2002; Glaser, 2005). It is generally accepted and expected that English will be one of the languages learned (if it is not the mother tongue), and many people who live in multilingual or border communities tend to learn the languages of their neighbours (Glaser, 2005; Risse, 2004, 2010 and others).

Europeans are probably not the most multilingual people on a global level (Glaser, 2005), but quite a large proportion of them are able to communicate at least in one other language than their mother tongue (Special Eurobarometer 386, 2012). The EU guarantees the right

of free movement within the Union, and although only a small proportion of Europeans take advantage of these benefits, and they are considered to be the elite, it does appear that younger Europeans are more keen on learning languages and on travelling, studying and working in the EU. There are thus strong indicators that in time the levels of European identity will be influenced by these opportunities. Multilingual abilities have been described as having a commodifiable value (Glaser, 2005; Heller, 2010), by increasing the chances of employment and financial gain in any part of the world, and within the European Union, specifically.

Critiques of the concept of European identity have argued that this identity will have difficulties in becoming a strong and widespread identity for European citizens, because there are no fixed geographical borders and no one common language, as it is usually the case for the formation of national identities. Others, like Grindheim and Lohndal (2008) argue that the EU is something new, completely different from the nation-state, and thus the rules of the formation of national identity do not apply to the development of the European identity. They argue that at least at the institutional EU level, this issue is solved by the complex and intricate mechanism of translation, which handles this task efficiently. As Kraus (2008) suggests, even if the Europeans communicate among themselves in one language, that should be done in such a way as to preserve the linguistic diversity of Europe. He argues for a “politics of language that substantially enhances our understanding of the language of diversity” (p. 198). Language, being part of each European’s identity, has the potential to become not just a means of communication with other speakers of that language or just a marker of identity, but also a sign of respect for the linguistic, cultural and political diversity of Europe. On a personal and social level, positive attitudes to multilingualism and multilingual practices could be the catalyst in the development of feelings of European identity.

2. Rationale for this study

The three contexts in which I chose to investigate the relationship between European identity and multilingualism are Romania, Belgium and the United Kingdom. The interdisciplinary and complex nature of the literature on European identity requires as a first step of the study an in-depth exploration of the components of European identity and the relation between this identity and the national one. The next step is the assessment of the relationship between European identity and multilingualism, and the enquiry into whether multilingualism has the power to predict European identity.

The contexts chosen provide the opportunity to look at one of the new member states (Romania), one of the founding members of the European Union (Belgium) and one member of the EU that has not joined the eurozone and where the discourse against the EU has intensified in recent years (the United Kingdom). Linguistically speaking, Romanian is a language spoken only within the borders of Romania; Belgium presents an interesting linguistic landscape, possessing a linguistic border between Dutch and French; and the UK's official language is English, one of today's *lingue franche* of Europe and the entire world. As Kohli (2000) states, "the most acute test for European mass identification is faced by those countries that will decide whether to join the EU, but also by those that may possibly face the decision to leave it again (such as the UK)" (p.126).

The previous studies which looked at European identity have consistently used a qualitative approach, with the exception of the Eurobarometers and Bruter's (2005) study discussed above. I believe that in order to better understand a complex concept such as European identity and its intricate relationship to multilingualism the best methodological approach is the use of triangulation (Dewaele, 2009; Duff, 2006; Saville-Troike, 2003), using both quantitative and qualitative methods. Thus, the first stage of the research was comprised of collecting online surveys, and the statistical results were complemented by interviews conducted in all contexts. As Duff (2006) argues, triangulation is not just employing quantitative and qualitative methods to study a particular topic, but also combining research and theory perspectives. This mixed-methodological approach combined the rigour of statistical analysis with the subtleties of data given by interview data.

The present study coincides with the evolution of the economic crisis in Europe. Such strained times will have an impact of the feelings of European identity, and it is possible that these changes will be most evident in countries such as Romania, which joined the EU recently, the UK, which has always been a somewhat reluctant member, but maybe even in Belgium, which is considered to be at the heart of Europe. I will briefly discuss each of these contexts from a linguistic point of view, as well as their relation and role within the EU.

2.1. Contexts

2.1.1. Romania

According to the press release from the Romanian National Statistics Institute, Romania has a bit over 19 million inhabitants, of which 90.6% speak Romanian as a mother tongue. Hungarian is the second largest mother tongue, with 6.7% of the citizens of Romania declaring it as first language (Institutul National de Statistica, 2012). Other ethnicities and languages of Romania are: Romani, Ukrainian, Bulgarian, Russian, German, Turkish and a few other languages spoken by small communities. The Romanian Constitution guarantees the ethnic, cultural, linguistic and religious right of all national minorities (Article 6, Constituția României, 2003), as well as support for the principle of equality among all Romanian citizens. It is also estimated that between 4 and 12 million Romanians live abroad, some having left as refugees or asylum seekers during the Communist regime, others left after the fall of Communism in 1989, while another wave of migrants left Romania after 2007, when the country joined the European Union.

Romania is the seventh largest European country, having the same borders since 1947 Peace Treaty signed in Paris. The Romanian language belongs to the family of Romance languages, and according to Article 13 in the Romanian Constitution, it is the official language of Romania (Constituția României, 2003). Certainly, with Romania's accession to the EU, Romanian became one of the EU's official languages. Romania joined the European Union only in 2007, thus being one of the youngest members of the EU. It has not yet joined the Eurozone or the Schengen area, but it has taken steps in these directions, expecting to join the Eurozone in 2015.

With regards to national and European identity, as discussed above, Romania is part of the Eastern European countries, and thus might adhere to a stronger ethnic national identity. Pichler (2008) maintains that there are no clear-cut differences between the Western and Eastern part of Europe with regards to their patterns of identification with Europe. Case (2009) suggests that it is wrong to consider the Eastern and Western Europeans as different and points to clear examples of how historical events in the Eastern part of Europe have impacted the history of Western Europe. This is not to say necessarily the concept of European identity has exactly the same meaning and connotations on both sides of the European continent. Clearly, the historical events that have dominated the European landscape in the 20th century must have left their mark on Europeans' understanding of their identity, be it national or European. However, as Case (2009) argues, the Eastern European viewpoint should not be underestimated in this debate. She states:

Overlooking or belittling the East-Central European perspective on what it means to be European is thus not an error of snobbery alone, it is a form of denial about the links between cause and effect and, as such, a political move. (p. 115)

Favell (2009) talks about the Eastern migration to the West and suggests that most of these migrants are well-educated, middle-class individuals, looking for a lower-level better-paid job. Although according to the European Union, these migrants should be considered “free movers” and should be encouraged to travel, study and work abroad, the reality is that they are more often than not considered immigrants. Some member states of the EU have put restrictions for the Romanians and Bulgarians in 2007, and presumably only in 2014 these restrictions should be lifted. There are however many right-wing political parties in the Western states who argue against the restrictions being lifted of fear of mass migration. In their nationalistic political discourse, the Western states attempt to portray the Eastern migrants as people coming to take advantage of the social systems of the host countries. Nonetheless, Favell (2009) argues that the Eastern European migrants are the European citizens who most take advantage of the European regulations with regards to freedom of movement and work, exercising their rights as citizens of the European Union.

Some recent studies have focused on the concept of Romanian national identity (Brubaker, Feischmid, Fox & Grancea, 2006; White, 1999; Flora, Szilagyi & Roudometof, 2005 and others), quite often emphasising aspects of the relationship between the Hungarians and Romanians in the region of Transylvania. Others have incorporated data from Romania

from Eurobarometers (Tatar, 2010 and others). A study conducted by Dragoman (2008) looked at the feelings of national identity and Europeanisation in the context of Sibiu becoming a European Capital of Culture in 2007, simultaneously with Romania's accession to the EU. In his study, he found that there is a tension between the feelings of Romanian identity and European integration which he attributes to the different demands imposed on an individual by these two concepts. Nonetheless, the study does not seem to have a sound methodological basis, having arrived to these conclusions based on data from the World Values Study, but without actually detailing the analysis. Dragoman (2008) also suggests that more studies should investigate the Europeanisation of Romanians and their identity after joining the EU.

To my knowledge, there is no study that investigated in depth the feelings of European identity within the Romanian space post 2007. The present study aims to address this issue, by collecting survey data as well as interviews. Due to convenience, most of the sampling will be done in Cluj-Napoca, one of the largest cities in Transylvania. However, since the surveys are online, they will not be restricted to a geographical area. The study also aims to investigate the differences, if any, between Romanians who were under 35 years old at the time of data collection, and those who were over 35. There is evidence to suggest that age is an important factor that influences European identity, and that younger participants feel more European than the older ones (Ross, 2012; Pichler, 2008; Inglehart, 1970 and others). The reason 35 was chosen as the cut-off age for the separation of the two groups is that people who were 35 at the time of the study would have been around 13 years old in 1989, at the time of the Revolution in 1989. This means that they would have lived their adult life in a democratic regime, unlike the other participants who would have been old enough to understand and experience Communism in Romania before 1989. The same cut-off age was used for the other contexts, for reasons of consistency.

2.1.2. Belgium

Belgium has about 11 million citizens (Eurostat, 2010) and it is located geographically and metaphorically at the heart of Europe. Belgium, specifically the capital Brussels, is the host of many European and global organisations, including the headquarters of the European Union. Belgium is a federal parliamentary democracy under a constitutional monarchy (The World Factbook - Belgium, 2013). Although, for many, Belgium is a symbol for the unity of Europe, there have been tensions between the Dutch-speaking Flemish people (living

mostly in Flanders, the Northern part of the country) and the French-speaking Walloons (residing in Wallonia, the Southern part of Belgium). These two languages, Dutch and French, have the status of official languages of the country, together with German, which is spoken by a smaller minority in the Eastern part of Wallonia. Dutch is spoken as a first language by approximately 6 million Belgians (about 58%), French by about 4 million, and German by 75,000 people (De Caluwe, 2012). Brussels is officially a bilingual city, having both French and Dutch as official languages. Although it is situated in Flanders, a bit over half the population of the capital has French as a mother tongue, about 5-7% speak Dutch as an L1 (De Caluwe, 2012), and almost 10% are bilingual (De Schutter, 2011). There is a growing number of people who have an immigrant language such as Arabic or Turkish as their L1 in Brussels (Ceuleers, 2008).

The geographical location of Belgium has influenced its linguistic landscape, being at the confluence of Romance and Germanic Europe. The economic situation of the two regions has shifted over the years, and together with other factors it has led to various political conflicts between the two regions, Flanders and Wallonia (De Caluwe, 2012). The most recent one was in 2007, when it took more than a year for the political parties to reach an agreement to form a government. During that time, there were rumours in the local and international media about whether the two regions would separate into two different countries. These political conflicts are not always reflected in the attitudes of the Belgians. For example, in 2008 the National Frite Day was organised for the first time, the organisers arguing that the words for *mayonnaise* and *frites* were the same in both French and Dutch, and that should be enough to unify Belgium. The motto of the day was “Everyone speaks Frites!” (Carling, 2008). Although on a comical tone, this might convey attitudes prevalent among Belgians with regards to their country and its internal linguistic borders.

The linguistic border of Belgium has been a source of tension to such degree that some have argued that they have developed their own forms of national identity (Keating, 2001, p.vii). Although this tension might stem from the economic differences between the more prosperous Flanders and the more penurious Wallonia, the “economic divide is construed along linguistic lines” (Vogl & Hüning, 2010, p. 228). There are nonetheless Belgians who believe that a resolution to the political and economic impasse in their country is bilingualism and multilingualism, which would allow people to work in any area of Belgium. Linguistic and political culture cannot be detached, and furthermore “linguistic culture *is* political culture” (Kraus, 2008, p. 83, emphasis in the original). In the case of Belgium, this

assumption has been part of the political life and has become entrenched in the political and linguistic discourse.

De Caluwe (2012) maintains that there is still a small number of Flemings, a few thousands, who insist on their children being bilingual French-Dutch, although in the educational system in Flanders French is taught as a second language, on the same level as English. Quite often, the author suggests, the young Flemings choose English over French as the language to become their L2. But those who believe in bilingualism distance themselves “from the prevailing ideology, which often equated the struggle on behalf of Dutch as a struggle against French” (De Caluwe, 2012, p. 270). Vogl and Hüning (2010) argue that the situation in Wallonia is different, as a recent change in policy is encouraging the teaching of Dutch in schools and is pushing for bilingualism. Nonetheless, they put forward the claim that the sum total of the language policies in both regions of Belgium “still add up to a lack of proficiency in the language of the respective other language community. This fosters the division of Belgium” (p. 244).

Belgium is officially a multilingual country, but in practice it is actually formed by two predominantly monolingual regions and the bilingual capital, Brussels. Geographically, Brussels is located in Flanders, but it is officially a bilingual region. Ceuleers (2008) argues that bilingualism is increasingly becoming a pre-requisite for a successful career in the capital. This is a new development, as traditionally individual bilingualism is not regarded as desirable (for a historical account, see Vogl & Hüning, 2010). Brussels has always been considered to be at the heart of Europe, but public discourse in Belgium often attempts to emphasise both the linguistic and identity differences between Brussels and the “Rest-of-Belgium” or RoB (de Schutter, 2011). De Schutter argues for what he calls “the Brussels model”, mirroring van Parijs’ Belgian linguistic justice model (2001). Van Parijs suggests that in order to maintain a just linguistic society, the language dominant in a territory should become the official language of the people living in that territory, much like it is in Belgium, with Flanders having Dutch as an official language, French in Wallonia, and German being the official language in the German Community. Brussels on the other hand is officially bilingual, providing services and administration in both French and Dutch. De Schutter (2011) suggests that in order for linguistic justice to be fully attained in a territory where there are more languages present, all these languages should become official, much like they are in Brussels. The latter would be a model for linguistic pluralism, while the former is a proponent of the linguistic territoriality principle. De Schutter (2011) argues in favour of

the Brussels model suggesting that this is the only model that can truly be considered linguistically just, while the RoB model allows for linguistic minorities to be driven away from a territory by means of linguistic territoriality. Although this is a philosophical argument closely related to issues of linguistic justice, the two linguistic landscapes currently present in Belgium (the bilingual capital and the monolingual regions of Flanders and Wallonia) are an interesting case study for the purposes of the present study, therefore one of the research questions has been included in order to test the differences between Brussels and RoB.

Belgium is a founding member of the European Union, being one of the original six countries which formed an economic alliance in 1950, as was discussed previously. The Eurobarometer surveys discussed earlier indicate that although there has been a decrease in the feelings of identification to Europe in recent years, Belgium is still one of the highest supporters of the EU and the eurozone. Therborn (2008) nonchalantly states that due to the political, economic, social and linguistic struggles within the Belgian borders, the country might have split long ago were it not for Brussels being the capital of the EU (idea also presented by Licata, 2000), and that it is “the capital of a failed nation-state” (Therborn, 2008, p.73), although it functions as the capital of the EU. Brussels is a model of cosmopolitan linguistically and ethnically diverse European city, which is not only the functioning capital of one of the leader European states, but also of the EU. It has become the home of many European and international institutions, which brought along with them more diversity by hiring people from all over the world. Brussels and Belgium have faced the many challenges of being at the heart of Europe, both practically and metaphorically, and have been successful at accommodating the needs of Belgians and Europeans alike. Thus, saying that it is “the capital of a failed nation-state” is a futile overstatement that does not characterise the state of affairs in Brussels and Belgium today.

The idea that Brussels has become a “den of techno-bureaucrats” (Cerutti, 2008) is in stark contradiction with it being the home of Europe. Being at the heart of Europe and seat of the European Union (for a historical perspective on how Brussels became the capital of Europe, see Therborn, 2008), the question of how European the Belgians feel has been addressed quite often, usually in comparative studies of various European nations and contexts (Bruter, 2009; Duchesne et al., 2010; Díez-Medrano, 2008; Licata, 2000, and many others). As discussed earlier, the Eurobarometers indicate that the levels of European identity in Belgium are moderate to high compared to the rest of Europe. Also, it seems

that a strong national Belgian identity is compatible with feelings of European identity. To my knowledge, there are no studies looking at the feelings of identification with Europe comparing Wallonia and Flanders, or Brussels and the two regions (the ROB). Through the surveys and the interviews conducted in Belgium, this study addresses issues related to these questions. The participants have the option of filling out the French or the Dutch version of the survey. As with the other contexts, the generational change will be investigated, by comparing the under 35 years old participants with the ones over 35. The survey data was collected online, while the interviews were conducted in Brussels.

2.1.3. United Kingdom

The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the official name of the UK, has a little over 63 million people, making it one of the largest countries in Europe by population. Great Britain includes England, Scotland and Wales (The World Factbook - United Kingdom, 2013), and the majority of the population is concentrated in England (over 53 million, UK Census, 2011). The largest city in the UK is its capital, London, with a population of about 8 million. London is a cosmopolitan city, attracting people from all over the world to work in various fields, including banking, services and education. With regards to the form of government, the UK is a constitutional monarchy with a parliamentary system.

The 2011 census data shows that in England and Wales more than 90% of the population has English as a main language, while in London the percentage is 78 (Nomis, 2011). These percentages indicate that London is home to a diverse population, but that overall in the UK the majority of people have English as a first language. English is the official language in the UK, while Scots, Scottish Gaelic, Welsh, Cornish and Irish are recognised as regional languages and some of them have official status in parts of the UK (The World Factbook - United Kingdom, 2013). As discussed previously, the Eurobarometers indicate that 61% of the participants from the UK are unlikely to speak a foreign language (Special Eurobarometer 386, 2012) and this might be due to the fact that English is becoming more and more a *de facto* lingua franca in the world, with 38% of Europeans speaking it as a foreign language (Special Eurobarometer 386, 2012). The United Kingdom joined the EU in 1973, which marked the beginning of the perceived threat to French as a foreign language within the EU. Many have argued (Oakes, 2002 and others) that the implementation of the

“mother tongue + 2” at the European multilingualism policy level was due to the perceived threat that English posed to French within the European Union.

The Eurobarometer opinion polls show that in the UK, attachment to the EU is one of the lowest in the Union - 29% (Special Eurobarometer 346, 2011). However, when broken down into civic and cultural components, the cultural European identity is found to be significantly higher than the civic identity (Bruter, 2005). This result is also corroborated by Eurobarometer studies, which show that for the UK sample a common European culture is one of the most important aspects of European identity, being endorsed by 26% of the sample - the highest level among the European countries (Special Eurobarometer 346, 2011). This finding could be due to the fact that the UK did not adhere to many of the civic elements of European integration, such as the Euro, or the Schengen zone.

Bruter (2005) discusses the evolution of the national identity in the UK and points out to the differences between feeling English and British. It appears that the term (and the symbols associated with it) *British* has been used interchangeably with English in England, but the Scottish, Welsh and Irish consider them to be entirely distinctive attachments. For example, in the 2011 Census, 57.7% described their identity as English only (data for England and Wales, Nomis, 2011), 8.7% called themselves “English and British”, and 19.1% identified as British only. In the same census, about 33% said they do not feel English at all, and 71% that they do not feel British. Bruter (2005) argues that because of the perceived threat of European integration, the British symbols (driving on the left side of the road, the non-metric system, the Pound Sterling) have gained substantial support. But the author describes the paradox of these symbols - the Pound Sterling is used by England and Scotland, but it has different physical characteristics, while the non-metric system was only adopted in the UK in the 19th century, and it was regarded as a threat to British-ness, while the metric system was regarded as a symbol of British identity (Bruter, 2005, p. 44-45).

Other studies have looked at European identity within the UK context. Some, such as Duchesne and her colleagues (2010) found evidence for a lack of interest on the part of the participants towards Europe and European identity. As discussed earlier, Grudy and Jamieson (2007) found that for their Scottish sample, the European identity concept is an unexamined concept and that they identified a lot stronger with the Scottish identity than the British one. The respondents in this study also expressed their view that being Scottish, rather than English, is more closely linked to being European, however the levels of

identification with Europe were not very high. The participants in this study were divided in two groups, one representative sample, and one target sample (which included participants who were enrolled in European language classes or other Europe-related fields). The results clearly indicate that the target group felt significantly closer to Europe than the representative sample, indicating that exposure to European topics is positively related to European identity.

An interesting finding was presented by Cinnirella and Hamilton (2007) who looked at European, British and ethnic identities and the relationship between them for a group of white British participants and a group of South Asian British participants. The results indicate that for the white British group high level of European identity correlated negatively with national identity, while for the other group this correlation was positive. The South Asian group also displayed higher levels of British, European and ethnic identity when compared to the white British group. The authors argue that this difference in the perceived relation between national and European identities between the two groups might be due to the fact that the white Britons tend to be past-oriented, still holding on to old stereotypes regarding the continental Europeans and strong positive attitudes towards the British Empire, while British minority members might be more future-oriented, attempting to distance themselves from the British imperialistic past.

Similar results were reported by Díez-Medrano (2003) in his study looking at the different ways people interpret European integration in Germany, Great Britain and Spain. He also found split opinions in the UK regarding the European Union and European integration, correlating with the participants' view of the British past and the British empire. Those who considered it to be a "glorious history" (Díez-Medrano, 2003, p. 182) tended to express more nationalistic views, while those who distanced themselves from the imperialistic past, although not expressing too much enthusiasm, did not display strong doubts about it either. Many of his British respondents reported a fear that the European integration was damaging to the UK and that it came to the detriment of British culture. Also, it seems that the British participants in his study reported perceived differences between the British and the European cultures. Nonetheless, there was a high frequency of respondents who referred critically to the "British nationalism and xenophobia" with regards to Britons who expressed a strong national identity. This is not to say that British nationalism is predominantly xenophobic, rather that it includes elements of multiculturalism (Risse, 2010) on a local level, and apart from ideas of European integration.

The previous studies regarding the views on European identity within the UK context suggest that although present, the European identity takes a potentially different form here than in the rest of Europe. Risse (2010) proclaims that in the eyes of the UK, Europe will always be regarded as the *Other* and that so far “the United Kingdom has embraced a ‘Europe a la carte’” (p.83, quotations in original). Even the political discourse advocating for the European Union and European integration is more often than not centred around economic interest, and not identity. The UK maintains its insular status with regards to Europe, preferring a more distant attitude to European integration on various levels proposed by European politicians. In spite of that, Favell (2008, 2009) argues that London is one of the Eurocities, where the EU citizenship is part of everyday life, engaging in behaviours facilitated by the membership in the EU, such as voting in local and European election or relocating within the EU, even though the participants in his studies did not display covert positive attitudes towards the process of European integration. The present study originated in London, but due to the fact that data for the survey were obtained via the internet, participants from other UK regions were included in the sample. The qualitative interviews were all conducted in London, with London residents. Once the data were collected, analysis was done to compare the Over-35 with the Under-35 years old group, in order to see if there were differences between the two.

2.1.4. Conclusion

The intricate relation between identity and language is well-known and well-researched. National identity, as a form of social identity, has also been shown to be linked to language and geographical borders (Ross, 2012). There are however some exceptions, as for example, the multilingual countries. European identity is not an entirely new concept, but it is a concept that is in constant change, depending on various political, economical and social factors. From an institutional perspective, the way linguistic diversity is currently addressed at the European level is to provide equal rights to all national languages, promote individual multilingualism and protect regional and minority languages (Vogl, 2012), as well as providing translation and interpreting services at the EU institutional level. However, the present study aims to investigate if favourable attitudes multilingualism and practices of multilingualism can boost the levels of European identity on a social and even individual level.

As described earlier, the Eurobarometers provide some data on the Europeans' views on multilingualism and identity, however the surveys have little data on attitudes towards these concepts (Favell, 2009). The present study aims to fill this gap, by conducting both surveys and interviews with Europeans from the three contexts mentioned above. The three contexts will provide three different angles to study European identity. Belgium is one of the founding members of the EU, the UK has long been seen as a reluctant member, while Romania is one of the newest EU members. From a linguistic point of view, Belgium is a multilingual country, at least from a territorial point of view, with Brussels being not only officially bilingual, but also at the "heart of the European Union" and a very cosmopolitan city. The United Kingdom is the country whose official language is one of the most prominent *lingue franche* of today, it is an insular country, separated geographically from Europe. Its capital, London, is a vibrant cosmopolitan and diverse city. Romania had been under communism for over forty years, until 1989. Since then, the country has made significant progress to become a democracy, progress that has been acknowledged by the international community together with Romania's accession to the European Union. By investigating these three contexts, using surveys and interviews I strive to provide a more nuanced view on the relationship between European identity and multilingualism.

2.2. Research questions

The research study was carried out in multiple stages. Quantitative data was initially collected in each context, followed by interviews in each of the three contexts. The research questions reflect the width of this study:

2.2.1. Quantitative studies

Using the data collected via the online questionnaires, the following research questions were investigated:

Each context:

RQ1: What is the relation between the national-European BIOS variables and attitudes to multilingualism, educational level, language proficiency, Bruter's (2005) European identities and other identities present in the study?

RQ₂: What is the relation between the linguistic variables and the various European identity variables?

RQ₃: Can positive attitudes to multilingualism and higher interest in learning languages predict a stronger sense of European identity (self-assessed, and also as understood by Bruter, 2005, - civic, cultural and general European identity) ?

RQ₄: Is there a difference between the younger participants (under 35) and the older participants in their identification with Europe and the European Union?

Belgium:

RQ₅: Is there a difference between the levels of European identity between the inhabitants of Brussels and the rest of Belgium (RoB), regardless of their linguistic background? Is there a difference between the linguistic variables between these two groups?

All contexts:

RQ₆: Is one context “more European” than the other contexts? Do they differ on the linguistic variables?

2.2.2. Qualitative studies

The interviews followed a semi-structured framework. The purpose was to give more nuance to the statistical analysis using the voices of the participants in the interviews. The following research questions were used as guidelines in the interviews, but the participants were free to mould the discussion as they saw fit. One of the main purposes of the interviews was to assess the content validity in each context for the scale proposed by Bruter (2005) to test various aspects of European identity. The rest of the questions covered topics from the Quantitative studies section, as follows:

All contexts:

RQ₇: Discuss with the interviewees their understanding of the European identity scale in order to assess its content validity.

RQ₈: Discuss the interviewees’ attitudes to multilingualism in light of their context and individual linguistic portrait.

RQ9: Discuss the interviewees' understanding of feeling European and European identity, including topics such as advantages and disadvantages, what factors benefit or hinder the development of identification with Europe, the relationship they perceive between national and European identity, and their particular identity portrait.

RQ10: Discuss the interviewees' opinions regarding the relationship between multilingualism and European identity - how are they related, is one a predictor of the other, or are they concepts independent of each other?

3. Quantitative studies

3.1. Methodology

3.1.1. Romanian pilot study

The questionnaire was tested for reliability and validity using a Pilot Study in spring 2010. Data was collected only in Romania and it included the majority of the instruments present in the online cross-national surveys. Most of the instruments had already been used in other contexts, but not in Romania. The total number of participants amounted to $N = 153$. The results of the pilot study indicated that the questions were relevant to the topic and context of study.

The data was collected through the snowballing technique, the questionnaires being distributed in Cluj-Napoca. The mean age of the respondents was $M = 27.4$ with a standard deviation of $SD = 13.4$. About 20% of the total sample of participants were over 35. The majority of the participants were female ($N = 119$), and most of them were still students at the time the data was collected ($N = 110$). With regards to educational level, 64% had finished high-school, 24% had a university degree and 12% had already received a Master or PhD. The high number of high-school graduates should be seen in light of the fact that a clear majority of the participants in the pilot study were still enrolled in university, but had not yet completed their studies in order to receive a Bachelor.

With regards to the background of the participants, 91% were Romanian, 6% declared they were Hungarian, and 3% German. The ethnic distribution of the sample was also reflected in the L1: Romanian - 93.5% and Hungarian - 6.5%. The most spoken L2 was English (61%), followed by French (18%), then German (8%); for L3, the most common language was again English (31%), then French (31%) and German (9%); the most spoken L4 was Spanish (24%), followed by French (13%), then Italian (7%) and so on. A very high number of participants reported they spoke an L2 (98.7%), an L3 (88.5%), and even an L4 (60.4%) suggesting that the sample was truly multilingual.

Some items on the scales needed to be reversed prior to the analysis. The mean scores for the scales were calculated. With regards to Bruter's (2005) European identity scale, a decision was made to recalculate all means for the cultural, civic and European identity

items by weighting them on a 6 point scale (rather than calculate 0-1 scores as he used the scale, Bruter, 2005) in order for these items to be comparable with other 6-point Likert scales included in the questionnaire.

The validity and reliability of the scales used were tested. The convergent validity (the degree to which the European identity scale developed by Bruter, 2005, was related to other European identity variables in the survey) needed to be assessed since this scale had not been previously used in the Romanian context. The results of the correlational analysis between the items of European identity on Bruter's (2005) scale and other variables of European identity showed that the scale had good convergent validity in this context.

The reliability analysis also indicated that all scales were reliable, with one exception. The cultural European identity scale proved unreliable when the sports question was included. When this item was removed, the reliability of that scale increased to acceptable levels (although the value remained one of the lowest among the instruments used). A decision was made at this point not to include the sports question in the cross-national study, but rather to discuss it with the participants in the Qualitative section of the study in order to test its content validity (See Appendix F for Cronbach α values).

The participants were also asked to describe their identity in a few words. The responses indicate that although in some cases identity was an unexamined concept, most participants understood the question and responded accordingly.

Based on the results of this pilot study, it was concluded that the instrument was fit for the purposes of the study. The final version of the questionnaire is described below.

3.1.2. Cross-national study

3.1.2.1. Instruments

The instruments used for these surveys have been compiled in order to assess the research questions posed earlier. The majority of the instruments are established scales, adapted to the particular contexts studied here. All questions of the surveys were translated by native speakers into the language/s of the contexts to be investigated, i.e. Romanian in Romania, French and Dutch in Belgium and English in the United Kingdom. The final versions of the questionnaires were uploaded to Survey Monkey, an online system for collecting

questionnaire responses. The study has been approved by the Ethics board at Birkbeck College, University of London.

The first page of the online questionnaire was the *Informed Consent*: participants were told about the nature of the study and the anonymity, voluntariness and confidentiality of their responses. Informed Consent was implied by filling out the questionnaire.

The first part of the questionnaire comprised questions regarding the *Background Information* of the participants, including age, gender, educational level, place of birth and place of residence, and self-described ethnic background. This section also included questions regarding the participants' linguistic background: languages known (regardless of the level); self-assessment of their proficiency in each language using a scale from 1 to 6, 1 being "Not at all" and 6 being "Native-like" (I read / write / speak / understand my L1, L2, L3, L4); frequency of use of each language using a scale from 1 to 6, 1 being "Less than once a month" and 6 being "Daily". Participants were also asked to describe their parents' linguistic background. Other questions included in this section asked participants about their interest in learning another language and how they would proceed to learn it, their use of various languages when they used social media and about their opinion regarding the importance of knowing foreign languages (see Appendix D for the English version of the questionnaire, including the *Background Information*).

The following section of the questionnaire included established scales and some questions aimed at understanding the participants' linguistic attitudes and practices, and their self-assessed levels of European identity (see Appendix A-D for the questionnaires in all four languages).

Anxiety and Confidence in Using L2 (adapted from Clément, Gardner & Smythe, 1977) :

Anxiety was assessed using 5 items on a scale from 1 to 6, 1 being "Strongly disagree" and 6 being "Strongly agree" (e.g., "I feel uncomfortable every time I have to use my second language"). Confidence was assessed using 9 items also on a scale from 1 to 6 (e.g., "I feel confident and relaxed when I have to use my second language to ask for directions").

Attitudes to Multilingualism (adapted from Baker, 1992): The scale was developed by Baker (1992) to evaluate people's attitudes to bilingualism. Each item was modified to ask about "more" or "various" foreign languages, rather than an L2 (as it was used by

Baker). The instrument included 24 items, assessed on a scale from 1 to 6, 1 being “Strongly disagree” and 6 being “Strongly agree”. Some items were reversed and adapted for each context (e.g., “It is enough to speak Romanian”).

Motivational Intensity (adapted from Gardner, Tremblay & Masgoret, 1997; Gardner, 1985): this index assessed on a 6 point Likert scale the effort and engagement in learning foreign languages (e.g., “I make a point of trying to understand all of the L2 I see and hear”).

Intention to Continue Studying Languages (adapted from Noels, Clément & Pelletier, 1999; Ryan & Connell, 1989): this instrument assessed participants’ intention to continue learning languages in the future, also on a 6 point Likert scale (e.g., “I intend to study foreign languages again in the future”).

Bicultural Identity Orientation Scale (adapted from Comănanu & Noels, in preparation): this instrument was adapted to include measures relating to the participants’ understanding of the relation between their regional and national identity, and their European identity. It included 20 items divided into 5 subscales: conflict, monoculture, alternation, compatibility and hybridity, to be rated on a 6 point Likert scale.

Circle Diagrams (adapted from Aron, Aron & Smollan, 1992): the initial purpose of this instrument as developed by Aron et al. (1992) was to test the inclusion of the other in the self using a pictorial measure. Based on their diagrams, two pictorial measures were developed to assess the degree of distance and overlap, as well as the nestedness of identities, between the national and European identity; another version of this diagram was created to investigate the relation between regional, national and European identity (see Appendix A-D for the diagrams).

European Identity (Bruter, 2005): the instrument developed by Bruter evaluated people’s perceptions of their European identity by dividing it in general, civic and cultural European identity (see Appendix D for the English questionnaire).

Various Other Questions: Participants were asked to describe in their own words their cultural and ethnic identity, and to rate on a 6 point Likert scale how much they identified with terms like: European, member of the European Union, world citizen, country citizen, the region they live in etc.

3.1.2.2. *Procedure*

The final version of the questionnaire was uploaded via Survey Monkey, an online survey software and questionnaire tool. Four different versions of the survey were uploaded: Romanian, English, French and Dutch (see Appendix A-D), and opened them up for data collection. Using our contacts both within and outside of the academic world, the survey was disseminated until at least 100 questionnaires were collected in each language group to allow for statistical analysis. The links to the web surveys have also been made available via various social networks, such as Twitter, Facebook, and Google Buzz. Potential participants were asked to send the link to others who might be willing to participate in this study. Once the target sample was reached, the questionnaires were taken offline and the collection of the quantitative data was considered completed. Participants had the opportunity to leave comments after the completion of the survey.

3.1.2.3. *Participants*

3.1.2.3.1. **Romania**

A total of 312 Romanian participants completed the survey. Twelve participants were removed from the final sample because they had only filled out the very first questions of the survey, leaving a final sample of participants of $N = 300$. The snowballing technique was used to recruit participants, sending the questionnaire to professors at the Babes-Bolyai University in Cluj-Napoca, Romania, and asking them to distribute it to students who might be interested in filling it out; the questionnaire was also circulated via social networks.

All of the participants indicated Romania, as their place of birth, with the majority being from the province of Cluj (35.4%). The second largest area represented was the capital, Bucharest (5.1%), while the rest of the participants indicated as a place of birth a wide distribution of towns and cities in Romania. As a place of residence, again most of the participants lived in Cluj and Bucharest, but some (approximately 20%) lived abroad.

With regards to the gender distribution of the sample, 27.5% participants were male (13 participants did not indicate their gender). About 37% had a university degree, almost 25% indicated that they had or were in the process of receiving either a Master's degree or a PhD, with the rest of them (35.5%) saying that they had a high-school diploma (1 participant did not answer this question).

The age of the participants in the Romanian sample varied from 18 to 75, with a mean of $M = 29.9$ and a standard deviation of $SD = 12.1$, suggesting a wide distribution of age, but with approximately 80% younger than 35 years of age. One question asked participants to identify their ethnicity. Again the results are unsurprising and in line with the ethnic demographic of the country: 90.5 % declared themselves Romanian and 7.4 % Hungarian. The other ethnic groups represented in a very small proportion - 4 participants - were Moldavian (from the Republic of Moldova), and one German. Only one participant identified as having a double ethnicity: Romanian and Canadian.

The distribution of the first language among this sample is consistent with the ethnic distribution: 90.4 % declared Romanian as their L1, 7.7 % Hungarian, and two participants were bilingual: Romanian and Hungarian, and German and Hungarian. Almost all participants declared they spoke an L2 (see *Table 1* for number of participants who spoke L2, L3, L4, L5 and L6). The predominant L2 was English (68.4%), followed by French (12.4%), and Romanian (7.1%). Other L2's included German (6.7%), Italian (3.4%), Russian (1.4%), Hungarian (0.3%) and Spanish (0.3%). The most widely learned language as an L3 was French (38.7%), followed by English (28.4%), German (13.5%), Italian (9.1%) and Spanish (5.2%). Three participants spoke Russian as their L3 and 2 Hungarian. The other languages spoken by just one participant each were: Greek, Dutch, Portuguese and Romanian.

With regards to L4, 25.4% declared Spanish to be their L4, 22.3 % - French, 18.1% Italian and 16.1 % German. The other languages present were English (5.2%), Russian (2.6%), Norwegian (2.1%), Hungarian (2.1%), Portuguese (1.5%), Japanese (1%), and Catalan, Chinese, Hebrew, Latin and Yugoslavian, each spoken by one participant (0.5 %). As an L5, 25.6 % of the participants who answered this question knew Spanish, followed by French and German with 17.1 % each, Italian (12.2%) and Hungarian (8.8%). The other languages were Latin, Polish, Portuguese and Swedish with 2.4% each, and Finnish, Greek, Norwegian, Dutch, Russian and Serbian - 1.2%.

Table 1. Number of Romanian participants who declared speaking foreign languages (L1 N=300)

	L2	L3	L4	L5	L6
Number Ps	294	274	192	81	26

Apart from asking the participants what languages they knew, they were also asked to self-assess their linguistic proficiency in the first four languages (speaking, understanding, reading and writing) and to rate with what frequency they used each language. The results are displayed in *Table 2*.

Table 2. Means and standard deviations of language proficiency and frequency of use of L1-L4 for the

	L1		L2		L3		L4	
	M	sd	M	sd	M	sd	M	sd
Proficiency	5.92	0.3	5.18	0.93	4.29	1.07	3.81	1.07
Frequency	5.98	0.11	4.51	1.66	2.78	1.8	1.77	1.31

3.1.2.3.2. Belgium - Francophones

One hundred and seventeen people filled out the French version of the questionnaire. The requirement for this questionnaire was that the participants be Francophone or bilingual French-Dutch and Belgian nationals. All participants were sent the two versions of the Belgian questionnaire, one in French and one in Dutch and were asked to fill out the appropriate one. After the data collection stage had been completed, four participants were removed from the final sample before the analysis for the following reasons: one participant was Flemish and lived in the UK; apart from moderate proficiency in French this participant could not be considered Francophone Belgian. Two other participants born in Flanders, one living there still and one living in Brussels were also removed from the sample before the analysis for the same reasons. Another participant born and residing in Guinea was not included in the final sample because she did not match the criteria. Six participants were excluded for failing to answer more than the demographic questions. Thus the final sample was composed of 107 participants.

A large majority of the participants indicated Belgium as a place of birth (96.3%). Two participants were born in Germany, one in Romania and another one in Congo, but they remained in the sample either because they have been living most of their lives in Belgium or because they were born to Belgian nationals abroad and then returned to live in Belgium. From the participants born in Belgium, 57% were born in the Walloon Region, 32.7% in Brussels, while 1.9% did not indicate their native town, writing down only Belgium. A small

number of participants (4.7%) indicated that their place of birth was Flanders in Belgium, but further investigations showed they were Francophone.

All but one participants indicated that they resided in Belgium; this participant, although of Francophone Belgian origin lived in Denmark. The majority of the other participants resided in the Walloon Region (63.6%), 21.5% lived in Brussels and 12.1% lived in Flanders.

The participants were asked about their gender and 72.4% were female (2 individuals did not answer this question). With regards to their age, the sample of Francophone participants had a wide distribution, with the youngest participant being 18 and the oldest 91 ($M = 29.37$, $SD = 15.78$), with approximately 75% younger than 35. The educational level was consistent with the age distribution of the participants: 32.7% were high-school graduates, 39.1% had a university diploma, and 26.2% had either a Master or a PhD.

When asked about their ethnicity, the largest number of participants indicated they were just Belgian (37.4%). Other answers ranged widely, from bilingual, European, Caucasian, multicultural, to answers such as “*nous ne faisons pas partie d'ethnies en Belgique, ce n'est pas le Rwanda ici !*” (translation: we do not belong to ethnic groups in Belgium, this is not Rwanda!)

The distribution of the first language within this group of participants showed that the vast majority (97.2%) had French as an L1, 2 participants spoke Dutch and one spoke German as a first language (these last 3 participants indicated that they were bilingual, and their other L1 was French). As for L2, the most represented language was Dutch (49.5%), followed by English (34.6%), then Spanish (7.5%). Italian (3.8%), French (2.8% - the bilingual participants), and Moroccan and Romanian with 0.9%. Interestingly, all participants indicated they spoke a second language (see *Table 3* for the number of participants who spoke foreign languages).

Table 3. Number of Belgian Francophone participants who declared speaking foreign languages (L1 N=107)

	L2	L3	L4	L5	L6
Number Ps	107	105	90	60	13

As for the L3, the most spoken language was English (55.1%), followed by Dutch (28%), Spanish (6.5%) and German (4.7%). Italian was spoken as an L3 by 1.9% and Arabic and

Danish by 0.9%. The most popular L4 was Spanish, spoken by 24.3% of the participants in this sample, followed by German (19.6%), Dutch (14%), Italian (10.3%), English (9.3%) and Walloon (dialect) - 1.9%. The following languages were spoken as an L4 by one participant each: Arabic, Berber, Japanese, Latin and Portuguese. With regards to the participants L5, the most well-known language was German (9.3%), followed by Italian (8.4.%), Spanish (5.6%) and Dutch (3.7%). Arabic, Latin and Portuguese were each known by 1.9% as their L5, and Catalan, Danish, Irish, Walloon and Yiddish were known by just one participant each. Some participants in this sample indicated they even spoke an L6 and these people spoke: Spanish (4.7%), German (1.9%), and Chinese, Danish, Irish and Latin (0.9%).

Apart from asking the participants what languages they knew, they were also asked to self-assess their linguistic proficiency in the first four languages known (speaking, understanding, reading and writing) and to rate with what frequency they used each language. The results are presented below in *Table 4*.

Table 4. Means and standard deviations of language proficiency and frequency of use of L1-L4 for the Belgian Francophone group

	L1		L2		L3		L4	
	M	sd	M	sd	M	sd	M	sd
Proficiency	5.92	0.24	4.51	1.09	4.01	1.09	2.68	1.3
Frequency	5.8	0.91	4.51	1.73	3.84	1.81	2.59	1.82

3.1.2.3.3. Belgium - Dutch speakers

The total number of Dutch-speaking participants in the study was 254. The requirement for inclusion in this group was that the participants be speakers of Dutch or Dutch-French bilinguals, and Belgian nationals. A closer examination of the sample indicated that some of the participants did not fulfil these requirements and, as a result, eight of them were removed from the sample before the analysis for the following reasons: one was born in the United States and lived in the United Kingdom. Three were born in the Dominican Republic, Hungary, and Romania, respectively, and although they spoke Dutch, it was their L3 and they did not identify as either Flemish or Belgian. Another participant was born and lived in Belgium, but his parents were German, and Dutch was also his/her L3. Several participants were born in the Netherlands and lived in Belgium. Only three of them were

removed from the sample, because they identified themselves as Netherlands, rather than Flemish or Belgian. Sixteen participants were removed from the analysis because they had only completed the background information section of the questionnaire and none of the other questions. The final sample used for the analysis was comprised of $N = 230$ participants. The participants were recruited through personal contacts at various academic institutions in Belgium and also through social networks.

The vast majority of the participants were born in Belgium (94.7 %), while the rest came from the following countries: 3% were born in the Netherlands, one participant was born in Congo, one in Germany, one in Luxembourg and one in South Korean. Further investigations revealed that although these participants were not born in Belgium, they either had Belgian parents or they had lived long enough in Belgium as to identify as Belgians. With regards to the region of origin in Belgium, the majority (72.5 % of the ones born in Belgium) came from Flanders, 25.7% were from Brussels, and only two (less than 1%) were born in Wallonia.

With regards to residence, most of the participants lived in Belgium (94.3%), almost 4% lived in the UK, 1% in the United States, one participant in the Netherlands and one in Australia. From the ones residing in Belgium, 73.3% lived in the Flanders, 24% lived in Brussels, and less than 1% in the Walloon region.

Consistent with the previous samples, the Dutch-speaking participants were divided on gender such that almost 61% were female and 29.1% male, with 10% of the participants refusing to answer the question. The age range varied from 17 to 68 years old, with a mean $M = 26$ and a standard deviation $SD = 10.72\%$ (23 participants refused to answer this question). The age distribution was skewed towards the younger generation, with 86% of the sample being under 35. Somewhat consistent with the age distribution was the educational level of the participants: most of them, 45.2%, had a high-school diploma, 17.4% had a university degree, 30% held a Masters or a PhD, while 6.5% had finished a technical school. One participant indicated they had a candidate diploma, a pre-Bachelor's degree.

The participants were asked to identify their ethnic background, and the majority (almost 50%) responded Belgian, or some variation of it (white Belgian, catholic Belgian etc.); approximately 10% indicated they felt Flemish, 8% answered white and about 7% answered

European. Others identified themselves with various other ethnic groups and combinations of characteristics.

The predominant L1 in this sample was Dutch (96.1%), followed by French (1.3%), Spanish (0.9%), and German, Italian and a Flemish dialect, each with 0.4%. The participants who declared not to have Dutch as an L1, were closely investigated to ensure they should still remain in the sample, and due to their identification as either Belgian or Flemish, it was decided that they fulfilled the requirements. One participant declared him/herself bilingual - Dutch and French. All participants in this study indicated an L2 and an L3, almost 90% knew an L4, about 50% an L5 and 18% and L6 (see *Table 5*).

Table 5. Number of Belgian Dutch-speaking participants who declared speaking foreign languages (L1 N=230)

	L2	L3	L4	L5	L6
Number Ps	230	230	202	117	41

English and French were the most spoken second languages, with 49.1%, and 42.6% respectively. The other languages present as an L2 in the sample were: Dutch (2.6%), German (2.2%), Spanish and Italian (1.3% each) and Finnish and the Limburgish dialect (0.4% each). As mentioned earlier, all participants in the sample declared they had an L3 and the distribution of it was as follows: French (44.8%), English (41.3%), German (6.1%), Spanish (4.8%), Italian (2.2%) and Swedish (0.4%). Almost 88% of the sample revealed they knew a fourth language. The most predominant L4 was German (45.2% of the entire sample), followed by Spanish (14.3%), French (9.6%), English (7.4%), Italian (6.5%). Latin, Portuguese and Russian were also among the L4s, each known by 0.9%, while the Brussels dialect, Norwegian, Polish, Romanian and Tagalog were each spoken by one participant (0.4%) as an L4.

The diversity of L5s known by the participants in the Dutch speakers sample increased, such that a little over 21% had German as an L5, Spanish (10.9%), Italian (7%), Latin (2.2%), English (1.3%), Arabic, Catalan, French, Japanese, Russian and Swedish (each with 0.9%), and Esperanto, Greek, Hungarian, Korean, Croatian, Norwegian and Polish (each with 0.4%). About 18% of the entire sample declared they knew a sixth language: 4.3% knew German, 3% Spanish, 2.6% Latin, 1.7% Italian. Catalan and Russian were known by 0.9%,

while Afrikaans, Arabic, Danish, Greek, Hungarian, Classical Greek, Norwegian, Portuguese and Punjabi by 0.4%.

The questionnaire also asked the Dutch-speaking participants to rate on a Likert scale their self-assessed proficiency (which was calculated again by taking the average of their reading, writing, listening and understanding skills) in the first four languages. Another question referred to the frequency with which these languages were used by the participants and this question was again assessed on the Likert scale. The results are presented below, in *Table 6*.

Table 6. Means and standard deviations of language proficiency and frequency of use of L1-L4 for the Belgian Dutch-speaking group

	L1		L2		L3		L4	
	M	sd	M	sd	M	sd	M	sd
Proficiency	5.94	0.18	5.2	0.77	4.63	0.96	3.42	1.23
Frequency	5.95	0.31	5.08	1.35	4.34	1.61	2.45	1.65

3.1.2.3.4. United Kingdom

A total of 125 people participated in the English version of the questionnaire. Six participants were removed from the sample before the analysis for the following reasons: 4 participants only answered the Background Information section, one participant was born in Germany and lived in Kenya, and another one was born in Romania and lived in Belgium; these last two participants had no direct ties with the United Kingdom, reason for which they were not included in the final sample. Thus, the analysis was carried on using a total of $N = 119$ participants. The participants were recruited using personal and academic contacts. The survey was sent to students and staff at Birkbeck, University of London, and was also distributed via social networks.

Almost 70% of the participants indicated they were born in England ($N = 83$). One participant was born in Scotland, one in Ireland and one in Wales, amounting thus to 72.9% of the entire sample being born in the UK. The rest of the participants were born in various European countries (Italy - 5 participants, Spain - 4, Poland - 3, Belarus, Cyprus, France, Germany - 2 participants each), but also Argentina, Australia, Hong Kong and United States (1 participants each). With regards to the place of residence, all but one

participant (who declared their residence in Finland) indicated they lived in the UK. More than 90% of them resided in England, 7.6% in Scotland and 0.8% in Wales.

The gender distribution of the participants in the English sample was 29.8% male and 70.2% female (15 participants did not answer this question). A little over 30% of the participants had a university degree, 37.8% had a master degree and 26.1% were PhD students or had already received their degree. Only 3.4% in this sample had just a high-school diploma, indicating thus a highly educated sample.

The age of the participants in this sample varied between 20 and 70 years old, with a mean $M = 34.9$ and a standard deviation $SD = 11.9$. Approximately 50% of the sample was younger than 35. The distribution of the mother tongue in this sample was the following:

Approximately 73.1% of the participants indicated that their L1 was English. The second largest group spoke Spanish as an L1 (5%), followed by French and Italian (each spoken by 3.4% of the total number of participants) and Greek (2.5%). Other L1's included: Finnish, Polish and Russian (1.7% each), Chinese, German, Portuguese, Ligurian, Swiss German, Slovak (0.8% each). Three of the participants indicated that they have grown up in a bilingual home, one speaking English and German, another one Chinese and English, and the last one Dutch and Limburgish.

A very large proportion of the participants indicated that they spoke a second language (see *Table 7* for the number of participants who spoke foreign languages). The most common L2 was French (39.5%), followed by English (17.6%), and German and Spanish, each spoken as an L2 by 11.8% of participants who answered this question. Other L2's were Italian and Swedish (each by 2.5%), Greek, Nepali and Russian (each by 1.7%) and Breton, British Sign Language, Mandarin, Dutch, Ga, Japanese, Polish and Twi (one participant each). As for L3, the most learned language in this sample was again French (26.9%), followed by German (18.5%), Spanish (16%), and Italian (5.9%). The other L3's were: English (5%), Mandarin (2.5%), Dutch, Japanese, Portuguese and Swedish (each 1.7%), and Belarusian, Catalan, Czech, Greek, Ha, Latin and Russian (0.8%).

Table 7. Number of British participants who declared speaking foreign languages (L1 N=119)

	L2	L3	L4	L5	L6
Number Ps	116	105	74	43	19

A little over 60% of the sample of participants indicated that they knew an L4. The distribution of these languages was as follows: Spanish (11.8%), French and German (9.2%), Italian (6.7%), Arabic, Dutch, Greek, Japanese and Swedish (1.7%), and Afrikaans, Bangla, Czech, Danish, English, Finnish, Guernesiais, Hausa, Hebrew, Hindi, Hungarian, Icelandic, Jamaican Patois, Mandarin, Polish, Punjabi, Sichuan, Thai, Turkish, Welsh (0.8%).

Approximately 36% of participants indicated they knew an L5. The languages spoken as an L5 were: Spanish (5.9%), Italian (5%), German (4.2%), Latin (3.4%), French and Portuguese (2.5%), Hebrew and Russian (1.7%), and Danish, Faroese, Greek, Irish, Japanese, Mandarin, Newar, Polish, Romanian, Swedish, Turkish (0.8%). The last question regarding language knowledge asked participants whether they had an L6 and 16% of the participants responded that they did know an L6. Out of the whole sample, 3.4% knew Italian as an L6 and another 3.4 knew Spanish. Icelandic was spoken by 1.7% as an L6. The other languages mentioned were: Akan, Arabic, Finnish, German, Greek, Hungarian, Polish, Portuguese and Turkish (0.8%).

The participants self-assessed their proficiency in their L1, L2, L3 and L4, by rating their speaking, understanding, reading and writing skills in each one of these languages. They were also asked to rate the frequency with which they use these languages. The results are displayed below in *Table 8*.

Table 8. Means and standard deviations of language proficiency and frequency of use of L1-L4 for the British groups

	L1		L2		L3		L4	
	M	sd	M	sd	M	sd	M	sd
Proficiency	5.92	0.3	4.41	1.35	3.67	1.41	3.05	1.3
Frequency	5.81	0.68	3.37	2.09	2.24	1.79	1.91	1.49

3.2. Results

The research questions proposed for the quantitative part of this study are:

- RQ1:* What is the relation between the national-European BIOS variables and attitudes to multilingualism, educational level, language proficiency, Bruter's European identities and other identity variables present in the study?
- RQ2:* What is the relation between the linguistic variables and the various measures of European identity present in this study?
- RQ3:* Can positive attitudes to multilingualism and higher interest in learning languages predict a stronger sense of European identity ?
- RQ4:* Is there a difference between the younger participants and the older participants in their identification with Europe and the European Union?
- RQ5:* In the case of Belgium, is there a difference between the levels of European identity between the participants from Brussels and the ones from the rest of Belgium, regardless of their linguistic background? How about on the linguistic variables?
- RQ6:* Is one context "more European" than the other contexts? Do they differ on the linguistic variables?

Before proceeding to investigate each of the research questions, the scales used were tested for reliability, assessed through the Cronbach alpha coefficient (see Appendix F for α values). Another analysis was also performed to look at the convergent validity of the European identity scale developed by Bruter (2005), by conducting correlational analysis with other scales included in the questionnaire which tapped at the concept of European identity.

The analyses performed for the RQ 1 were correlations between the 5 BIOS variables and various measures of identity, educational level and proficiency in foreign languages. The validity of the BIOS scale was also explored here. In order to investigate RQ 2 correlational analysis were conducted between the linguistic variables and the measures of European identity. For the analysis required by RQ 3, regression analysis was used to identify the best predictors of European identity. T-tests were used to investigate the differences between the younger and older participants with regards to their feelings of European identity (RQ

4). For RQ 5, the Belgian Francophone and Dutch speakers data sets were merged and the analysis was conducted on the whole sample together. Using t-tests, the differences and relations between the participants from Brussels and those from the rest of Belgium were assessed. A similar procedure was followed for RQ 6, combining all sets of data and using analyses of variance to determine the differences between the groups.

3.2.1. Romania

3.2.1.1. *Reliability*

Reliability analysis was conducted on all scales to be used in the statistical analysis. The values of the Cronbach α were all acceptable for analysis, varying between .58 and .89. Cronbach alpha values indicate the internal consistency of a scale and vary between 0 and 1. It is considered that a .6 value is questionable, but useable. The higher the value, the better the internal consistency of the scale (George & Mallery, 2003, p.231)

3.2.1.2. *Validity*

To check whether the scales used tapped at the same concepts, correlational analysis was used for the various measures of identity. The results indicated that most of them were highly and positively correlated. The relation between different self-assessed identities was investigated here, as well: the general European identity correlated strongly and positively with the civic and cultural European identity, with feeling European, Eastern European and a citizen of the world, as well as with the two diagrams (European - national and European - national - regional). This variable did not show any relation to the measures for Romanian, regional and city identity (for a breakdown of all correlations, see *Table 9*).

3.2.1.3. *RQ 1 - BIOS and European identity & language*

In order to assess the validity of the BIOS scale, its scores were assessed in relation to the two diagrams (adapted from Aron et al., 1992), the first one representing the possible overlapping between the national and European identity, and the second one between regional, national and European identity. The results obtained indicated that conflict and monocultural orientation were negatively and significantly correlated with the two diagrams. Alternation showed no relation, while compatibility and hybridity were both

positively and significantly correlated with the scores obtained from the graphical representation. This pattern of correlation was observed throughout the analysis.

The results obtained by performing correlational analyses indicated overall, that the stronger the feelings of European identity (general, cultural or civic), the more people perceive the national and European identity to be compatible and even to form a new identity, a hybrid between the two, and the less they felt a conflict between the two or displayed an inclination for monoculture. This pattern was also obtained when correlating the BIOS variables with educational level, and the trend was present in the correlation with attitudes to multilingualism (see *Figure 3* for graph of the r scores). The variable that was most strongly related to the BIOS scale was general European identity, showing strong negative correlations with conflict and monoculture, no correlation with alternation, and strong positive with compatibility and hybridity

The same pattern of correlations was obtained between the BIOS variables other identity variables, such as feeling Romanian, European, and member of the EU. No relation was observed between the five dimensions and proficiency and confidence in foreign languages, or intention to continue studying languages. Motivational intensity showed some relations, enough to suggest a trend, consistent with the pattern described above.




Figure 3. Graphical representation of the r scores between BIOS and European identity variables, educational level and attitudes to multilingualism for the Romanian group

Table 9. Pearson r correlations between the various measures of identity for the Romanian group

	Eur gen	Eur civ	Eur cult	EU member	Eur	East Eur	World citizen	Romanian	Regional	City	Diagram 2	Diagram 3
Eur gen	1											
Eur civ	-.47**	1										
Eur cult	-.44**	.62**	1									
EU member	.50**	.30**	.26**	1								
Eur	-.49**	0.12	.27**	-.57**	1							
East Eur	.27*	-.001	.22**	-.34**	-.49**	1						
World citizen	.27*	0.09	0.09	-.43**	.27**	.22**	1					
Romanian	0.1	0.01	0.01	0.12	.16**	.23**	-.002	1				
Regional	0.04	.15*	0.1	.16*	0.02	0.03	.16*	0.08	1			
City	0.03	.20**	.16*	.16*	0.06	0.05	.16*	.16*	0.72	1		
Diagram 2	-.42**	.20*	.21*	-.44**	-.51**	-.25**	-.23**	0.08	-.007	-.009	1	
Diagram 3	.23*	0.13	0.08	.25*	.23*	0.02	0.13	0.16	-.008	-.001	.69**	1

** Significant at .01 level; * Significant at .05 level.

3.2.1.4. RQ 2 - Language and European identity

The correlational analysis between the linguistic variables and the measures for European identity was conducted by correlating Bruter's European identity instrument (general, civic and cultural) and linguistic measures. These measures included self-perceived proficiency in L1, L2, L3 and L4; frequency of use of L1, L2, L3 and L4; and the scales which assessed the participants' attitudes to multilingualism, their confidence and anxiety in using foreign languages, motivational intensity to study foreign languages and intention to continue studying them. The results of these analyses suggested that frequency of use and self-perceived proficiency in a foreign language are arbitrarily related to the measure of European identity mentioned above: the civic European identity correlated negatively with frequency of use of L2 ($r = -.14$, $p < .05$) and the cultural European identity correlated with frequency of use of L4 and proficiency in L1 ($r = .19$, $p < .05$; respectively, $r = .14$, $p < .05$).

The variable that correlated strongly and positively with all three types of European identity was attitudes to multilingualism, suggesting thus that the higher the support for multilingualism, the stronger the sense of European identity. The general European identity also correlated with motivational intensity and intention to continue studying foreign languages, and negatively with feelings of anxiety when using a foreign language (see *Table 10* for the r values). The civic European identity was also correlated positively with motivational intensity.

Table 10. Pearson r values for European identity and linguistic variables for the Romanian group

	Eur gen	Eur civ	Eur cult
Attitudes	.20**	.14*	.14*
Anxiety	-.20**	0.02	0.03
Confidence	0.06	-0.06	-0.09
Motivation intensity	.21**	.14*	0.06
Intention to continue	.13*	0.06	0.02

** Significant at .01 level; * Significant at .05 level.

Attitudes to multilingualism also correlated positively with the variables that asked participants whether they identified with being a member of the European Union ($r = .16$,

$p = .01$) and a world citizen ($r = .19$, $p = .003$). These two variables showed significant negative correlations with anxiety when using a foreign language, suggesting that the more anxious people are when using a foreign language, the less they feel as a member of the EU and as a world citizen. Interestingly, the identification with being a world citizen correlated positively with proficiency in all foreign languages: L2 - $r = .16$, $p = .01$; L3 - $r = .20$, $p = .004$; L4 - $r = .18$, $p = .03$, as well as with interest in learning another foreign language ($r = .20$, $p = .002$) and motivational intensity and intention to continue studying languages ($r = .18$, $p = .004$; respectively, $r = .21$, $p = .001$).

Other correlational analyses were performed in order to assess the relation between the identification with Romania and the linguistic variables mentioned earlier. The results seem to suggest that the stronger the feelings of nationalism, the lower the confidence, proficiency and frequency of use of foreign languages, the correlations being negative. Feeling Romanian correlated with the confidence in using foreign languages at $r = -.19$, $p = .003$, the frequency of use of L2 at $r = -.16$, $p = .01$, L3 at $r = -.12$, $p = .08$ (not significant, but a possible trend, given the other correlational results), and L4 at $r = -.20$, $p = .01$. The self-perceived proficiency in the foreign languages showed the following correlations with the identification with the term Romanian: L2: $r = .21$, $p = .002$, L3: $r = -.18$, $p = .01$, and L4: $r = -.05$, $p = .54$ (not significant).

3.2.1.5. RQ 3 - Linguistic predictors of European identity

Regression analyses were performed in order to find the best predictors for the general, civic and cultural European identity. The starting point for this analysis were the results of the correlational analyses described above. As such, the variables entered as independent were attitudes to multilingualism, motivational intensity and intention to continue studying foreign languages, and anxiety, all entered at the same time. The dependent variables used were in turn general, civic and cultural European identity.

In the first instance, the linguistic variables were entered as predictors for the three types of European identity (Bruter, 2005). At the bivariate level all the linguistic variables correlated with this variable, however at the multivariate level, only the variables attitudes to multilingualism and anxiety in using a foreign language were predictors of the general European identity, with anxiety predicting a low level of general European identity. Although the variable attitudes to multilingualism was correlated significantly and positively with the two other types of European identity at the bivariate level, the

regression analyses showed that this variable was a predictor only for cultural European identity. None of the other linguistic variables proved significant in the regression analyses (see *Table 11* for values).

Table 11. Results of the regression analyses of the linguistic predicting variables (IV) and the

IV	Equation		Coefficients				
	R	F	Beta	t	r	pr	sr
Eur gen	0.08	5.19*					
Attitudes			0.24	2.02*	0.21	0.13	0.13
Motivational Intensity			0.11	1.38	0.21	0.09	0.09
Intention to Continue			0.01	0.09	0.13	0.01	0.01
Anxiety			-0.15	-2.23*	-0.2	-0.14	-0.14
Eur civ	0.03	1.73					
Attitudes			0.1	1.37	0.13	0.09	0.09
Motivational Intensity			0.12	1.56	0.14	0.1	0.1
Intention to Continue			-0.03	-0.35	0.07	-0.02	-0.02
Anxiety			0.06	0.9	0.01	0.06	0.06
Eur cult	0.03	1.54					
Attitudes			0.16	2.22*	0.15	0.15	0.15
Motivational Intensity			0.03	0.4	0.06	0.03	0.03
Intention to Continue			-0.04	-0.56	0.02	-0.04	-0.04
Anxiety			0.05	0.72	0.02	0.05	0.05

* Significant at .05 level.

The same analyses was performed for the other variables that aimed at the feelings of European identity, namely, feeling like a member of the European Union and feeling European. An inspection of the results indicates that anxiety was a predictor of lower levels for both dependent variables. An unanticipated result showed that intention to continue studying foreign languages was also a predictor of lower levels of European-ness (see *Table 12* for values).

Table 12. Results of the regression analyses of the linguistic predicting variables (IV) and the European-ness and member of the EU (DV) for the Romanian group

IV	Equation		Coefficients				
	R	F	Beta	t	r	pr	sr
Eur	0.08	4.85*					
Attitudes			0.1	1.38	0.11	0.09	0.09
Motivational Intensity			0.08	1	0.09	0.06	0.06
Intention to Continue			-0.17	-2.20*	-0.07	-0.14	-0.14
Anxiety			-0.21	-3.20*	-0.23	-0.2	-0.2
EU member	0.06	3.75*					
Attitudes			0.12	1.73	0.15	0.11	0.11
Motivational Intensity			0.08	0.95	0.12	0.06	0.06
Intention to Continue			-0.09	-1.2	0.01	-0.08	-0.07
Anxiety			-0.17	-2.55	-0.2	-0.16	-0.16

* Significant at .05 level.

A decision was made to investigate the predictiveness of just two of the independent variables, that is, attitudes to multilingualism and anxiety to communicate in a foreign language (see *Table 13*).

Table 13. Results of the regression analyses of the linguistic predicting variables attitudes to multilingualism and anxiety (IV) and Bruter's European identity measurements (DV) for the Romanian group

IV	Equation		Coefficients				
	R	F	Beta	t	r	pr	sr
Eur gen	0.06	8.87*					
Attitudes			0.18	2.80*	0.2	0.18	0.17
Anxiety			-0.17	-2.66*	-0.2	-0.17	-0.16
Eur civ	0.02	2.61					
Attitudes			0.15	2.26*	0.14	0.15	0.15
Anxiety			0.05	0.74	0.02	0.05	0.05

IV	Equation		Coefficients				
	R	F	Beta	t	r	pr	sr
Eur cult	0.02	2.6					
Attitudes			0.15	2.21*	0.14	0.14	0.14
Anxiety			0.06	0.92	0.04	0.06	0.06

Significant at .05 level.

These variables were chosen based on theoretical grounds, but also because they seemed to be the best predictors of European identity in the analyses presented above. The results of this second regression analysis indicate that attitudes to multilingualism is a suitable predictor of all types of European identity (although, just the *t* score was significant, the *F* score was not), while anxiety only predicted the general European identity.

3.2.1.6. RQ 4 - Generational differences

In order to investigate whether there was a difference between the younger and the older generations of Romanians who participated in this study, the sample was split into two groups, the ones younger than 35 and the ones older than 35 years of age. As discussed earlier, the reason for choosing this age is that the people who are now 35 would have been in beginning of their teens when the 1989 revolution against the Communist regime took place, therefore, it is safe to say that they grew up in a democratic environment, opened to Europe and the world.

A series of independent *t*-tests were performed in order to identify the differences between the two groups on various identity measures. The results suggested that there were significant differences on most of the variables investigated.

The initial analysis looked at Bruter's instruments for European identity. The comparison between the Under-35 group and the Over-35 group showed significant differences between the groups on all three variables of European identity, with the Over-35 group scoring higher in all cases (General European identity: $t(235) = -2.52, p = .01$; Civic European identity: $t(220) = -3.62, p < .001$; Cultural European identity: $t(223) = -3.11, p = .002$). The results obtained by looking at these groups on the first diagram (European and national identity) are consistent with the findings for European identity from Bruter's instrument ($t(236) = -3.36, p = .001$).

The two groups were compared on their identification with being a world citizen, European, Eastern European, member of EU, Romanian, member of the region and the city they were from. The significant results were European ($t(234) = -2.20, p = .03$) with the Over-35 group feeling again more European. Interestingly, the results for world citizen and regional identity followed a different pattern: they showed significant differences between the groups, with the Under-35 group scoring higher on both variables ($t(232) = 3.14, p = .002$, respectively $t(228) = 2.83, p = .005$). These differences in means are represented in *Figure 4*.




Figure 4. Means of the identity variables in the two age groups for the Romanian group

3.2.2. Belgium - Francophones

3.2.2.1. Reliability

Reliability analyses were conducted on all scales to be used in the statistical analysis of the data collected from the Francophone Belgian participants. All scales except one proved to be reliable, with the Cronbach alpha value ranging between .93 and .63. The exception was recorded for cultural European identity as described by Bruter (2005). This variable was not included in the analysis of the Francophone data.

3.2.2.2. *Validity*

In order to assess the validity of the identity scales, correlational analyses were conducted with these scales. The results indicate that Bruter's general European identity variable correlated strongly and positively with other variables tapping at the European identity, such as European-ness, member of the EU, the two-layer diagram and others. These results are presented in *Table 14* below. Interestingly, some of the European-ness measurements also correlated strongly and positively with measures of national and regional identity, but not with the variables tapping at the participants' identity with their city.

3.2.2.3. *RQ 1 - BIOS and European identity & language*

The five variables of the BIOS were again correlated with the two diagrams. Not all the correlations were significant, but the pattern of correlations was again consistent, with the conflict and monocultural orientation variables correlating negatively with the diagrams, alternation showing no relation and compatibility and hybridity correlating positively (see *Table 14*). The trends of this correlational pattern being present, it can be presumed that with a larger sample of participants the correlations could have reached significance levels. The fact that the pattern was somewhat consistent with the Romanian sample, allowed us to continue to investigate the relations. Due to the fact the cultural European identity did not have a high reliability index, it was not included in the analysis. However, the general European identities correlated in a pattern consistent with the diagrams, but stronger and more significant correlations were recorded between the compatibility and hybridity variables and both civic and general European identity.

With regards to educational level and attitudes to multilingualism, no relation was recorded with the five variables. Alternation though showed strong positive correlations with some linguistic variables, such as confidence in using a foreign language, L2, L3 and L4 proficiency. The foreign language proficiency also correlated positively and significantly with hybridity. The motivational intensity correlations showed a trend consistent with the pattern observed earlier, but none of them were significant; intention to continue studying languages showed no relation to the five variables.




Figure 5. Graphical representation of the r scores between BIOS and European identity variables, educational level and attitudes to multilingualism for the Belgian Francophones

3.2.2.4. RQ 2 - Language and European identity

In order to assess the second research question for the Francophone Belgian sample, correlational analyses were conducted, looking at the relation between Bruter's general and civic European identity measurements and the linguistic variable present in the study. The linguistics self-assessed proficiency did not correlate with the European identity variables, except for one: the correlation between the civic European identity and proficiency in L1 was positive and significant ($r = .25$, $p = .03$). In the case of the frequency of use of various languages and their relation with the European identity scales, again only one relation was significant, between frequency of use of L3 and the general European identity, but this relation was negative: $r = -.25$, $p = .03$. Consistent with our expectations and with the previous results, the variables related to attitudes to multilingualism and confidence in using a foreign language (respectively, anxiety in using a foreign language) also showed significant correlations with the civic European identity; these variables did not prove to be significantly related to the general European identity scale. Interestingly though, the other linguistic variables, motivational intensity and intention to continue studying foreign

Table 14. Pearson r correlations between the various measures of identity for the Belgian Francophones

	Eur gen	Eur civ	EU member	Eur	West Eur	World citizen	BXL	Walloon	Belg	Regional	City	Diagram 2	Diagram 3
Eur gen	1												
Eur civ	-.41**	1											
EU member	.67**	-.44**	1										
Eur	.69**	-.40**	.67**	1									
West Eur	.35**	.24*	.44**	.53**	1								
World citizen	-.42**	0.14	.66**	.36**	.27*	1							
BXL	0.05	-.01	0.09	0.07	0.06	0.09	1						
Walloon	0.15	0.01	0.1	.22*	0.12	0.08	-.55**	1					
Belg	.31**	0.02	.36**	.26*	0.13	.26*	-.0.003	0.21	1				
Regional	.32**	0.02	.37**	.24*	.28*	.39**	0	0.13	.31**	1			
City	0.14	-.0.04	0.15	0.13	0.12	.22*	0.03	0.14	.25*	.74**	1		
Diagram 2	.62**	.30**	.51**	-.44**	0.21	.36**	0.11	0.05	0.15	0.19	0.04	1	
Diagram 3	-.49**	-.23*	.34**	.28*	.23*	.26*	0.02	0.04	.27*	-.40**	0.15	.70**	1

** Significant at .01 level; * Significant at .05 level.

languages, did not show significant correlations with either of the two European identity variables. The results are presented in *Table 15*.

Table 15. Correlational r values for European identity and linguistic variables for the Belgian Francophones

	Eur gen	Eur civ
Attitudes	.28*	.30**
Anxiety	-.012	-.23*
Confidence	0.2	.31**
Motivation intensity	-.002	0.18
Intention to continue	-.004	0.03

** Significant at .01 level; * Significant at .05 level.

The correlations between the linguistic variables and the other measurements of identity were then tested. Some of the proficiency variables showed relations with the identity variables such that proficiency in L2 was significantly correlated to the Brussels identity ($r = .32, p = .005$), while proficiency in L4 was related to a feeling of being Western European ($r = .25, p < .05$), with the Brussels identity ($r = .34, p = .006$), with regional identity ($r = .28, p = .014$) and the city identity ($r = .31, p = .013$). The feeling of European-ness only correlated with attitudes to multilingualism ($r = .25, p = .023$). Identification as a member of the EU and a world citizen also correlated positively with attitudes to multilingualism ($r = .28, p = 0.11$, respectively, $r = .25, p = .023$). Interestingly, a feeling of belonging to the capital city of Belgium was negatively related to both motivational intensity to learn a foreign language ($r = -.23, p = .039$) and intention to continue studying languages ($r = -.40, p < .000$). A strong identification with being Walloon was only significantly related to intention to continue studying a foreign language ($r = .27, p = .016$).

3.2.2.5. RQ 3 - Linguistic predictors of European identity

In order to evaluate the third research question for the Francophone Belgian sample, regression analyses were carried out. The purpose of these analyses was to identify the best predictor, if any, of the European identity measurements. Initially, the predictability of Bruter's general and civic European identity by the attitudes to multilingualism and anxiety in communicating in a foreign language was assessed. Motivational intensity and intention to continue studying languages were not included in this analysis because of the low or inexistent correlations they showed with the identity variables in the analysis conducted for RQ 2. The results indicate that for the Francophone Belgian sample the best predictor for

both general and civic European identity was again attitudes to multilingualism, but in this case the anxiety variable did not show any power of predictability (see *Table 16* for values).

Table 16. Results of the regression analyses of the linguistic predicting variables attitudes to multilingualism and anxiety (IV) and Bruter's general and civic European identity measurements (DV) for the Belgian Francophones

DV	IV	Equation		Coefficients				
		R	F	Beta	t	r	pr	sr
Eur gen		0.08	3.49*					
	Attitudes			0.27	2.41*	0.28	0.26	0.26
	Anxiety			-0.05	-0.44	-0.12	-0.05	-0.05
Eur civ		0.12	5.12*					
	Attitudes			0.26	2.30*	0.3	0.26	0.25
	Anxiety			-0.17	-1.53	-0.24	-0.17	-0.17

* Significant at .05 level

Regression analyses was continued by keeping the same independent variables - attitudes to multilingualism and anxiety in using a foreign language - and changing the dependent variables to European and member of the EU. The results showed a similar pattern to the results obtained for general and civic European identity, i.e. the only predictor for these IVs was attitudes to multilingualism in both cases. Similar to the previous analysis for this sample, the R square and F values were quite low, and not significant in the case of European ($F(2,80) = 2.66, p = .076$).

3.2.2.6. RQ 4 - Generational differences

In order to answer the fourth research question, the sample of Francophone Belgian participants was split based on age. This split yielded a sample of $N = 26$ Over-35 and $N = 78$ Under-35. Although the split yielded groups of very different sizes, independent t-test were still used to assess the difference between them, keeping in mind the fact that the results might prove to be just tentative.

The only two results that showed a significant difference between the two groups were the investigating people's identity as Walloons (with the Under-35 groups feeling significantly

more Walloon than the Over-35 group) and inhabitants of Brussels (the Under-35 group felt significantly less Brusseler than the Over-35 group). The graph below shows the two groups and their scores on each one of the identity variables analysed.




Figure 6. Means of the identity variables in the two age groups for the Belgian Francophones

3.2.3. Belgium - Dutch speakers

3.2.3.1. Reliability

The Cronbach alpha index for reliability was calculated for all variables in order to decide whether all scales could be used for the analysis of the data. The alpha value ranged between .93 and .66 for all variables, except the cultural European identity. As in the case of the Belgian Francophone sample, the Cronbach alpha value for cultural European identity was not suitable, therefore the variable was excluded from further analysis.

3.2.3.2. Validity

In order to assess the validity of the European identity scale, correlational analysis with the other European identity variables were conducted. The relation between these variables

and other identity variables present in the questionnaire was also assessed. The results indicated that general and civic European identities correlated strongly and positively with other variables aimed at tapping at the European identity concept. The Flemish identity correlated negatively with the general European identity and showed no relation to other variables of interest. The Belgian identity variable was positively correlated to most of the measure of European-ness, i.e., civic European identity, EU membership and feeling European (see *Table 17* for r values).

3.2.3.3. RQ 1 - BIOS and European identity & language

In the case of the Dutch-speaking Belgian sample the cultural European identity was not a reliable scale, thus this variable was not used in the analysis. To test the validity of BIOS scale, correlations were conducted between the five variables of BIOS and the two diagrams - the diagrams were the graphical representation of the relation between the participants' national and European identity; and regional, national and European identity (see *Table 17*). The results indicated that in the case of the Dutch-speaking sample, similarly with the previous samples analysed, the pattern of correlations was maintained; the conflict and monoculture variables correlated negatively with the two European identity scales, while compatibility and hybridity correlated positively and significantly with them. Alternation showed a correlation with civic European identity, but not with general European identity. This pattern was also observed when the five variables were compared to the variable attitudes to multilingualism, confidence in using a foreign language, motivational intensity and intention to continue studying foreign languages; in some these cases, the correlations were not significant, but the pattern was present.

With regards to proficiency in other languages and their relation to the five BIOS variables, it is worth noting that hybridity correlated positively with proficiency in all languages, including L1, while compatibility showed the same relation to proficiency in L1, L2 and L3. Alternation again showed zero correlations to these variables, but monocultural orientation and conflict correlated negatively (although not always with significant correlations) with the linguistic proficiency variables. Educational level showed a negative relation to conflict and a positive one with compatibility and hybridity (see *Figure 7* for graphical representation of the r scores).




Figure 7. Graphical representation of the r scores between BIOS and European identity variables, educational level and attitudes to multilingualism for the Dutch-speaking Belgians

3.2.3.4. RQ 2 - Language and European identity

The second research question was aimed at understanding the relation between the European identity variables and the linguistic variables. For this purpose, correlational analyses were conducted between the general and civic European identity variables and the linguistic self-assessed proficiency and frequency of use, as well as anxiety and confidence in using a foreign language, attitudes to multilingualism and the motivational intensity and intention to continue studying languages. The results showed positive and significant correlations between the general European identity and proficiency in L2, L3 and L4 ($r = .26$, $r = .24$, $r = .28$, respectively, with $p < .001$). The frequency of use variables showed no relation with the two European identity measurements, however, attitudes to multilingualism correlated strongly and positively with both of them: for general European identity, $r = .28$, $p < .001$, and for civic European identity, $r = .21$, $p = .003$. The general European identity variable also showed significant relations with motivational intensity ($r = .20$, $p = .006$), confidence ($r = .30$, $p < .001$) and anxiety ($r = -.20$, $p = .005$). Civic European identity was also shown to be related, although weaker, to motivational intensity ($r = .18$, $p = .02$) and intention to continue studying a foreign language ($r = .15$, $p = .04$).

Table 17. Pearson *r* correlations between the various measures of identity for the Dutch-speaking Belgians

	Eur gen	Eur civ	EU member	Eur citizen	World citizen	BXL	Flemish	Belg	Regional	City	Diagram 2	Diagram 3
Eur gen	1											
Eur civ	.48**	1										
EU member	.68**	.49**	1									
Eur	.61**	.38**	.69**	1								
World citizen	.46**	.23**	.46**	.41**	1							
BXL	0.13	.16*	0.09	0.07	0.07	1						
Flemish	-.17*	-.0.07	-.0.06	-.0.01	-.0.04	-.26*	1					
Belg	0.07	.21**	.25**	.35**	0.06	.24**	0.06	1				
Regional	0.1	0.05	.15*	.22**	-.8	0.05	.32**	.17*	1			
City	0.07	0.06	.22**	.28**	0.09	.17*	0.13	.30**	.72**	1		
Diagram 2	.44**	.30**	.21**	.29**	0.13	.15*	-.15*	.34**	0.04	0.09	1	
Diagram 3	.30**	.27**	0.13	.17*	0.02	0.11	-.17*	.31**	0.07	.17*	.66**	1

** Significant at .01 level; * Significant at .05 level.

The investigation went on, by assessing the relation between the other identity variables and the linguistic variables. Some results indicate a strong and negative correlation between feeling Flemish and L3 proficiency ($r = -.22$, $p = .002$), frequency of use of L2 ($r = -.23$, $p = .002$) and L3 ($r = -.30$, $p < .001$), as well as attitudes to multilingualism ($r = -.24$, $p = .001$). The only other relations between feeling Flemish and a linguistic variable were observed with the anxiety of speaking a foreign language variable ($r = -.20$, $p = .007$) and confidence variable ($r = .30$, $p < .001$). A somewhat similar pattern of correlations was observed with the identity variable tapping at the Belgian identity; one of the differences remarked though was that attitudes to multilingualism correlated positively with this identity variable, although it was a somewhat weak correlation ($r = .14$, $p = .05$). Feeling Brusseler showed a positive and significant relation with the frequency of use of L2 and L3 ($r = .17$, $p = .02$; $r = .23$, $p = .002$) and attitudes to multilingualism ($r = .27$, $p < .001$).

3.2.3.5. RQ 3 - Linguistic predictors of European identity

The analysis of the Dutch-speaking Belgian sample of participants continued by investigating the best predictors of the general and civic European identity. In the first instance, all the linguistic variables were included in the analysis, but motivational intensity and intention to continue studying the language showed no power of prediction for these two European identity variables. The analysis was run again, this time introducing as possible predictors only the variables attitudes to multilingualism and anxiety. The results indicated that in the case of general European identity, both independent variables showed significant results, while in the case of civic European identity, only the variable attitudes to multilingualism variable was significant (the results are displayed in *Table 18*).

Table 18. Results of the regression analyses of the linguistic predicting variables attitudes to multilingualism and anxiety (IV) and Bruter's general and civic European identity measurements (DV) for the Dutch-speaking Belgians

DV	IV	Equation		Coefficients				
		R	F	Beta	t	r	pr	sr
Eur gen		0.1	10.50*					
	Attitudes			0.25	3.54*	0.28	0.25	0.25
	Anxiety			-0.16	-2.20*	-0.2	-0.16	-0.15
Eur civ		0.05	4.54*					

DV	IV	Equation		Coefficients				
		R	F	Beta	t	r	pr	sr
	Attitudes			0.22	3.01*	0.21	0.22	0.22
	Anxiety			0.04	0.5	-0.01	0.04	0.03

* Significant at .05 level.

As in the previous analysis, the predictability of other measures of European identity by these linguistic variables was investigated. Yet again, motivational intensity and intention to continue studying a foreign language were not included because at the bivariate level they showed no relation to the European identity variables. The regression analysis showed that attitudes to multilingualism and anxiety in speaking a foreign language were not predictors of the identity as a member of the EU; as for the European variable, again, only attitudes to multilingualism proved to be a somewhat strong predictor ($F(2,189) = 3.70$, $p = .027$).

3.2.3.6. RQ 4 - Generational differences

The Dutch-speaking Belgian sample was also assessed with regards to the fourth research question which investigated the differences in various identity measures between the Under-35 and the Over-35 participants. It is worth keeping in mind that the two groups are quite different in size. T-tests were performed in order to investigate the possible differences between them and the results showed very little variation in the scores obtained by the Under-35 groups and the Over-35 one. The only significant t-test was on the variable EU member identity, $t(172) = -2.53$, $p = 0.12$, with the Over-35 scoring higher (see *Figure 8* for comparison of scores between the two groups).




Figure 8. Means of the identity variables in the two age groups for the Dutch-speaking Belgians

3.2.4. United Kingdom

3.2.4.1. Reliability

Reliability analyses were conducted on all scales to be included in the analysis. All scales indicated an appropriate Cronbach alpha value (ranging between .63 and .97), which allowed us to proceed to the statistical analysis.

3.2.4.2. Validity

For the English sample, correlations between the identity measures were run in order to check whether the measures were consistent and valid for this context. The results indicate that most measures correlate strongly and positively with each other. Correlations between the self-assessed measurements of identity were also conducted in order to better understand the relation between them. Unsurprisingly, the measures of European-ness correlated significantly and negatively with the measures of British and English identity (trend, not significant). The pattern of correlations is consistent with the correlation recorded for the Romanian sample (for a breakdown of all correlations, see *Table 19*).

3.2.4.3. RQ 1 - BIOS and European identity & language

For the UK sample, the validity of the five BIOS variables was initially checked, by correlating them with the two graphical representations of the possible relation between the national and European identity; and the regional, national and European identity (see *Table 19*). The correlations observed were consistent with the pattern previously observed and were surprisingly strong: negative significant correlations were observed with the conflict and monocultural orientation variables, no correlations with alternation, and positive and significant correlations with compatibility and hybridity.

Bruter's European identity variables displayed similar correlations as in the previous analysis; conflict correlated significantly and negatively only with civic European identity, but indicated trends for the other two as well; monocultural orientation was also negatively correlated with general and civic European identities, while alternation correlated strongly and positively with general European identity. Compatibility and hybridity showed positive and strong relations to all European variables.

With regards to language proficiency, the only variable that showed strong correlations with the BIOS variables was proficiency in L2, such that it correlated positively and significantly with alternation, compatibility and hybridity, but showed no relation to the conflict and monoculture variables. This particular pattern of correlations was also observed for confidence and intention to continue studying languages, while motivational intensity only correlated with compatibility and hybridity.

Educational level also showed slight variations from the pattern of correlations observed for the other sample, such that it correlated negatively and significantly with conflict and monocultural orientation, positively with compatibility, but showed no relation to alternation or hybridity.




Figure 9. Graphical representation of the r scores between BIOS and European identity variables, educational level and attitudes to multilingualism for the British group

3.2.4.4. RQ 2 - Language and European identity

Correlational analyses were performed to investigate the relation between the European identity scales developed by Bruter (2005) and the linguistic variables pertaining to language proficiency and frequency of use, confidence and anxiety in using a foreign language, motivational intensity and intention to continue studying a foreign language, and attitudes towards multilingualism.

The results obtained in the case of the UK sample indicate a relationship between the proficiency one has in a foreign language and general European identity; Proficiency in L2 showed a correlation of $r = .47$, $p = .000$ with general European identity, while L3 proficiency correlated at $r = .32$, $p = .003$ and L4 proficiency correlated at $r = .27$, $p < .05$. The only other correlation between the linguistic proficiency variables and Bruter's European identity scales was recorded between L2 proficiency and civic European identity ($r = .36$, $p = .000$). With regards to the frequency of use of the languages known and their relation to the European identity scales, a pattern can be distinguish, although it is not always significant. The frequency of using L1 was correlated negatively with all measures of Bruter's European identity, but significantly only with the civic identity ($r = -.22$, $p < .05$). However, the results indicate that there is a significant positive relation between the frequency of use of L2 and L3 and the general and civic European identity (L2 frequency of

Table 19. Pearson r correlations between the various measures of identity for the British group

	Eur gen	Eur civ	Eur cult	EU member	Eur	West Eur	World citizen	UK	Eng	City	Diagram 2	Diagram 3
Eur gen	1											
Eur civ	.77**	1										
Eur cult	.59**	.54**	1									
EU member	.74**	.79**	.46**	1								
Eur	.80**	.67**	.49**	.67**	1							
West Eur	.36**	.27**	.25**	.34**	.42**	1						
World citizen	.45**	.45**	0.19	.61**	.48**	.23*	1					
UK	-.25*	-.24*	-.01	-.19	-.09	0.07	-.008	1				
Eng	-.018	-.017	0.09	-.005	-.04	0.12	-.01	.63**	1			
City	0.04	0.03	-.002	0	0.09	-.001	0.09	0.13	-.009	1		
Diagram 2	.61**	.45**	.38**	.41**	.51**	0.2	.22*	-.013	-.26*	0.05	1	
Diagram 3	0.2	0.17	0.15	.21*	0.12	0.01	0.16	0.1	-.015	0.14	.59**	1

** Significant at .01 level; * Significant at .05 level.

use and general European identity: $r = .44$, $p = .000$; L3 frequency of use and general European identity: $r = .36$, $p = .000$; L2 frequency of use and civic European identity: $r = .42$,

$p = .000$; L3 frequency of use and civic European identity: $r = .39$, $p = .000$). The other linguistic variables mentioned above all correlated significantly with the measures of European identity, anxiety having a negative relation to them (see *Table 20* for r values).

Table 20. Correlational r values for European identity and linguistic variables for the British group

	Eur gen	Eur civ	Eur cult
Attitudes	.30**	.38**	.27**
Anxiety	-.46**	-.28**	-.014
Confidence	.46**	.33**	.24*
Motivation intensity	.42**	.34**	.28**
Intention to continue	.42**	.43**	.25*

** Significant at .01 level; * Significant at .05 level.

The relation between the linguistic variables and the various identity measures was assessed by conducting correlations between the same linguistic variables and European, Western-European, British, English regional and city identity. Western European identity, region and city identity did not prove to be related to any of the linguistic variables. But the other variables followed a pattern consistent with the previous results, such that European-ness correlated with L2 proficiency ($r = .40$, $p = .000$) and with L3 proficiency ($r = .33$, $p = .002$), as well as with the frequency of use of these languages ($r = .28$, $p = .007$; $r = .26$, $p = .02$). It also correlated positively with attitudes to multilingualism ($r = .22$, $p = .03$), motivational intensity ($r = .38$, $p = .000$), intention to continue studying a foreign language ($r = .33$, $p = .001$), and confidence when using a foreign language ($r = .34$, $p = .001$). European-ness correlated significantly and negatively with anxiety in using a foreign language ($r = -.30$, $p = .003$). The variables tapping at the British and English identity showed an exact opposite pattern to the European identity variable, correlating negatively with L2 proficiency and frequency of use, as well as attitudes to multilingualism, intention to continue studying another language and confidence. The only significant and positive correlation was recorded between strong feelings of being British and English and anxiety to communicate in a foreign language.

3.2.4.5. RQ 3 - Linguistic predictors of European identity

Regression analyses were used in order to find the best predictors for general, civic and cultural European identity. Based on the theoretical assumptions and the previous correlational analyses reported here, the independent variables chosen were attitudes to multilingualism, anxiety to communicate in a foreign language, motivational intensity and intention to continue studying foreign languages. These variables were entered at once, since there was no presumption that one would take precedence over the other. The variable confidence in communicating in a foreign language was again dropped due to the high correlation it showed to have with anxiety ($r = -.73$, $p = .000$). The other linguistic variables also showed strong correlations, but not as strong as the correlations between anxiety and confidence. Andy Field (2009) suggests that variables can be entered as predictors even if they are correlated, unless the correlations are above .80, on the condition that the collinearity statistics are closely examined. The dependent variables considered were general, civic and cultural European identity, in the first place. Regression analyses were also conducted looking at the variables European and member of the EU. All the results are presented in *Table 21* and *Table 22*.

The collinearity statistics tolerance and VIF were inspected for any abnormal values, which would indicate the relation between the predictors is too strong to allow for a valid regression analysis, but in all cases these statistics were within the normal values. Thus, the next step was the regression analyses; in the first instance, the predictors for general, civic and cultural European identity variables were investigated.

Table 21. Results of the regression analyses of the linguistic predicting variables (IV) and the European identity variables (DV) for the British group

DV	IV	Equation		Coefficients				
		R	F	Beta	t	r	pr	sr
Eur gen		0.3	9.53*					
	Attitudes			0.03	0.26	0.3	0.03	0.02
	Anxiety			-0.31	-3.13*	-0.46	-0.32	-0.28
	Motivational Intensity			0.16	1.4	0.42	0.15	0.12
	Intention to Continue			0.2	1.57	0.42	0.16	0.14
Eur civ		0.23	6.50*					
	Attitudes			0.16	1.37	0.38	0.14	0.13
	Anxiety			-0.12	-1.14	-0.28	-0.12	-0.11
	Motivational Intensity			0.08	0.67	0.34	0.07	0.06
	Intention to Continue			0.24	1.85	0.43	0.19	0.17
Eur cult		0.11	2.61*					
	Attitudes			0.15	1.2	0.27	0.13	0.12
	Anxiety			-0.001	-0.01	-0.14	-0.001	-0.001
	Motivational Intensity			0.19	1.44	0.28	0.15	0.15
	Intention to Continue			0.33	0.33	0.25	0.04	0.03

* Significant at .05 level.

Although at the bivariate level there were strong positive correlations between the identity and the linguistic variables, at the multivariate level, these predictors barely had any effect on the dependent variables. The same results were obtained for the European and member of the EU variables. All the F values for the regression analyses were significant; however, a close inspection of the t values and their significance levels points to the fact that the only predictor for general European identity was anxiety, suggesting that higher levels of anxiety might predict lower levels of general European identity.

Table 22. Results of the regression analyses of the linguistic predicting variables (IV) and the European-ness and member of the EU (DV) for the British group

DV	IV	Equation		Coefficients				
		R	F	Beta	t	r	pr	sr
Eur		0.18	4.95*					
	Attitudes			-0.02	-0.13	0.22	-0.01	-0.01
	Anxiety			-0.15	-1.39	-0.3	-0.15	-0.13
	Motivational Intensity			0.24	1.91	0.38	0.2	0.18
	Intention to Continue			0.16	1.16	0.33	0.12	0.11
EU member		0.2	5.56*					
	Attitudes			0.13	1.05	0.33	0.11	0.1
	Anxiety			-0.1	-0.93	-0.27	-0.1	-0.09
	Motivational Intensity			0.2	1.62	0.38	0.17	0.15
	Intention to Continue			0.15	1.12	0.37	0.12	0.11

* Significant at .05 level.

In regression analysis, when too many variables are entered at once, there is a possibility that they will mask (Lawrance, 1995) the truly significant ones and yield a significant F value, but no significant t-values. Thus, the same analysis was carried out again, but only with the variables attitudes to multilingualism and anxiety as predictors for the various measures of European identity. These predictors were chosen due to their theoretical relevance and their distinctive nature. The results showed a dramatic change, indicating in almost all cases these two independent variables were strong predictors of all types of European identity (the only exception was anxiety as predictor of cultural European identity showed no significance). The results in *Table 23* show the strength of these predictors.

Table 23. Results of the regression analyses of the linguistic predicting variables attitudes to multilingualism and anxiety (IV) and Bruter's European identity measurements (DV) for the British group

DV	IV	Equation		Coefficients				
		R	F	Beta	t	r	pr	sr
Eur gen		0.25	14.89*					
	Attitudes			0.2	2.09*	0.3	0.21	0.19
	Anxiety			-0.41	-4.36*	-0.46	-0.42	-0.4
Eur civ		0.19	9.94*					
	Attitudes			0.33	3.33*	0.38	0.33	0.32
	Anxiety			-0.2	-2.04*	-0.28	-0.21	-0.19
Eur cult		0.08	3.75*					
	Attitudes			0.25	2.38*	0.27	0.24	0.24
	Anxiety			-0.08	-0.72	-0.14	-0.08	-0.07

* Significant at .05 level.

3.2.4.6. RQ 4 - Generational differences

The differences between people under 35 and people over 35 with regards to their identification to various groups were investigated by conducting independent sample t-tests. The sample was split in two groups: Under-35 (N = 45) and Over-35 (N=38). The results of the t-test analysis investigating the various measures of identity indicated that these two groups were different on some of these variables.

Bruter's European identity variables were first assessed, and the results showed that the two groups were different with regards to their general and civic European identity, but not their cultural identity (General European identity: $t(81) = 2.66$, $p = .009$; Civic European identity: $t(81) = 3.63$, $p = .001$). The Under-35 group scored thus significantly higher on measures of general and civic European identity. The other significant differences were recorded in the case of Diagram 3, which showed various possible representations between the regional, national and European identities ($t(81) = 2.05$, $p < .05$); in this case as well, the Under-35 group scored higher than the Over-35 group, indicating a stronger relation between the 3 identities (for the graphic representation of Diagram 3, see Appendix A-D).

With regards to their identification as members of the European Union, the Under-35 group scored significantly higher as evidenced by the t-tests ($t(81) = 2.26, p < .05$). These results indicate that the younger generation of people in the UK tend to identify more with Europe and, mostly, the European Union.




Figure 10. Means of the identity variables in the two age groups for the British group

3.2.5. Belgium - Brussels and the rest of Belgium

3.2.5.1. RQ 5 - Brussels versus RoB - linguistic and European identity

For the purposes of investigating the European identity of the people from Brussels compared to the rest of the Belgian sample, the analysis was conducted by splitting the sample based on whether they were born or resided in Brussels. This division yielded two groups of participants: the ones who were born or lived in Brussels ($N=132$) and those who were neither born in Brussels, nor lived there ($N=205$). Descriptive analyses of the background information of the two groups indicated that the first one consisted of 31.1 % male participants (7 did not indicate their gender), while the second had 26.8% male participants (18 participants in this group did not indicate their gender). With regards to age, the Brussels Group had a mean of $M = 27.6$ ($SD = 11.0$) and for the Rest-of-Belgium

Group the mean was $M = 26.8$ ($SD = 13.8$). The educational level distribution was also similar between the two groups, same as the distribution of the L1 (around 65% in both groups had Dutch as a L1, and around 30% had French in both groups).

In order to investigate the differences between these two groups a series of t-tests were conducted to determine whether there were significant differences between the Brussels Group and the Rest-of-Belgium Group on these following variables: proficiency and frequency of use of a foreign language, the linguistic variables, the European identity and other identity variables and the BIOS variables. The results are presented below.

3.2.5.1.1. Proficiency and frequency of use of foreign languages

The two groups were compared on their self-assessed proficiency and frequency of use of various languages. The results of the t-test indicate that the groups are significantly different with regards to proficiency in L2, L3 and L4, and also frequency of use of L2, L3 and L4, with the Brussels Group scoring significantly higher on all of these variables. The results are presented in the *Table 24*:

Table 24. Language proficiency and frequency of use means for the Brussels Group and RoB Group

	Group		t	df
	Brussels	RoB		
L2 Proficiency	5.23 (0.78)	4.85 (0.99)	3.68*	325
L3 Proficiency	4.69 (1.02)	4.29 (1.03)	3.40*	324
L4 Proficiency	3.54 (1.28)	2.99 (1.26)	3.54*	279
L2 Frequency	5.20 (1.32)	4.71 (1.57)	2.87*	317
L3 Frequency	4.56 (1.60)	3.96 (1.70)	3.14*	317
L4 Frequency	2.78 (1.79)	2.31 (1.62)	2.19*	267

Note: * = $p < .05$. Standard deviations appear in parentheses next to the means.

3.2.5.1.2. Linguistic variables

The same analyses were conducted to investigate the differences between the two groups on the following linguistic variables: confidence and anxiety in communicating in a foreign language, attitudes to multilingualism, motivational intensity and intention to continue

studying another language. The results of the t-tests indicated that the two groups were only different in their levels of anxiety ($t(324) = 3.18, p < 0.05$) and confidence ($t(324) = 2.95, p < 0.05$) in using a foreign language.

3.2.5.1.3. European identity variables

With regards to the differences between the two groups on the European identity variables, the results of the t-test analyses indicated that the two groups were not significantly different on any of these variables.

3.2.5.1.4. Other identity variables

The two groups were also compared on other identity variables, such as their identification with their city, region or country, with being a member of the European Union, a Western European and a world citizen. The t-test analyses yielded no significant results between the Brussels Group and the Rest-of-Belgium Group, thus suggesting that from an identity point of view the two groups were equivalent.

3.2.5.1.5. BIOS variables

The two groups were compared on their scores on the BIOS instrument, which intended to assess the way people manage their regional, national and European identities, whether they see these identities as forming a hybrid, being complementary, requiring them to be flexible and alternate between them depending on the context, preferring a monocultural identity or being conflictive. The results of the t-tests suggested that the two groups were only significantly different on their levels of alternation ($t(273) = 2.04, p < 0.05$), with the Brussels Group showing a higher degree of alternation between their regional, national and European identities.

3.2.5.1.6. Conclusion

The results obtained by comparing the Brussels Group with the Rest-of-Belgium Group indicate that they are not significantly different on any of the identity variables, except that the Brussels Group alternated more between their national and European identity than the Rest-of-Belgium Group. Due to the cosmopolitan nature of Brussels, people might encounter more opportunities in which they need to alternate between their regional, national and European identities. The main differences however, were recorded on the linguistic variables with the Brussels Groups feeling less anxious when using a foreign

language, and declaring more proficiency and frequency of use of foreign languages than the other group. One explanation for this result is that there may be increased opportunities to use a foreign language in Brussels. It seems then that the Brussels model fosters the development and use of foreign languages, but it does not influence the levels of identity between the participants in the two groups. Nonetheless, when interpreting these results it is important to keep in mind that the participants were all highly educated, young and multilingual. It is however reassuring to observe that the national, regional and European identity are at similar levels throughout the whole of Belgium, including Brussels. The results obtained here are also a good validator for the previous decision to compare the Belgian Francophone and Dutch-speaking groups.

3.2.6. All contexts - Romanian, English, French and Dutch

3.2.6.1. RQ 6 - *Comparison of contexts*

The four data sets were merged in order to be able to assess the level of impact of context on the European identity and linguistic variables. The analysis was performed by forming the four groups based on the context and comparing their results. The resulting groups were: English (N=119), Belgian Dutch speakers (N=230), Belgian Francophone (N=107) and Romanian (N=300). The analyses investigating how the groups differed on the European identity and linguistic variables were performed using one-way ANOVAs and the significant results were further assessed using Tukey post-hoc tests. The variables investigated were: proficiency and frequency of use of foreign languages, the linguistic variables, the European identity and other identity variables and the BIOS variables. The results are presented below.

3.2.6.1.1. Proficiency and frequency of use of foreign languages

One-way ANOVAs were conducted to see whether the context affected the levels of self-assessed proficiency and frequency of use of foreign languages. Statistical significant differences were observed for all variables, except proficiency in L1. The Tukey post-hoc tests indicated which groups were significantly different from each other and these results are presented in *Figure 11*.




Figure 11. Means of proficiency and competence in L1, L2, L3 and L4 for the four groups

The graph above presents the significant results of the analysis of variance between these four groups. The post-hoc Tukey tests indicated which of the groups showed significant difference. With regards to proficiency in L2, there was a significant difference between the four groups: $F(3, 722) = 27.93, p < 0.001$. The mean scores indicated that the English and the Belgian Francophone group scored significantly lower than the Romanian and the Dutch-speaking group, but the English and the Belgian Francophone groups did not differ significantly; same was true for the Dutch speakers and Romanian groups. The ANOVA for proficiency in L3 showed significant differences between the groups as well: $F(3, 686) = 20.40, p < 0.001$. In this case, the Dutch-speaking group scored significantly higher than all other groups, while the Romanian groups was significantly higher than the English group. The results of the One-way ANOVA for proficiency in L4 were also significant: $F(3, 533) = 19.00, p < 0.001$, and the post-hoc Tukey tests indicated that the Romanian groups scored significantly higher than all other groups, and that the Dutch-speaking group was significantly more proficient in L4 than the Belgian Francophone group.

The frequency of use variables for L1, L2, L3 and L4 all showed significant differences between the groups, although in some cases the F values were quite low. For example, with regards to frequency of use of L1, $F(3, 701) = 6.44, p < 0.001$. As indicated by the graph, the

Romanian group was significantly different from the Belgian Francophone and the English group, and the Dutch-speaking group was significantly different from the Belgian Francophone. Although these results are statistically significant, the graphical representation and the F value, clearly indicate that the differences are not so high. But these differences increased in the case of the frequency of use of the L2 between the four groups: $F(3, 712) = 26.15, p < 0.001$. In this case, the Dutch-speaking group was significantly different from all other groups, and the Belgian Francophone and Romanian group were also significantly different from the English group. The differences in the frequency of use of the L3 between the four groups were even stronger, with $F(3, 677) = 49.1, p < 0.001$. The Dutch-speaking group was significantly different from the other three groups, the Belgian Francophone group was also significantly different from the Romanian and the English group, and lastly, the Romanian group was significantly different from the English group. The last variable investigated was frequency of use of L4. In this case, the results showed again a significant difference between the four groups: $F(3, 514) = 8.47, p < 0.001$. The post-hoc Tukey tests indicated that the Belgian Francophone and the Dutch-speaking groups were significantly different from the Romanian and the English groups.

3.2.6.1.2. Linguistic variables

One-way ANOVAs were also conducted to test the differences between the four groups on the following linguistic variables: anxiety and confidence in communicating in a foreign language, attitudes to multilingualism, motivational intensity and intention to continue studying a foreign language. The means of each group for each variable are presented in *Figure 12*, followed by a description of the results of the analysis.

The results of the one-way ANOVAs investigating the differences between the four groups on the linguistic variables proved to be significant for all five variables. For the first variable, anxiety in communicating in a foreign language, $F(3, 715) = 20.73, p < 0.001$, and the post-hoc Tukey tests showed that English and Belgian Francophone group scored significantly higher than the Dutch speakers and the Romanian group. There were no significant differences observed between the English and Belgian Francophone group, nor the Dutch speakers and the Romanian group.




Figure 12. Means of the linguistic variables for the four groups

With regards to the confidence variables, $F(3, 714) = 25.5$, $p < 0.001$. In this case, post-hoc analysis indicated that the Romanian and the Dutch-speaking group scored significantly higher than the Belgian Francophone and the English group, and the difference between the Belgian Francophone and the English groups was also significant. The analysis of variance for the variable attitudes to multilingualism was significant, as well: $F(3, 658) = 49.31$, $p < 0.001$. As the graph and the post-hoc analyses clearly point out, the Romanian group was significantly different from all other three groups. Among these groups, no differences were observed. A smaller F value was observed for the variables motivational intensity to continue studying foreign languages: $F(3, 639) = 8.62$, $p < 0.001$. In this case, the Tukey post-hocs showed that the Romanian group was significantly different from the English and the Dutch-speaking group, but no other differences were observed. Lastly, the variable intention to continue studying a foreign language, was again significant: $F(3, 647) = 5.17$, $p = 0.002$. In this case, the Dutch-speaking group scored significantly lower than the Belgian Francophone and the Romanian group, and no other differences were indicated by the post-hoc analysis.

3.2.6.1.3. European identity variables

In the analysis of the European identity variables, general European identity, the civic European identity, country, regional and city identity were included, as determined by the items of the scale developed by Bruter (2005). The cultural European identity was not

included in this analysis, since this variable proved to be unreliable for two of the four groups. The results of the one-way ANOVAs are presented below in *Figure 13* and they are explained in more detail afterwards, using the post-hoc Tukey results.




Figure 13. Means of the European and other identities variables for the four groups

As mentioned before, all variables in this category showed significant differences between the groups. The first one to be analysed was the general European identity: $F(3, 611) = 14.35$, $p < 0.001$. In this case, the Romanian group indicated it was significantly different from the other three groups, and the Dutch-speaking group was significantly different from the English group, but no other significant differences were observed. The differences on the civic European identity variables between the four groups was analysed: $F(3, 592) = 24.1$, $p < 0.001$. The post-hoc Tukey tests suggested that the differences observed were recorded between the English group and all the other three groups (the English groups scored significantly lower than all three). Another difference was observed between the Dutch speakers and the Romanian group. The one-way ANOVA for the feelings of identification with one's country was also significant: $F(3, 611) = 31.40$, $p < 0.001$. The differences observed were recorded between the Romanian and the Belgian Francophone group when compared to the other two groups. The difference between the Romanian and the Belgian Francophone group was also significant, with the former scoring higher. A significant result was obtained for the variable investigating the feelings of identification with one's region: $F(3, 610) = 52.78$, $p < 0.001$. The Romanian group was different from the other three groups. The last variable investigated in this section was the feelings of identification to the city: F

(3, 611) = 37.58, $p < 0.001$. The post-hoc Tukey tests showed again that the only significant difference was observed between the Romanian group when compared to the other three groups.

3.2.6.1.4. Other identity variables

The four groups were also compared on some other identity variables: European-ness, feelings towards their membership in the EU and being a world citizen. The results of the one-way ANOVAs were once again significant. The figure below represents the means of each group on these variables and below these differences are described in more depth, using the Tukey post-hoc tests.




Figure 14. Means of other identities variables for the four groups.

Participants rated their feelings of European identity and the results of the comparison between the four groups on this variable showed there were significant difference: $F(3, 615) = 4.00$, $p = 0.008$. The low F value indicated that although significant, the differences between the groups were quite small; the post-hoc Tukey tests showed that this difference was actually observed between the Dutch speakers and the English group only. With regards to feelings of world citizenship, again the results of the one-way ANOVAs showed significant results: $F(3, 613) = 4.13$, $p = 0.007$, but also indicated only small differences. These differences were recorded between the Romanian group, and the English and the Dutch-speaking group, with the former scoring significantly higher than the latter two. Lastly, the differences between feelings of being a member of the European Union were investigated. The results showed that $F(3, 616) = 3.03$, $p = 0.03$. Although the F value was low, the significant differences were identified using post-hoc Tukey tests and they indicated that the Dutch speakers and Romanian groups were significantly different from the English group.

3.2.6.1.5. BIOS variables

One-way ANOVAs were performed in order to investigate the differences between the four groups on the five variables that together form the BIOS instrument: conflict, monoculture, alternation, compatibility and hybridity. Although sometimes small, the differences observed between the four groups on these variables were significant. The graph and the explanation below describe these differences in more detail.




Figure 15. Means of BIOS variables for the four groups.

The one-way ANOVAs for the five BIOS variables showed that the four groups were significantly different when compared on these variables, although the differences observed were not always very large. For conflict, $F(3, 616) = 3.10$, $p = 0.03$, the post-hoc Tukey tests showed that the only significant difference was recorded between the Dutch speakers and the English groups. The next variable investigated was monocultural orientation, that is, a desire to have only one identity. The F value in this case was slightly larger: $F(3, 616) = 8.80$, $p < 0.001$. The significant differences for this variable were observed between the English group, which scored significantly lower than all other groups. The variable alternation investigated the participants' ability to switch between their national and European identities depending on the context. The results of the one-way ANOVA indicated an $F(3, 616) = 4.01$, $p = 0.008$. Post-hoc Tukey tests showed that the only significant difference observed was between the Dutch speakers and the Romanian group. With regards to compatibility between these two identities, $F(3, 614) = 13.03$, $p < 0.001$. As the graph and the post-hoc Tukey tests reveal, the significant differences were observed between the

Belgian Francophone group and all the other three groups, and between the Romanian group and the Dutch and English ones. And lastly, scores for the hybridity variable were also significant: $F(3, 616) = 8.64$, with a $p < 0.001$. The post-hoc Tukey scores indicated that the English group scored significantly lower than the other three groups. The only other difference observed was recorded between the Romanian and the Belgian Francophone groups.

The orientation most endorsed by the participants in all contexts was compatibility, followed by hybridity. This points out to the fact, that overall, European citizens might perceive their national identity to be compatible with their European identity, sometimes up to the point where they can fuse and blend to become one identity. The least endorsed orientation was the monocultural one, suggesting that the participants were not keen on feeling just national or just European, but that they prefer to be part of both. A conflict between the national and the European identity was not a prevalent orientation for the participants in these studies, obtaining very low endorsement scores when compared to the compatibility and hybridity orientations. Lastly, alternation showed moderate to low levels of endorsement from all participants.

The patterns of correlations between the BIOS variables and the linguistic variables for all contexts are presented in the graph below (*Figure 16*). These results have been discussed previously, for each context. This graphical representation aims to compare the values of the correlations between the contexts. When looking at the variable *attitudes to multilingualism*, it is clear that for the Dutch-speaking participants, more positive attitudes are strongly and positively related to a sense of complementarity and hybridity between the national and European identities. These results also apply to the UK sample, however in this case, the relationship between alternation between the two identities and positive attitudes to multilingualism was stronger. For the Romanian and Belgian Francophone participants, these relationships were not as powerful.

The graphical representation of the patterns of correlations between the *proficiency and frequency of use of L1, L2, L3 and L4* and the BIOS variables indicates that for the Romanian sample, the correlations were quite small in comparison to the other three contexts. The range of correlations is clearly narrower for the Romanian group. The Dutch-speaking group pattern of correlations suggests that the more proficient the participants were in their foreign languages, the more they perceived the national and European identities to be complementary or to form a hybrid. However, for the same group, the correlations between

frequency of use of these languages seems to be almost unrelated to the more positive BIOS variables. The Francophone Belgian sample and the English sample show a more disperse pattern. Interestingly, proficiency and frequency of use of foreign languages seems to be quite strongly related to alternation between the national and European identity.




Figure 16. Correlations between BIOS variables and linguistic variables for all contexts

The pattern of correlations between the identity and the linguistic variables for the three contexts is presented in the graph below (Figure 17). The cultural European identity was not included for the two Belgian contexts. These results show clearly that positive attitudes to multilingualism are related to feeling more European, to stronger civic and cultural European identities (except for the Dutch speakers sample). However, strong regional and national identities do not seem to correlate with positive attitudes to multilingualism - and again, in this case, the Dutch-speaking participants are the exception. This graphical representation suggests that particularly for the UK sample, proficiency and frequency of use of foreign languages is strongly and positively related to a general and civic European

identity, however they have no relationship with the cultural European identity, nor the national and regional identity.

		Romanian					French				Dutch				English				
Attitudes		+	+	+			+	+			+		+	+	+				
Proficiency	L1			+				+						+					
	L2				-							+			+	+			
	L3											+			+				
	L4											+			+				
Frequency	L1															-			
	L2		-		-										+	+		-	
	L3						-								+	+			
	L4			+															
		General	Civic	Cultural	National	Regional	General	Civic	National	Regional	General	Civic	National	Regional	General	Civic	Cultural	National	Regional

Figure 17. Correlations between identity variables and linguistic variables for the four contexts.

3.2.7. Conclusion

These results suggest that proficiency and frequency of use of foreign languages are particularly important for some contexts in the development of a stronger sense of European identity. They also seem to play a role in the integration of the national and European identities, and in the development of a feeling of complementarity and hybridity between the two. The emergence of the alternation variable as one strongly and positively correlated with proficiency and frequency of use of foreign languages, as well as positive attitudes to multilingualism is an interesting result. It might indicate that for some people the two identities, although quite strongly endorsed, are considered separate identities, and that some participants have no issues alternating or switching between them depending on the context. This suggests that unlike the relation between two cultural or ethnic identities, the link between national and European identity is construed differently, pointing to the supra-national characteristic of European identity.

The endorsement of the various identities by the participants in the three contexts suggests that as expected, the UK sample was the least European, displaying lower levels of

general, civic and cultural European identity. A riveting result is that the Romanian participants scored significantly higher on all European identity scales, but they also showed stronger national, regional and local identities. These results were obtained using the European identity scale developed by Bruter (2005), which at least in the Belgian context proved to be unreliable for the cultural European identity variable.

A promising result, consistent with the literature presented here, is that at least in the UK, the younger participants endorsed the European identity scales significantly more than the older participants. There were very few differences for the Belgian samples, while in Romania the pattern was reversed, with the older Romanians declaring they felt more European than the younger ones. This last result regarding the Romanian sample might be due to the fact that the older Romanians have witnessed the transformation of their country from a communist to a democratic one, and later a member of the European Union. In comparison, the older British participants might have witnessed the country's shifting position towards the European Union, while the younger British participants might have had more opportunities to take advantage of the UK's membership in the EU. For the Belgians however, the EU and Europe have always been a part of their political landscape, and this could explain the lack of generational differences in European identification.

Another interesting and quite surprising result was that when asked to rate their feelings of European-ness, citizenship of the world and their identification as being a member of the EU, all participants showed strong positive feelings towards these items, regardless of the context. The statistical analysis pointed to significant differences between the contexts on these scales, but the differences were quite small. Also, the fact that the means for endorsing these items were higher than 4 on a 6-point Likert scale suggest that overall, all participants felt European, citizens of the EU and of the world.

The results presented here shed light on many aspects of European identity and how it is constructed in relation to national identity, as well as attitudes and practices of multilingualism. The following section will present the results of the interviews conducted in the three contexts and will attempt to give some nuances and clarifications to the statistical analysis presented so far.

4. Qualitative studies

4.1. Methodology

4.1.1. Procedure

The participants were asked to fill out a short version of the questionnaire which included a background information section and Bruter's (2005) instrument for assessing European identity. This component of the study investigated the content validity of the instrument in the three different contexts. This was deemed to be a good starting point for a discussion with the participants regarding their feelings of European identity and their attitudes to multilingualism. The second goal of the interviews was to better understand people's attitudes towards multilingualism, and if and why it is important for them to be multilingual. Another goal was to give nuances to the concept of European identity by allowing the participants to describe how they understood the concept. And lastly, they were invited to discuss whether they perceived a link between attitudes to multilingualism and European identity. This component of the study aims also to counteract the potential self-selection bias of the survey data collected. Although the sample does not claim to be representative, the interviews might present views that differ or complement the survey results.

Other topics discussed during the interviews included the perceived differences and similarities between being European and being a member of the European Union, whether speaking languages was useful for traveling, the importance of knowing more languages in the personal and professional life, the impact that travel in Europe and contact with other Europeans has on the participants' feelings of European identity, and others. The interviews followed a semi-structured pattern, allowing the discussion to be directed by the participants. All participants volunteered to take part in the interviews. The interviews were conducted in Romanian in Romania and English in the other two contexts.

All interviewees signed an informed consent form, which included consent for the audio recording of the conversation, and they were debriefed at the end of the session. The anonymity clause in the informed consent means that the participants will not be identified by name, but rather by codes. There were five interviews per country. The aim of the interviews was to talk to people of different ages and backgrounds about their views on

European identity and multilingualism. The interviews were recorded digitally and stored in a secure location, as per the Ethics Board approval received from Birkbeck College, University of London (for a list of the guiding questions for each context, see Appendix E).

For each context, the ages of the participants had a wide range, since the study aimed to cover a wider range of attitudes towards European identity and multilingualism. Most of the participants were highly educated individuals, living either in the capital of their country or in a big city. All of the participants were multilingual to some extent. The recorded interviews lasted anywhere between half an hour and an hour and a half, depending on the willingness of the participants to discuss the topics presented.

4.1.2. Participants

4.1.2.1. Romania

Five interviews were conducted in Romania. The language in which these interviews were conducted was Romanian and the excerpts presented in the Results section are presented both in Romanian and their English translation. Only one of the interviewees (Rom_4) was born in Cluj-Napoca, a city in the heart of Transylvania, while the others were born in other cities in Transylvania. All of them lived in Cluj-Napoca for most of their adult life. They rated their knowledge of foreign languages quite high, all of them able to speak, understand, read and write at least in their L2 and L3. *Table 25* below presents the demographic information for these participants.

Table 25. Background information for the participants in the interviews in Romania

ID	Age	Sex	Education	L1 / L2 / L3 / L4 / L5 / L6	Language spoken most frequently
Rom_1	24	F	University	Romanian / English / French / Spanish / German	Romanian
Rom_2	21	F	University	Romanian / English / French / Spanish / Hungarian	Romanian
Rom_3	67	F	University	Romanian / English / French / Russian / Spanish / Japanese	Romanian / English

ID	Age	Sex	Education	L1 / L2 / L3 / L4 / L5 / L6	Language spoken most frequently
Rom_4	29	F	Master	Romanian / English / French / German / Italian	Romanian
Rom_5	70	F	University	Romanian / French / German / Russian / English	Romanian

4.1.2.2. Belgium

All five interviews conducted in Belgium took place in Brussels. The interviews were conducted in English, a language that all participants declared they knew very well. One interview was conducted with two participants (Bel_2 and Bel_3) due to circumstances. This did not hinder the discussion, on the contrary, since the two participants came from very different backgrounds, they had the opportunity to discuss and engage with each other. Two of the participants were from Brussels (one having French as L1 and the other Dutch, but declaring herself completely bilingual), one participant was born in Wallonia and the other three in Flanders. All six had been living in Brussels, either studying or working, for an extended period of time. All of them were multilingual and declaring high proficiency levels in at least two languages apart from their mother tongue. The demographic information is presented in *Table 26* below.

Table 26. Background information for the participants in the interviews in Belgium

ID	Age	Sex	Education	L1 / L2 / L3 / L4 / L5 / L6	Language spoken most frequently
Bel_1	26	F	Master	Dutch / French / English / German	Dutch
Bel_2	26	M	Master	Dutch / French / English / Danish / German / Swedish	Dutch
Bel_3	30	M	Master	French / English / Italian / Dutch	French
Bel_4	28	M	Master	Dutch / English / French / German	Dutch / English
Bel_5	30	M	University	French / Spanish / English / Dutch	French
Bel_6	61	M	Master	Dutch / German / French / English	Dutch

4.1.2.3. *United Kingdom*

The UK interviews were conducted in English and they all took place in London. A total of five interviews were conducted for the UK sample. The place of origin of the British participants was diverse: one was from the North-East of England, one was born in Cyprus, but had moved to the UK with her family at a very young age and identified herself as British Greek Cypriot, one was born in London, one in Hertfordshire, and another one in Wales. At the time of the interviews, they all lived in London. Their ages also covered a wide range. With regards to their multilingualism, four out of the five participants declared high proficiency in at least one other language apart from their L1. One participant on the other hand reported that although she attempts to use her L2 and L3 while on holidays, she has very little proficiency in either of them. Another participant reported fluency in seven languages. *Table 27* below presents the demographic information for these participants.

Table 27. Background information for the participants in the interviews in the United Kingdom

ID	Age	Sex	Education	L1 / L2 / L3 / L4 / L5 / L6	Language spoken most frequently
UK_1	26	F	Master	English / French / Spanish	English
UK_2	62	F	High-school	Greek / English / French	English / Greek
UK_3	58	M	Master	English / Portuguese / Spanish / Arabic	English
UK_4	43	F	Master	English / Portuguese / Spanish / French	English
UK_5	28	M	Master	English / Welsh / Italian / French / Spanish / Scottish Gaelic / Polish	English

4.2. Results

4.2.1. Romania

4.2.1.1. RQ 7 - Content validity

The content validity of the scale on European identity developed by Bruter (2005) was tested by discussing each question with the participants. The participants understood most of the questions as they were intended. The only question that seemed problematic for some of the participants was the sports question. The aim of the question was to see whether the participants tend to choose the European players when they knew little about the sport. One participant said:

Eu sunt fan tenis de câmp, îmi place mai mult jucătoarea poloneză.
Dacă ar fi volei sau alt sport despre care nu știu prea multe, aş alege
după alt criteriu, aş alege după țară și oamenii de acolo. (Rom_1)

[I am a fan of tennis, I like the Polish player more. If it would have
been volleyball or another sport I knew little about, I would have
chosen based on a different criteria, I would have chosen based on
the country and its people. (Rom_1)]

For this particular participant, the content validity was compromised because she seemed to be interested in the sport and had preferences regarding the players. Out of the 4 items on the question, she chose two European players and two non-European. Another participant said she chose based on the players, as well as their countries of origin:

La propriu, dar cred că și după preferința de țară. (Rom_4)

[Literally, but I think also by country preference (Rom_4)]

Other participants chose mostly (but not entirely) European players, and declared that they chose thinking of whether the players were from Europe or not.

Ca și nume nu cunosc, dar fiind din UE, m-aș simți mai mândră să
câștige ai noștri. M-aș bucura mai mult să câștige cineva din familia
noastră europeană. (Rom_2)

[By name, I don't know any of them, but being from the EU, I'd feel prouder if ours won. I'd be happier to see someone from our European family win. (Rom_2)]

One of the participants said that she did not think much about her European identity. In the Romanian media and public discourse, the concept and the term “European identity” and “identity” in general are not discussed extensively. Although national identity is used and discussed quite often, it is mostly in light of ideas of patriotism or nationalism. However, all participants in the interviews were able to understand and relate to the questions.

Mă simt în egală măsură cetățean al Europei ca și cetățean al României. E foarte ciudat să răspund la chestia asta, că nu m-am gândit niciodată; m-am gândit întotdeauna că mă simt, adică am aceleași libertăți, teoretic, am aceleași drepturi ca și alt cetățean al Europei. Oricunde mă duc nu mă simt doar cetățean al României, ci fac parte din întreg. (Rom_4)

[I feel equally a citizen of Europe and a citizen of Romania. It is very weird to answer this, because I've never thought of it; I always thought that I feel, I mean, that I have the same freedoms, theoretically, that I have the same rights as any other European citizen. Anywhere I go, I don't only feel I am a citizen of Romania, but that I am part of the whole (Rom_4)]

Although Rom_4 briefly states that she has never thought about the question of her European identity, she quickly considered the question and came up with a coherent answer, which was maintained throughout the interview.

It thus seems that the content validity of the European identity scale was quite high, with the only exception being the sports questions. Identity questions, although potentially unexamined in some cases, were easy to grasp and discuss for the participants, proving that it was not a matter of the validity of the scale, but of whether the question was something present in the thoughts of the participants to a high degree.

4.2.1.2. RQ 8 - Attitudes to multilingualism

Overall, all the participants in the interviews had very positive attitudes towards multilingualism. All of them said that people should speak at least two or three languages apart from their mother tongue. When asked whether they knew what the EU

recommendation was, only one participant, Rom_3, knew about the MT + 2 policy, which means that for the other four it was a personal opinion that each European should be able to speak two or three languages. The predominant view was that English was absolutely necessary, but also that it was a given that people were going to learn it. When discussing learning English, one participant brought up the generational differences between the younger and older people with regards to knowledge of English:

Fiecare ar trebui să știe minim trei limbi, cu tot cu limba maternă.
Sau minim trei pe lângă limba maternă. Adică engleza oricum în
generația noastră o învățăm în școală, trebuie măcar să înceri, să îți
dai interesul. (Rom_1)

[Everybody should know a minimum of three languages, including
their mother tongue. Or minimum three apart from it. I mean, in
our generation, we learn English in school, you have to at least try, to
show an interest. (Rom_1)]

Other participants also mentioned the benefits of knowing English, suggesting that English was the language of tourism:

Ca turist mi-ar fi greu să învăț toate limbile, atunci cu engleza pot să
mă descurc. (Rom_2)

[As a tourist, it would be hard for me to learn all the languages, but
knowing English, I can manage. (Rom_2)]

For one of the older participants, English came as a second choice after French. Until the revolution in 1989, French and Russian were the most studied languages in Romania. Nonetheless, during the last couple of decades, English has gained a very important status in Romania, and most school children choose it as a first or second foreign language. French, however, is also a widely spoken language in Romania.

Având în vedere că limba franceză în Europa prin tradiție era o limbă
a culturii mi se pare normal ca un cetățean al UE să vorbească și
limba franceză. Având în vedere circulația mondială a limbii engleze
sau spaniole ar putea fi și astea un atu pentru un cetățean care circulă
în Europa. Engleza în primul rând. Depinde de scopurile pe care le
ai. Pentru tehnică în tinerețea mea era foarte importantă limba
germană și limba rusă, acum importanța lor a scăzut prin faptul că
limba engleză e mult mai vorbită. (Rom_3)

[Considering that traditionally French has been the language of culture in Europe, I find it obvious that every European citizen should speak French. Considering the worldwide importance of English or Spanish, these could also be an advantage for a citizen who moves in Europe. English in the first place. It all depends on your goals. When I was young, for technology, German and Russian were very important, now their importance has dropped because English is widely spoken. (Rom_3)]

The views of the interviewees from Romania regarding the advantages of speaking English and any other foreign languages were extremely positive: access to information, access to the foreign mass-media, communication with foreigners, access to the culture and literature of another country, and even changes in identity.

Orice limbă care o vorbești e de fapt o multiplicare a identității tale. Sigur, n-o s-o vorbești la nivel basic, ci la nivel bun. (Rom_3)

[Any language you speak is in fact a multiplication of your identity. Of course, you have to speak it proficiently, not at a basic level. (Rom_3)]

Most of the participants said that when they travel they prefer to learn at least a few phrases in the language of the country they are visiting. Some mentioned that this would make them feel closer to the people of the other country, while others said that they appreciated greatly when a foreigner in Romania is addressing them in Romanian, even if they later switch to speaking in another language. It seems that in Romania at least this is considered a sign of respect and politeness. One of the older participants said that she usually traveled with organised groups, and thus did not need to learn the language of the country she visits, because there was always a tour guide who could interpret and translate. She said she only tried to learn two or three words, to be polite. But she also maintained that it was important to speak three or four languages:

Toată lumea ar trebui să știe trei-patru limbi maxim: limba lui, engleza, poate franceza și germana mai apoi. Ar folosi pentru comunicare, peste tot se vorbesc limbile astea de circulație. (Rom_5)

[Everybody should know maximum three-four languages : his language, English, maybe later French and German. They would be useful for communication, these international languages are spoken everywhere. (Rom_5)]

The participants interviewed here had positive views on multilingualism. They considered it a normal and useful thing to be able to speak a few foreign languages, they found it useful for communication and interaction with others, but also for their own development. They all seemed happy to hear that the EU suggested policy was for every European to speak two European languages apart from the mother tongue, but they seemed to have arrived at the same conclusion on their own. English was considered useful, even essential in today's world, but not necessarily enough. These views were also reflected in their proficiency in various languages.

4.2.1.3. RQ 9 - Feeling European and European identity

When the discussion reached topics related to feeling European and having a European identity, there were different points in time used as reference, either explicit or implicit, dividing the timeline in three periods: before the 1989 revolution against the Communist regime, between 1989 and 2007, and after 2007 when Romania joined the European Union. It seems that these time points are relevant for the interviewees' feelings of European identity. It should be mentioned here that before the fall of the Communism, the Romanian people had to request permission from the Party to travel abroad and travel to Western countries, in Europe and outside of Europe, was very restricted.

Pentru ca să te identifici cu o țară trebuie să traiești o perioadă în mijlocul cetățenilor ei. Înainte de revoluție am putut să circul doar în țările est-europene și asta cu restricții și după revoluție același statut mi s-a aplicat de către Germania în anul 2000 când nu mi-au dat viza. Acum când aș putea să calatoresc nu mai am suficienți bani ca să pot să stau în orice țară a UE pentru că macar să cunosc mentalitatea indivizilor și autoritatilor pe viu. Ceea ce citești în ziare nu e suficient ca să te poți identifica cu cineva, cu o țară. (Rom_3)

[In order to identify with a country you need to live at least for a period of time amongst its people. Before the revolution I could only travel to the Eastern-European countries, and even then I had restrictions. And after the revolution I was given the same status by Germany in 2000 when they denied me a visa. Now when I could travel, I don't have enough money anymore to afford to stay in any EU country so that I can at least get to know in person the mentality of the individual people and the authorities. What you read in the newspapers is not enough to allow you to identify with somebody, with a country. (Rom_3)]

The same participant said that although she did not know for sure, she thought that Romanians had a negative image in Europe. Others who have travelled or lived in other European countries declared that the situation changed radically for Romanians after 2007. One participant said:

Nu mai stau la coadă la ambasadă, nu mai stau ore și zile întregi la coadă să iau o viza și, doi la mână, când trec granița e foarte important, nu mai ești controlat, nu se mai uită lumea foarte urât la tine, nu se poartă urât. Libertatea de circulație e importantă. Dacă vreau să mă duc la Londra trebe doar să îmi iau un bilet de avion care nici nu mai e foarte scump. Înainte chestia asta era imposibilă. (Rom_4)

[I don't have to queue at the embassy, I don't have to queue for hours or days to take out a visa, and secondly, and this is very important, when crossing the border, you are no longer checked, people don't look at you suspiciously, they don't treat you badly. The freedom of movement is important. If I want to go to London, all I need to do is buy a plane ticket, which is no longer expensive either. Before, this was impossible. (Rom_4)]

It was common practice before 2007 for the Romanians who wanted to travel abroad to queue for hours and even days in front of the embassies in Bucharest since there was no system of appointments and most of the times, an interview was required for the visa. The perceptions of the changes that happened after 2007 were echoed by participant Rom_4, who had studied abroad in France and Belgium before and after 2007. She argues that these changes were also felt in the way foreigners perceived Romanians.

Eu consider că atitudinea altor europeni față de noi s-a schimbat foarte mult după aderare. E drept că eu am trăit în Paris, dar eu așa cred (...) Eu am trăit în Franța și am simțit-o pe pielea mea. După 2007, totul a fost mai ușor, cont în bancă, chirie, viza, nu mai ai nevoie de permis de sejur pentru care stai la cozi interminabile și se poartă execrabil cu tine, și examene medicale, o întreagă bătaie de cap. Asta am simțit cel mai tare, e mult mai natural cumva. (Rom_4)

[I think that the attitude of other Europeans towards us has changed very much after joining the EU. It's true I lived in Paris, but that's what I think (...) I lived in France and I felt it on my own skin. After 2007, everything was a lot easier, opening a bank account, finding a flat, visa, we no longer needed a residence permit for which

you had to queue endlessly and they would treat you miserably, medical exams, it was such a headache. This is what I felt the most, it is somehow a lot more natural now. (Rom_4)]

Thus joining the EU for this participant meant that the process which allowed her to study abroad became much more natural and easier to handle. She experienced the changes that were implemented at a European level allowing Romanians freedom of movement in Europe and she was one of the Romanians who witnessed the change first-hand. Another participant said that apart from all the advantages that Romanians had from joining the EU, they also had responsibilities.

Inseamnă și beneficii dar și responsabilități: libertatea de trecere foarte mare, libertatea de a ajunge la instituțiile din alte țări pentru că suntem europeni și avem dreptul să ne adresăm cuiva. Dar și responsabilități pentru că trebuie să te porți ca atare, mie mi se pare că cetățean european e același lucru cu civilizat, parcă e o relație de sinonimie între ele. Să fim toleranți față de etniile minoritare, să ne ajutam între noi, să ne comportăm ca și o comunitate. (Rom_2)

[It means having some benefits, but also responsibilities: the freedom of movement, the freedom to reach institutions in other countries because we are Europeans and we have the right to address someone. But also responsibilities because you have to behave accordingly, for me being a European citizen is the same thing with being civilised, there is a synonymy between these two. Being tolerant to the ethnic minorities, helping each other, acting like a community. (Rom_2)]

Joining the EU brought about new rights for the Romanians, allowing them freedom of movement within the EU, but for this participant, it also brought on new responsibilities, which she primarily understood as learning to be tolerant and acting according to the norms of the community joined. The idea of being part of a community or of the European family was expressed by other participants as well. Rom_1 talked about “our European family” while Rom_4 said:

Să te simți european e să faci parte dintr-o echipă și într-o echipă reușești să faci mai multe decât pe cont propriu. (Rom_4)

[Feeling European is to be part of a team and in a team you always do more than on your own. (Rom_4)]

The relation between feeling Romanian and European was emphasised consistently throughout the interviews. Some participants described their identities as nested: town or city first, region, Romania and then Europe. They talked about the fact that because Romania was part of Europe geographically, they felt European. In line with the opening of the borders, being allowed to travel the continent increased the contact with other Europeans, which for some led to increased levels of European-ness. But feeling European also meant distancing from the wrong type of nationalism.

Ne simțim mai bine acum, având în vedere peste ce a trecut România e important. Faptul că generații întregi au avut un nationalism deșăntat ca pe vremea lui Ceaușescu. (Rom_5)

[We feel better now, and considering what Romania had to go through, this is important. The fact is that for generations we had a kind of exaggerated and shameful nationalism, like in Ceaușescu's time. (Rom_5)]

Nonetheless, one of the participants appeared to be less enthusiastic about the European Union, although she still identified strongly as European. She said:

Te poți simți european, dar are un drum dus și întors. Eu mă pot simți europeană, dar trebuie să primesc și un feed-back, nu pot să mă simt europeană dacă ei nu mă doresc. Pot să mă simt ca aparținând zonei Europa, dar nu pot să mă simt cetățean al Europei atâta timp cât unii nu doresc să mă vada așa. Asta nu ține numai de ceea ce doresc eu, ci de ceea ce doresc alții. Niciodată nu m-am simțit altfel decât european, și înainte de a fi în UE. (Rom_3)

[You can feel European, but it is a two-way road. I can feel European, but I need to receive some feed-back, I can't feel European if they don't want me. I can feel I belong to the area of Europe, but I can't feel I am a citizen of Europe as long as there are some who don't want to see me as such. This is not about what I want, but about what others want. I have never felt anything but European, even before the EU. (Rom_3)]

There do seem to be slight differences between the three younger participants and the two older ones in their perceptions of European identity. For the younger ones, joining the EU brought about advantages (and responsibilities as mentioned earlier), freedom of movement and the possibility to explore and engage with the other European countries, as well as the feeling of being part of a team or a family. The other participants seemed to

focus more on the past and to compare the present situation with the two other periods of time: the one era before the fall of communism and the one before Romania joined the EU. They also seemed to be more preoccupied with what the rest of Europe thought about Romania, and felt that there was a cultural and financial divide between Romania and Europe. As one of them said: “Romania e țară de origine, iar Europa e dorința noastră” [Romania is our country of origin, while Europe is our desire]. Europe continued to appear to be something distant, which the Romanians needed to attract, they still had to convince the other Europeans to accept them and, at the same time, Europe was seen as the holy grail of culture. Two of the younger participants felt that there might be a generational divide with regards to European identity:

E un curent relativ nou, nu au avut posibilitatea de a experimenta. Noi, tinerii, am avut privilegii să le zic așa, datorită vârstei și mediului în care am crescut și ne dezvoltăm acum, dar am impresia că e o chestie relativ nouă. (Rom_1)

Noi, care suntem mai tineri, cam simțim acest lucru pentru că am fost și implicați în mai multe campanii de informare cel puțin, prin școli. (Rom_2)

[It is a relatively recent trend, they didn't have the chance to experiment. We, the young, we had privileges if I can call them that, because of our age and the environment we grew up in and where we develop now, but I have the feeling it is a relatively new thing. (Rom_1)]

[For us, who are younger, we feel this because we were more involved with the information campaigns at least in schools. (Rom_2)]

Some participants thought that people in Romania felt quite European:

Cred că e răspândit în România, poate în proporție de 60%, se tot pluseaza pe chestia asta. (Rom_5)

[I think it is a prevalent feeling in Romania, maybe about 60%, they keep emphasising this thing. (Rom_5)]

Conversely, others thought the opposite:

Oamenii din România nu se simt foarte europeni și nu cred că știu ce înseamnă. Eu vorbesc de oamenii care nu au călătorit sau nu au trăit într-o țară din Europa. (Rom_4)

[People in Romania don't feel very European and I don't think they know what it means. I am talking about people who didn't travel or live in another country in Europe. (Rom_4)]

When discussing the prevalence of the sentiment of European-ness in Romania, the participants touched on issues of as public opinion campaigns, being part of the younger generations, having travelled, having financial stability. One other aspect discussed was that people in the urban areas felt more European than people in the countryside. One of the participants illustrated clearly the difference between rural and urban areas:

Pe badea Gheorghe din vârful muntelui nu-l doare capul de Europa,
pe el îl doare capul de lucruri mult mai lumesti, vaca, pământul.
(Rom_3)

[Peasant John, who lives on the top of the mountain, doesn't worry about Europe, he worries about more mundane things, like the cow, the land. (Rom_3)]

All participants were eager to share their thoughts on European identity and it appears that although they do understood it in different ways, it was something that they could relate to and could discuss at length. The next section will look at whether these participants reported any connections between multilingualism and European identity.

4.2.1.4. RQ 10 - Multilingualism and European identity

Most of the participants in the interviews agreed that speaking more languages allowed one to get closer to other cultures while travelling, but also that it allowed one access to the identity and culture of other countries. Foreign language proficiency seemed to be a way in which people could connect with others, get to know them better and thus could make the world, or Europe, a more familiar place. Although all Romanian participants spoke a few foreign languages, most of them said they would like to learn more, and some were actively engaged in learning a language at the time of the interviews. The affinity to other countries brought about by foreign language proficiency was mentioned often:

Dacă vorbești spaniolă te simți un pic mai apropiat de ei, dacă vorbești franceza sau germana la fel, de fiecare în parte. (Rom_3)

[If you speak Spanish you feel closer to them, and same with French or German, you feel closer to each of them. (Rom_3)]

One participant talked about the importance of speaking a language in case one decided to move to another country. She also mentioned the easiness of integrating in Europe through foreign languages:

Cunoașterea mai multor limbi mi se pare că ajută foarte mult la integrarea europeană pentru că e important să mergi într-o altă țară și să poți discuta cu oamenii de acolo. Dacă te muți într-o altă țară, mult mai ușor te poți integra dacă poți să vorbești cu cineva. Asta e firea noastră ca oameni. (Rom_2)

[I think knowing more languages helps a great deal with European integration because it is important to go to another country and to be able to talk to the people from there. Once you move to another country, you can integrate a lot easier if you can talk to people. This is the way we, humans, are. (Rom_2)]

Proximity and ability to communicate with others seem to be key factors in increasing levels of European identity. Travelling for pleasure, work, or study are all opportunities for people to interact and engage with other European citizens. Joining the EU conferred young Romanians the opportunity to enjoy freedom of movement in the EU. They have the advantage of learning languages from a young age and being allowed, and even encouraged to use them, while travelling abroad, or to interacting with other Europeans in Romania. As one interviewee said:

Astăzi tinerii se identifică mai ușor cu Europa, știu limbi, circulă mult, studiază. Mai puțini vin, mai mulți pleacă. (Rom_5)

[Today, the young people identify more easily with Europe, they know foreign languages, they travel a lot. They study. Some come back, but more of them leave. (Rom_5)]

Although in a subtle tone, this participant brought up the issue of migration of young people from Romania and connected it to the European identity. Having the option to travel and study and learn languages means that some choose to leave the country and exercise their rights as European citizens to study, live and work in other countries in Europe. By ending this statement with “some come back, more leave”, the interviewee links these opportunities to the possible migration towards other European countries.

4.2.2. Belgium

4.2.2.1. RQ 7 - *Content validity*

Following the interviews in Romania, it was decided that the sports question on Bruter's (2005) scale should be dropped both from the interviews and the surveys since it did not seem to be understood by all participants in the same way and some participants answered the question literally, being familiar with the sport. Also, the fact that the question was somewhat deceitful in that it tried to uncover underlying sentiments towards the European identity by favouring one player over another was not in line with the rest of the questions on the scale and seemed to create a schism in the flow of the interview and completion of the scale, as the participants would wonder about the purpose of the question within the short survey administered.

The Belgian participants responded well to the scale and all had enough experience in filling out surveys to understand the purpose and aim of the questionnaire. There was one exception - a participant who refused to fill out the Bruter scale because of his views on using surveys for research. He said:

I always have some issues with these scales. Like, what is 6? Well ok, let's say that how I speak my mother tongue, that's 6, that's perfect and you measure everything according to that. I have problems with identification because it asks me about something I think about very often, but I am not so much of a ... I don't identify with so many things consciously or happily, I do notice that in some contexts I identify with things, but I am very conscious of what it means to identify with something and the political connotations and so on. There's a political question behind these questions. (Bel_4)

This is not an uncommon view when critiquing survey research and it is often used as an argument when discussing the bias of survey research. Potential participants might refuse to fill out a questionnaire if they have to rate their answers on a Likert scale. Also, it is sometimes argued, as this participant pointed out, that there is no way of knowing if people understand the questions in the same way or use the scales consistently. This is one of the reasons research projects should attempt to use various methods to study the same object (Duff, 2006; Blommaert & van de Vijver, in press) in order to arrive to valid and clear results.

Other participants also commented on the fact that the background questionnaire asked them to name their ethnic background. Although all of them could answer the question, some mentioned that they do not necessarily agree with the term *ethnic*.

I am of no ethnicity. When I hear of ethnicity I think it refers to various ethnicities in Africa, for example. It refers to traditions, habits and cultural ceremonies and so on. I think this doesn't exist in Europe anymore, at least not in Western Europe. In Belgium you can talk about Flemish or French speaking people, but it's no ethnicity, it's just the language. (Bel_5)

I don't think Flemish is an ethnic background; linguistic background definitely, cultural maybe. (Bel_4)

It was compelling to observe that all interviews started with a discussion about how in Belgium there are no ethnic, but rather linguistic differences between the Flemish and the Walloons. One participant also mentioned that race and ethnicity had a negative connotation in Belgium, referring more to primitive ethnic groups. Nonetheless, all participants could identify their cultural and linguistic background.

4.2.2.2. RQ 8 - *Attitudes to multilingualism*

The Belgian interview participants regarded multilingualism very positively. This is also reflected in the fact that all of them were highly proficient multilinguals, speaking fluently at least three languages. Two of the participants mentioned that in their opinion speaking more languages made them smarter:

I'd learn another language. It would make me smarter. [laughs] It would give me access to other cultures. I'd like to learn German because I think German literature is very good, I'd do it for the culture. (Bel_1)

Speaking foreign languages is good for a lot of reasons, it helps you to understand someone else, you express things differently in different languages so you learn that people have a different look on things in the world. It makes you smarter, you become better as a person. All kinds of improvements if you study another language. And it's fun of course. (Bel_2)

One of the most predominant reasons to learn a language was for communicative purposes. Some of the participants were in multilingual relationships and at the time of the interview

they were learning the language of their partners. This is a reflection of an integrative motivation to learn a language - in order to gain access to another linguistic community.

My girlfriend is Hungarian and I try to learn the language. It's a lot easier when I'm there, visiting her family. We are the typical Euro-couple, we are this mediocre English couple. (Bel₄)

I am learning Dutch, it's compulsory at secondary school, but the further you are from Brussels the worse the lessons are. My girlfriend is Dutch speaking, and she has a whole group of friends who speak Dutch, so now I again have to listen to Dutch and I need to make some effort sometimes, it is my duty to make myself understood in their language. (Bel₅)

In the first case, Bel₄ was attempting to learn a new language, Hungarian, in order to be able to communicate with his partner and her family in Hungary. Their language of communication at the time of the interview was however English. The other participant, Bel₅, had already studied Dutch in school, but since dating a native speaker of Dutch, he realised that he needed to improve his Dutch skills in order to better integrate in her circle of friends. These personal reasons for integration in the community of their partner were the main motivation for their language study. Language fluency allows access to linguistic communities and their cultures. One of the Belgian participants declared that she was bilingual French and Dutch, and that allowed her to enjoy the two cultures:

It makes life very easy because I speak French and Dutch very well and I can mix in both communities, both worlds, everybody understands me. I like it because culturally speaking I can enjoy both cultures, literatures, pop culture. (Bel₁)

I'm starting to speak better Dutch so I start to identify with that region more, I feel a part of the Flemish more and more. (Bel₃)

Learning Dutch for Bel₃ meant also a change in identity. Although of Walloon origins, having spent much of his life in the Francophone region of Belgium, at the time of the interview he was living in Brussels and actively learning Dutch. The fact that learning Dutch allowed him to feel he was a "part of the Flemish" group, without actually being a native of that community pointed to the powerful influence that learning Dutch had on his life. It might be that a Francophone Belgian identifying with the Flemish community was mediated by the fact that he was living in Brussels, officially a bilingual city, and studying at the Dutch-speaking university.

The communicative purpose of language learning was also mentioned by the participants:

When I travel to places I don't speak the language, the first thing I do is try to learn a few words. I think it is very important. After I decided to go to Romania, the first thing I did was buy a dictionary with all the phrases and I would actually study, even on the plane, just the basic things. If you just drop a sentence you see people 'Oh!', they light up and it makes things a lot easier. (Bel_2)

Every time you can speak to a person in their language it will be better for the experience, the cultural exchange. I also believe that English is the Esperanto of nowadays, it has been reduced to a very simple language. I'm ok with English imposing itself as the working language in Europe. (Bel_5)

Being able to communicate with people of a different background in their language even at a basic level was seen to be beneficial for a successful interaction. However, the idea that English was necessary and was the practical lingua franca of Europe was discussed repeatedly in the interviews.

Everybody should know English, you have to go along with your time and English is the world language. (Bel_1)

English is a technical communicative language. (Bel_6)

The specific characteristics of Belgium as a multilingual country were discussed and most participants believed that it was important to be able to speak the language of the other linguistic community. All of the participants declared at least basic knowledge of either French or Dutch. Most participants had a political reason for supporting knowledge of both languages for Belgians, saying often that they believed this to be the solution for the political impasse the country was in.

I think we should learn both languages, it should be imposed at least on an administrative level. It would help a lot. (Bel_3)

Politicians are proposing separatism from a linguistic point of view as a solution for the language problem in Belgium, but unitarism could be a solution as well. (Bel_2)

It is also interesting to note that all of the participants, but especially the ones who had a Flemish background spoke against the Flemish nationalism. This should be seen in light of

the fact that they were all highly educated individuals, living and working in Brussels. It is nonetheless important to point out that they all expressed a sense of uneasiness towards the Flemish nationalistic movement and their way of using language to create a dichotomy between Flanders and Wallonia.

People in Flanders learn French in school, do you think they ever speak it afterwards? No. Same with German. (...) In Flanders everything has to be in Dutch, those people in public services speak French and English, but they are not allowed to speak it in institutions. That is petty, what are you protecting? If Flemish and Flanders is so vulnerable that you can't take speaking French to a Senegalese refugee, that's ridiculous. (Bel₄)

Some of the Flemish participants talked about the negative connotation that identification with Flanders had at this point in time and they blamed it on the political developments.

I consider myself a Dutch speaking Belgian, it's a matter of fact. I was born in Flanders, I don't identify with being Flemish. From a factual point of view I am Flemish, but for political reasons it has a very negative connotation so I refuse to identify with it. I think it's irrelevant. It's just a region in my country, I identify with my nationality which is trilingual. (Bel₂)

I always thought I was an exception because I considered myself a Dutch-speaking inhabitant of Brussels and part of the European construction, less Flemish. There is a kind of Flemish nationalism that is not mine (...) But I am not the exception, most of the Flemish people in Brussels are like me, we are not nationalists. (Bel₆)

Although the Flemish nationalist politics had been growing steadily over the years, these participants were vehemently refusing to identify with the nationalistic politics to such a degree that some mentioned that they were Flemish just because of their origin, cultural and linguistic background, but that they associated negative meanings with the term and refused to identify with it politically. And, as Bel₆ pointed out, this was a prevalent feeling among all the Flemish participants in the interviews, and potentially among the Flemish population of Brussels.

Overall, the attitudes to multilingualism among the Belgian participants were highly positive. They were all fluent multilinguals, living and working in multiple languages. English was regarded as a language of communication, a technical language, but also the

lingua franca of the world. All of them spoke French and Dutch to a certain extent, and many considered that it was crucial for them as Belgians to be able to speak both languages. Many spoke against the nationalistic politics in Flanders and some even rejected to self-categorise as Flemish for that reason. But Brussels is not only a cosmopolitan, multilingual city, but also the capital of Europe. The following section will discuss participants' identification with Europe and feelings of European identity.

4.2.2.3. RQ 9 - Feeling European and European identity

The topic of European identity was also discussed during the interviews. The interviewees seemed to have thought about their own European identity more than the Romanian participants. The answers were more elaborate, having reached a deeper level of examination. Living in Brussels, this is no surprise, as news and symbols related to Europe are probably more prevalent than in any other city in Europe. Due to the context in which the participants lived, European-ness and the European Union were significantly more salient in their everyday lives.

As mentioned earlier, the Belgian participants insisted on distancing themselves from Flemish nationalism, but most of them seemed to identify themselves as Belgian without hesitation. There was one exception, and that was the participant who had declared that he was not comfortable with any kind of identifications because they all had political signification.

The answer that I would like to give is that being Belgian or Flemish doesn't mean anything. But that's bullshit. That fact that we live in a country where Belgian or Flemish means something, it is very much politicised, this identity you do not escape from it however much you want to escape it. It's not how much you identify, but how much you would like this identification to mean something politically for example. And then I don't like that fact that Flanders means so much politically, so I would prefer to have Belgian as a structure, and not because I really feel Belgian but because it is a sort of a structure that doesn't push any identification on its citizens, because it consists of different groups. No one really feels Belgian, and it doesn't really mean anything. I wouldn't dismiss the history either, I just think that today it is going in the wrong direction. (Bel_4)

The complex nature of this response indicated that issues of identity were central to this participant. He rejected identification with any group by saying that the meaning attached

to that identification was always politically charged. In his opinion, being Belgian was less problematic than identifying as Flemish. He stated that feeling Belgian was not very prevalent, but the responses given by the other participants pointed in a different direction.

Some of the participants said that they would first identify as Belgian, and then as European, denoting maybe to a type of nested identity. Some also included Brussels as the first identity, while others rejected any forms of regional identity.

I prefer to describe myself as Belgian, not from that region, or Brussels (...) I am Belgian more than European, I don't think Europe will ever be like the US. (Bel₅)

It's not a regional identity, it's very specific. It's Brussels because Brussels embodies for me a mixture of two communities, the French speakers and the Dutch speakers, but it embodies more than that, it's the capital of Europe, it embodies all the identities that I have. That's why I'm so proud of living in Brussels, all the levels of identity that are in me are in Brussels: Europe, Flemish, French, you've got all the other European people that are living here, I can speak English every day if I want to. I really like Brussels as an idea. (Bel₁)

These two answers reflect the different views on regional, national and European identity for the Belgian participants. The first quotation was evidence to a stronger national identity, followed by a European identity, but also a rejection of the regional identity. The second quotation expressed the idea that Brussels differed drastically from the rest of Belgium, and it was a unique place, because it brought together all the levels of identification that this participant considered central to her identity. It is maybe important to remember that Bel₅ had moved to Brussels from Wallonia, while Bel₁ was a Brusseler by birth, as well as being from a bilingual family. One other participant though gave an example of the perfect nested identity. He said:

Belgian, European and then citizen of the world as my way to see the world. (Bel₅)

Many of the participants spoke about the easiness that the European Union brought about: the ease of travel, not having to exchange money or pass through border control, and that these facilities made travelling more enjoyable and less stressful. They also talked about the

fact that today not many remembered how difficult it was before all these measures were introduced in Europe.

The common currency, people were very sceptical about it, I was young when it happened, but i think it's one of the best things they did. Imagine how ridiculous it must have been to pass through customs every time. (Bel₃)

An interesting discussion arose about whether feeling European and being a member of the EU were the same thing. Some argued that it was:

Being European is the same as approving of the EU, there's no difference, no different identity between the two. (Bel₁)

Other participants were a bit more reluctant towards the European Union:

I am not convinced yet by the EU. I don't ... it seems to be very economically oriented. I am not convinced about the social aspect (...) the EU is very much economical. I feel more European than part of the EU. (Bel₃)

One of the interviewees saw that there was a connection between the two, but they were still different entities:

Feeling European and feeling like a member of the EU... the latter is being part of a bigger political organisational group and the other one is about culture and history. They are linked but still different. (Bel₅)

Bel₄ who rejected identification with any political entity said that in his view, being European does not have any particular meaning, and that it was up to the Europeans to attribute the correct meanings to the term. In his opinion, if the European Union was active in protecting the rights of workers, the term European would gain a characteristic that would make him more eager to identify as European. Having a partner who worked for the EU, this participant suggested that he was well acquainted with the salaries paid to EU employees and considered it to be excessive.

The EU has very good aspects, the pacification of Europe and so on but it is also fundamentally undemocratic in a lot of ways, the money spent on European institutions. (...) I have serious problems with how much money the EU clerks make, it is not alright. Europe in Brussels is that, they make a lot of money working 9 to 5 and I have

very serious problems with that. I know these people who are there don't care about the European project, but that they are there because they make a lot of money. (Bel₄)

The presence of the EU institutions in Brussels was regarded as positive by some, who said that it gives Brussels an international, diverse and cosmopolitan atmosphere, but others mentioned that it had negative aspects, mainly because the employees of the EU in Brussels did not interact extensively with the other people in the city.

Asked where the feeling of European-ness came from, some participants discussed the common culture and heritage, and on a couple of occasions the interviewees mentioned the differences between Eastern and Western Europe and the fact that together with the enlargement of the EU, it was becoming harder to build a common European identity for all its citizens because of the cultural differences between the countries. However, they all regarded the Eastern enlargement as a positive aspect of the EU.

Maybe there is Eastern and Western Europe and there are differences, but I think, what we all have in common is a history of wars, migration within Europe. (Bel₂)

The EU is a big monster that doesn't seem to move quite easily... in general we are moving in the right direction slowly. (Bel₅)

One of the most important aspects of the EU mentioned by many of the participants was the same reason for which the EU won the Nobel Prize: the fact that it brought peace to a continent that had been struggling with conflicts for centuries. For the Belgian participants, this was a strong reason for identifying with Europe and for wanting to build a sense of European identity around the European integration project.

I feel wise, we learned in this part of the world to talk, to negotiate, that we should not go for the army solution and I think that is something that can unify Europe but I think each country should have their own way of handling things. We are very different culturally but there are big similarities in the way we see the world, geo-politically we are united. What unites Europe is the rejection of conflict. (Bel₅)

Some suggestions and solutions for building a stronger European identity were also discussed. One participant suggested that travelling was a viable option for an elite sector of the European population, but that the EU should design and implement programmes for

other social classes and attempt to conceive them keeping in mind the various other identities of the Europeans.

They should see people on other levels, not national. Farmers in England, Belgium, France they have a very common identity, so from other identities than the national identities. They should talk to people in the context of those identities and not the national ones. (BeL₁)

She argued that by designing programmes aimed, for example, at bringing the European farmers together, the EU would foster feelings of European identification among the non-elite Europeans who were not necessarily keen on travelling, learning foreign languages, working or studying abroad. Another interesting suggestion made by the same participant was the EU should impose the European Day as a holiday in all its member states, even if it had to come at the cost of a religious holiday. She argued that Europe would become more salient for every European person.

When it comes to identity construction, Europe should be much more proactive like impose an official holiday on all the member countries. If you get a holiday for it you'll think about Europe and they can just replace a church holiday. (BeL₁)

And lastly, this participant proposed that the concept and meaning of European needed to become more appealing, in such a way as to encourage young people to want to identify with it.

They should make it cool. It's cool to say I'm from Brussels, it's cool to say I'm Belgian, but it's not cool to say I'm European. (BeL₁)

The Belgian participants had elaborate and thought-out understandings of European identity. Although not explicit, their answers suggested that identity was a social construct, that it could be constructed according to some principles, it could be malleable and influenced by various factors. Unlike the Romanian participants who argued, possibly rather defensively, that they were European because Romania was part of Europe, the Belgian participants implied that European identity was an identity in constant change, that could be influenced and dissipated throughout the EU through various means. It was the difference between an almost essentialist view on European identity and a social constructivist one. The next section will attempt to investigate whether the Belgian

participants considered multilingualism to be an important factor in building a European identity.

4.2.2.4. RQ 10 - *Multilingualism and European identity*

Multilingualism was already regarded by most of the Belgian participants as a characteristic of feeling European and being a cosmopolitan person. Some of the participants talked about learning languages and multilingual education and the benefits it could bring to somebody's life.

I'm a big proponent of multilingual education. I don't care what your background is, if you're a plumber in Belgium if you speak Dutch and French you double your market and your potential customers. It's not just about feeling European, it's about practical reasons. Social standards have improved, Even workers which a long time ago were lower social classes, they also travel so they see the benefits of speaking other languages as well. (Bel_2)

In a multilingual country like Belgium, speaking more languages could have benefits on the every day life of the people, as exemplified here. One could have access a larger market for the trade they worked in, increasing their income and thus having the financial means to travel to other countries. Although in an indirect way, this was regarded as one process through which multilingualism could foster feelings of European-ness. The experience of learning a foreign language was also suggested to be a catalyst for feeling closer to others.

If you learn just one other language you put yourself in the shoes of everybody else trying to learn another language and it makes you more more open and that can facilitate the European integration. At that point you feel on the same level. (Bel_3)

Once again, language learning was an indirect way of connecting people who participated in the same activity. The relationship between multilingualism and European identity was seen as either a direct one - being multilingual was a characteristic of being European, or as an indirect one - it allowed one to feel closer to others through travelling and realising the commonalities between the cultures, either the national cultures or the social cultures.

Knowing more languages helps feel more European, but only a little bit, it's not the primary object (...) Travelling is nice to get to know your neighbours, but you feel the diversity much more. It's more positive than negative though. When I go to London, Madrid,

Barcelona it feels like going to another city in my country, there's the language difference of course but the culture is so similar in cities. There's more a difference between cities and the countryside than between countries. I identify much more with a girl living in Berlin than with a 26 year old that lives 30 km away from here. (Bel_1)

Again, the similarities between the elite Europeans from various urban environments (as well as between farmers in different countries) were discussed. This participant could relate a lot better to a person from another city in Europe than somebody who spoke the same language as her and lived in the Belgian countryside. But some of the interviewees talked about the fact that European identity already incorporated or would soon incorporate the idea of multilingualism.

It will become part of European identity that we are all multilingual. (...) I think it is part of the European identity, the fact that we speak different languages, even though not all of us are multilingual, but I think it's already there (Bel_2)

Being multilingual will enhance feeling European, but we are 27 countries now, there's no way everybody is going to learn all the languages, they can promote learning languages, that's a good idea I think. (Bel_3)

For the Belgian participants, there seemed to be a connection between being multilingual and feeling European. Some participants regarded this relationship as a direct one, multilingualism fostering feeling of European identity, while others argued that the connection might be indirect. Nonetheless they all had positive views on being proficient in more languages and on the process of learning foreign languages and argued that by being able to communicate people realise the multitude of things they have in common:

I don't think speaking languages has a direct effect on European identity, but I do think it is important to speak languages, travelling helps a lot, speaking to somebody you realise that they are just like you and me. (Bel_4)

4.2.3. United Kingdom

4.2.3.1. RQ 7 - Content validity

The content validity of Bruter's (2005) scale was assessed in the discussion with the participants with regards to their answers. The sports question was again dropped from the interviews. All the participants discussed their answers at length and had a very good grasp on the concepts. The scale was interpreted as it was intended and based on the discussions around the participants' answers, a high content validity of the scale could be inferred.

4.2.3.2. RQ 8 - Attitudes to multilingualism

All of the participants from the UK declared they had at least some knowledge of other languages and regarded being multilingual as a positive trait. One of the interviewees, UK_I, had minimal knowledge of L2 and L3, another participant, UK_5, could be considered to be an autodidact polyglot, declaring fluency in seven languages, while the other three were bilinguals who used their first two languages on a regular basis, and had knowledge of other languages as well.

A topic that came up in almost all of the interviews was the attitude British people have towards learning and speaking more languages. Most participants said that although personally for them being multilingual was a positive thing, the rest of the British people did not hold the same view:

The British don't like to learn another language, because they've never been put in that position, my husband says they are lazy. Well, English is spoken all over the world, wherever you go somebody will speak it, they can't be bothered to learn another language. But again, it's the educational system. Here children start learning languages a lot older than anywhere else in Europe. (UK_2)

This participant was from a Greek Cypriot background and spoke Greek with her family. Her answer touched on the prevalence of English as a lingua franca in the world and her view was that most people in Britain did not learn languages because wherever they would go, they would always find English speakers. She blamed this fact on the educational system which did not require school children to start learning a foreign language at an early age. This view was reflected in the discussion with other participants:

What we are taught in English schools is not conversational, it's useless for even a fleeting visit. (...) We only start learning foreign languages when we're 12, stop at 16, it's not enough to get an idea of a language or a culture. (UK_1)

Although the general perception was the British people did not feel they needed to learn languages because English was spoken everywhere, some participants indicated that they believed there was a generational shift underway:

The perception is that everyone speaks English and they don't need it. The family background and experience make a lot of difference. Adolescents are waking up to the idea that the world is so competitive today, if you don't have another language you will be at a disadvantage. The older you get the more you get to accept that idea, that in your workplace you are going to need it. (UK_4)

The young generations would like their children to learn more languages, so these generations that are growing up now will be different, maybe more European. (UK_2)

Younger generations growing up in Newcastle want to go travelling, want to have more opportunities, and I think people my age and older aren't open to them and this needs to change. I think there's a distinct generational difference and I am on the edge. The internet will open up everything to everyone, younger people are seeing there are options and it's good to explore them. Particularly in Newcastle people were poor, didn't go much on holiday, so the only experience was going on holiday there or to Cornwall and that limits your worldview. The internet has changed that. (UK_1)

The generational shift was influenced by the developments in technology. As UK_1 argued, the younger British people were more informed and for that reason, more open to new experiences, such as travelling abroad. The internet is bringing the world closer together, and although English is spoken in other places as a second language, younger British people will potentially realise the importance of being able to communicate in other languages in securing a better job or for understanding other cultures. The same participant showed dissatisfaction for being fluent only in English. She argued that the little French and Spanish she spoke was not enough to have a basic conversation:

I went inter-railing a few months ago, we went to France, Belgium and Holland and I was ashamed that I couldn't communicate

properly, the fact that I knew English didn't really help because if you're in another country I feel you should make the effort to speak that language or try and involve yourself in that culture. But because I didn't know the basic, the language and the culture, I felt incredibly isolated (...) My French is that bad that I couldn't even order drinks in a restaurant because the waiters spoke so quickly. It's horrible to feel that you can't communicate and that you stick out. Maybe that's just me. I would like to be able to merge in whatever culture I'm in and language is a huge part of that and if you can't communicate how are you going to become immersed fully in an environment? (UK_1)

Although the other participants spoke about the arrogance of British people who do not want to learn a foreign language and expect they will always find English speakers when they travel abroad, the only participant from the UK interviews sample who was more or less monolingual described a sense of shame and guilt and even frustration at not being able to communicate and immerse in a foreign culture. This might point out again to a flawed educational system that does not encourage children to learn foreign languages, but also to a potential shift in people's opinion about the usefulness and importance of being multilingual. The same participant described how much she admired foreign students not only for leaving their families and friends and moving to another country, but also being able to build a life in another language, to work, study and socialise in a second language. Interestingly, she also mentioned that if the opportunity would arise for her to work abroad, she would take it and she would immerse herself in the language and culture, and attempt to build a life for herself there. Her willingness to move abroad to work was evidence of her open-mindedness and confidence that she could be successful in learning another languages if immersed in it.

The participants all agreed that English was an international language, widely spoken in the world. But there are different types of English and two of the participants described their feeling towards British English compared to other world English-es. One of them lived in Brazil for a while and taught English there. She said:

Being a British English speaker you were put on a pedestal as compared to Americans. I was proud to be British over there. The Brazilians were very interested in our heritage, our traditions and culture, so I was becoming more British as it were. (UK_4)

One of the participants considered himself Welsh Scottish, although his first language was English. He also spoke Welsh and Scottish Gaelic and grew up in Wales before moving to London with his family. He said:

I love the queen. I love the way she speaks English and I try to emulate her English. (UK_5)

Although he regarded being a monarchist and speaking the Queen's English as a positive thing, he talked about the difficulties these attitudes brought about when he was growing up in Wales:

I was beaten up once for having an English accent in Wales, I don't really like admitting that too much, I used to get bullied for having an English name. (UK_5)

The same participant, who was fluent in seven languages, also talked about the importance of learning a few words in the language of the country one visits:

Wherever I go, I do try to learn a bit of the language and that's how I try to show respect and the message behind that is: I'm not one of those awful English people who just come to get drunk in your country! I'm not an ignorant lager-drinking lad, I respect your country. (UK_5)

Through learning some phrases in the language of the country, this participant attempts to distance himself from the negative stereotypes that he perceived British people to have when travelling abroad. Learning a bit of the language is a sign of respect for the culture and openness to new experiences:

The willingness to learn a few words when travelling is very important, that there are other languages out there to be learned and to communicate with them. If people try to learn a few words they are showing an openness that will encourage them to become more aware of multilingualism and of wanting to learn other languages. (UK_4)

The UK interview participants had a positive attitude towards multilingualism, although they believed that this was not a prevalent attitude in the UK. They indicated that there may be a generational shift underway and that the younger British people would learn to value multilingualism and the advantages it could bring to one's social and professional life. The monolingual interviewee expressed frustration and shame at not being able to

communicate in other languages, and suggested that the educational system and the social attitudes to language learning were to blame for it.

4.2.3.3. *RQ 9 - Feeling European and European identity*

During the interviews with the UK participants, European identity was discussed at length, covering the strength of identification with Europe, the hierarchy of identities, the comparison between British and continental European identification and other topics.

Some participants discussed the feelings of European identity in light of the fact the the UK is an island, part of Europe and the European Union, but also detached from it. One of the participants when discussing this issue said:

I'm not sure if this is a predominant feeling, we consider ourselves to be part of an island and not connected to the continent. So I don't really consider myself a citizen of Europe, I consider myself a citizen of England or Britain. And I don't know if there are ideological reasons behind that, but it's just how we were brought up, the idea that you're British, and European people they're a step away, there's a sea in between and it's there for a purpose. It's not xenophobic or anything like that. If I'd say I was a citizen of Europe, I'd be cheating Europeans. (UK_I)

The view expressed by this participant was that Britain is somewhat distant from Europe, geographically speaking, but also from an identity perspective. Interestingly, this participant considered that for her to identify entirely as a citizen of Europe would be detrimental to the other Europeans. The feeling expressed here was not necessarily one of inferiority; nonetheless, it seems there were a set of characteristics that the British did not possess in her opinion, and for this reason, they could not identify as European. By arguing "it's just how we were brought up", the responsibility was shifted to the educational and possibly societal factors, and away from the individual. Uk_I went on to argue that:

Someone who lives in Belgium will have more cultural connections to someone who lives in France or Germany and to the surrounding countries. In Britain we are only connected to France by the Eurostar so we don't have any neighbours that can influence us. (UK_I)

Britain being an island and not having direct neighbours was discussed from different perspectives. The same topic yielded a different response from another participant who argued:

The proximity, the shared historical, cultural things., we have all these things in common with other Europeans. Because we are so close geographically there has been a lot more contact and influence. I would consider myself part of that. We are kind of isolated as an island, but the influence between the countries is there. I was thinking how past history has connected us, be it through war or whatever, all that kind of things, that's why I feel we are all connected. Because of the war, we all participated, and we are all part of that outcome today. (UK_4)

Interestingly, these two participants proposed different views on the same topic. One of them argued that since Britain was an island, it was isolated, and therefore different from Europe, while the other participant perceived the distance between Britain and Europe to be small enough to be conducive to cultural exchange and political influences. Britain's participation in the war was a factor that seemed to have brought a sense of closeness and camaraderie with other European countries. This stance was echoed by another participant, who declared that his European identity was influenced by his parents' participation in the war:

I do feel European actually but more importantly I feel it is important for Europe to be united, I have a strong sense of history, my father fought in the war, my mother lived in London during the Blitz and nobody wants that again, so I think the EU is a great thing and I feel very positive about Europe. (UK_3)

The World War II in which Britain fought alongside other continental European countries brought a sense of closeness, a shared history, which was described as the basis for the present Europe. In the same manner as the Belgian sample, this UK participant brought up the pacifist European ideals and the fact that the EU was a safeguard against international conflicts in Europe. The same participant also talked about the importance of the EU with regards to different kinds of legislation, such as workers' rights.

Without being pretentious, I feel that there's lots about the EU that people don't realise, in terms of worker protection, human rights, all the European laws are all very positive and I do identify with these rights and world outlook.(...) One of the best things is the maximum

working hours, it's 48 hours in Europe. That changed a lot of things for Britain. (UK_3)

The understanding of the concept of identity varied among the UK participants. Some appeared to approach identity from a more essentialist perspective, while others understood it as a social construct, influenced by experiences and social context. Some of the UK interviewees expressed their perspectives on identity as a nested concept, based primarily on geography:

I identify myself more with the regional identity, I am very much from the North East, I'm a Geordie, I have their norms and values, I have their dialect, and we have a very strong culture and the heritage of that is... See, I'm wearing the Angel of the North as a necklace, I have strong identifiers. (...) I'm a Geordie, I'm English, I'm British, I'm from the UK. (...) I don't know what it means to be European and that is potentially one of the problems I have, I have no experience of what it is to be European so I couldn't even try and explain it. It is very hard for me to accept that I have no idea. (UK_1)

The concentric circles of a nested identity were expressed clearly in this answer. This participant identified primarily with her regional identity, then three levels of national identity, followed by an extremely diffused European identity. The fact she did not have any experience with Europe precluded her from considering the last level of the nested identities. The notion that experience aided the creation of an identity resonated with another participant, as well:

If you have a strong European identity, it must be that you support being part of a community of countries, and what that represents and what the EU is trying to do and you support it. And you understand what the EU is and what it means to be European citizen. (...) Because of our shared historical background I would like to think I am European. (UK_4)

The understanding here is that identification with Europe comes with understanding and experience with European politics and ideals. This can be considered a social constructivist approach to identity. Nonetheless, the same participant when discussing her national identity took a more essentialist view on identity:

I'm 100% English in terms of background, my parents, my grandparents, totally British and that was always something I saw as

a fact of life, in terms of what I speak, where I was born, my heritage, yes, I'm very very English in those terms, it's my genetic makeup. (UK_4)

Genetical background, place of birth, ancestors, native language were the primary factors which came into play for the formation of this participant's identity. These characteristics pointed to an essentialist understanding of identity. She later described that although she lived for a long time in Brazil, married a Brazilian, raised her children there before moving back to the UK and spoke Portuguese fluently, she would never consider herself Brazilian. Similarly, she argued, her husband who had just received British citizenship would never consider himself British, because his heritage was Brazilian. Therefore, it appeared she considered regional and national identity to be fixed and hard to change, even when one acquired a symbol of that identity - the citizenship; however, this participant's understanding of European identity had a more constructivist structure, being built around knowledge and experience of Europe, as well as a shared history and heritage.

Most participants agreed that there is a common European history and a European heritage. With regard to whether they perceived Europe and the European Union to be the same thing or different entities, the responses were mixed. Some of the interviewees argued that the UK and Europe were fundamentally different from a political point of view:

I do feel European to some extent, I feel we have a different culture and politics but I don't think that makes us less European, I think that we just have to respect that. (...) So I feel European, but maybe not a member of the EU because politically I think we are quite separate, we have our own identity. I love the idea of unity, I think it's wonderful, but we can work in different countries, work together for a peaceful world, I have a lot of respect for the EU, I think it is a peaceful organisation. (UK_5)

The response presented here portrayed the participant's understanding of the Europe from a political point of view as homogenous among European countries and quite unlike Britain's political system. This interviewee had lived in two European countries prior to the interview and had extensive experience with Europe. Another participant declared that for her Europe and the EU were similar:

Europe and the EU, they're of the same thing, the EU might be more of the corporate term, in essence I think they're the same, but again I don't know. The more I talk about it the more I realise I'm

really stupid, I don't like being ignorant. It's really unfortunate.
(UK_1)

Although she started off arguing that Europe and the EU were similar, she went on to find a difference, and then expressed again her frustration at her lack of knowledge regarding Europe. This sentiment came up at various points in this interview and quite often, the participant prefaced or ended her answers saying that she was uncertain of her response and that this lack of knowledge was frustrating to her. Although she was assured that the questions did not require a correct answer, rather an opinion, she continued to display irritability towards her lack of familiarity with Europe. The participant who had been born in Cyprus but lived most of her life in England, when asked about whether she identifies more with Europe or the EU answered:

I am an EU member and European, I don't think there is a difference. (UK_2)

When asked to describe why and how European she felt, she alternated inclusion in various communities:

Cyprus is in Europe, I think we do belong to Europe geographically, we joined the EU (...) In Cyprus they feel European, they travel a lot, they are more travelled around the world than the people here. Our community here follow the old traditions. (UK_2)

Initially, she responded to the question regarding feeling European by including herself in the Cypriot community in Cyprus, but then moved on to distance herself from this community and situated herself within the Cypriot community in the UK. When discussing feelings of European identity, this participant detached herself from her British identity and responded more from the perspective of being Cypriot either in the UK, or in Europe. It is possible that this was an unconscious attempt to rationalise her feelings of European identity. Although she perceived herself as more European than other British people, she felt less European than the Cypriots in Cyprus and argued that it was because the Cypriot community in the UK was more old-fashioned and more rooted in their traditions. This is a common occurrence in some immigrant communities, who attempt to defend and maintain their traditions by distancing themselves from the host community, but also from the home community which is probably evolving at a different speed and sometimes in a different direction. Speaking about the understanding of the relationship between Europe and the EU, another participant said:

Europe it's the geographical space for me while EU is the institutions, the currency - I was very positive about the euro, until I realised what a big mistake it was. Originally I was upset we didn't go in it, but I might have been wrong. (UK_3)

The economic developments in recent years might have had an influence on people's opinion about the eurozone. As this interviewee stated, he initially was in favour of the euro, but considering the financial crisis, he admitted he could have been mistaken about it. Other participants spoke about the ties between the British pound and the British identity:

I don't think it's a good idea that we join the euro, there's the stressful economical side, but also that the pound has a really strong connection to the monarchy and the history of Britain. Potentially if we would have the euro, I would feel more of a connection, more European. Is that weird? (UK_1)

Not only did this participant perceive the pound to be stronger from an economical point of view than the euro, but also as a symbol of the British Monarchy and the past. She asked rhetorically whether it was stranger for her to believe that having adopted the euro would have increased the feelings of European identity in the UK. In spite of the fact that she argued that she knew nothing or very little about Europe, her intuition was correct. Risse (2003) discussed how the introduction of the euro in Europe had a beneficial effect on the levels of European identity.

Other factors that might influence a stronger European identity were also mentioned. Some participants talked about travelling as a positive experience and one that made them feel closer to other Europeans:

Travelling helps with feeling European, I've been to some European countries, we went on some cruises with other people. (...) We might feel closer to other Europeans, but it might be because we travel more to Europe. (UK_2)

One participant said that while travelling and living abroad in some European countries, he experienced some negative attitudes towards the UK and that brought down his levels of European identity:

What brings me a bit down is the attitude towards Britain. When I lived in Poland and Italy they kept saying Britain is trying to be

different. We are not trying to be different, we are trying to continue as we are and be European at the same time. That's what I think. I feel like Europe has more in common with each other, especially, Spain, France, Italy. (...) After travelling in Europe I feel a bit less European, I think to some extent it is the negative attitude towards Britain and that they are trying to be different. (UK_5)

The interviewee here expressed a defensive attitude towards the things that made the UK different from Europe, which he earlier described as being the monarchy, driving on the left side of the road and the British pound. Again, the idea that European countries had more in common among themselves than with the UK came up. This idea was also reflected in another participant's discourse, who thought that:

The perception is that we have more in common with other English speaking nations than with European countries, but in essence everybody is the same everywhere. (UK_1)

This was an intriguing idea, which had not been expressed by any other participants, but it suggested that a common language could potentially lead to the formation of a common identity between the native speakers of that language, even though they come from distinct cultural backgrounds. The internet, the media and the export of cultural material between countries which speak the same language was a well-known phenomenon and was discussed with some participants in the Belgian interviews as well. After proclaiming that she considered the British to have more in common with other native speakers of English than with Europeans, she toned down her statement, by adding that people were the same everywhere.

Other factors that could influence European identity were discussed and one participant talked about the important role that the media played in the development of a stronger affiliation with Europe:

The airfare is so cheap, it's absurd, so people should travel. A more positive media would make people feel more European. A positive education. Also, there are things that are wrong with the EU, I remember a couple of years ago, there were scandals with corruptions and expenses of the MEPs, so this has to change. More knowledge about what the EU does, the fact that they invest in regional development for example. (UK_3)

And he went on to say:

Sadly Europe is quite fragmented now. If the media would portray it in a better light, in a year everybody would think that Europe is fantastic. One of the things I really hate about the media is the lies, they lie, it's ridiculous. (...) Generally people are quite antsy here about Europe and that's partly because of the press. Sadly there's a negative attitude to Europe. My own view is that people don't understand the things that Europe has given us. (UK_3)

Travel, media, education and knowledge about the EU were the factors that could lead to a stronger sense of European identity. This participant expressed his anger at the media and the media's portrayal of Europe and the EU, and argued that a positive media attitude to Europe would change the British perceptions in a short time. He blamed the current negative attitude of the British towards the EU on the press and the lack of knowledge regarding the European influence in the UK. Still, he expressed his discontent towards a media that could not be trusted. Apart from these factors, the interviewee also advocated for transparency on the part of the EU and its members of Parliament. Being able to trust the European institutions could also help in encouraging people to feel more European. Some interviewees discussed what they perceived to be the advantages and disadvantages of being a member of the EU.

The advantages of being an EU citizen is access, being able to freely move, to work, to be able to get to know other cultures without any impediment, you're not going to be stopped from going anywhere. Disadvantages, maybe in terms of... if the EU would stipulate some things whereby cultures would lose out. (UK_4)

Freedom of movement, work and study, and having access to the market in other countries were perceived as important and an advantage for EU citizens. The only fear expressed by this participant was that by being part of the EU, the countries would have to obey potential EU regulations, which could be damaging to the culture. The fear of uniformity and eradication of the cultural diversity of Europe was expressed in a veiled manner. Although she was aware that the EU currently had no agenda that could be detrimental to the cultural diversity of Europe, and they also had programmes to help promote this diversity, there was the fear that ultimately the EU would be damaging to the cultural makeup of Europe.

A common heritage, a common history, a shared geographical space and many other factors came into the creation and development of a sense of European identity. However, one

participant talked about the importance of the EU as an institution, together with its policies:

I have to come back to the idea of the EU, only because there is one.
If there wasn't a European Union I think there would still be a
European identity somehow, but I think of the EU when you say
European identity. And within the EU, the policies and the attitudes
put Europe in a positive light. Europe leads the way in terms of
human rights. (UK_3)

In his opinion, even without the EU there would be a sense of European identity, but because the EU and its institutions and policies existed, they influenced the way in which people saw themselves in light of European identity. The fact that the EU was a promoter of peace and human rights, and as he said, "leads the way" in these fields, made feeling European that much more important and relevant in this time and geographical space.

The interviews with the UK participants revealed that to some extent, they identified with Europe. Only one participant who was also the only monolingual participant reported not identifying as European, and expressed feelings of frustration and shame for knowing very little about Europe and the EU. The general understanding was that European identity was not very widespread in the UK, and the primary reasons were identified as the UK being an island separate from Europe, the media's negative portrayal of Europe, and the lack of knowledge and education regarding European issues. Nevertheless, for some participants travelling and learning about other cultures was important with regards to feeling more European.

4.2.3.4. RQ 10 - Multilingualism and European identity

Most of the participants in the interviews in the UK agreed that being multilingual was a significant factor for a stronger European identity. Knowledge of foreign languages was posed to provide insights into other cultures, and increase awareness and knowledge about that culture. Some participants also discussed the fact that together with proficiency in more languages came an increased tolerance to diversity and that in turn made people feel more European and even more as a citizen of the world.

As discussed above, there was just one participant who considered herself monolingual, although she had limited knowledge of two European languages. While describing her language skills, she said:

Particularly the language issue is a big one, I can't speak more than English. I claim to speak French and Spanish, but I speak them incredibly badly. We only start learning foreign languages when we're 12, stop at 16, it's not enough to get an idea of a language or a culture. I don't think I have enough knowledge to say I'm a citizen of Europe. (UK_1)

After admitting to speaking the two foreign languages very poorly, she justified her monolingualism by saying that in the UK foreign languages were only taught in school for a brief period of time. In this context, she argued that she did not have enough knowledge, presumably of foreign languages and thus cultures, to consider herself to be European. The idea that knowledge of languages and experience abroad was related to being more European was expressed by another participant, as well:

Having stayed abroad and speaking some languages, it made me feel more knowledgeable in front of my friends, more European, I suppose. (UK_4)

Another participant blamed the educational system for failing to teach foreign languages, and thus providing a disservice to the people:

Definitely if you speak more languages you'll feel more European. That's one obvious one. I think here in the UK we are poorer because we don't speak anything but English. It never takes off, a few years ago they talked about teaching languages in junior school, but it never took off. (UK_3)

The ease with which this participant proclaimed that it was obvious that speaking more languages would determine one to feel more European was dramatic. In the same way as the previous quotation described, this participant also criticised the educational system for failing to provide language learning at an early age. One of the participants was a teacher and among her duties she had to teach her students some French and Spanish. Being involved in the educational system that the other two participants criticised, she said:

Being multilingual makes you more of a world citizen, you've probably experienced other cultures and societies and that can make you feel part of the bigger picture, you're not isolated and turned in on yourself, which I think a lot of people in England are. I teach secondary school kids, they're 14-15 and they keep saying 'What's the point of learning a foreign language, I'm never going to leave Britain' and so on, and that's very narrow minded, thinking that you don't

need to learn another language and you are closing yourself off from all the richness and the experiences that you could have in a wider world. You have to learn all these things to be able to be tolerant, that's what makes you a citizen of the world, and languages is the way. We, as teachers, need to do that at primary school, they don't have any prejudice at this age. (UK_4)

The interviewee was a teacher, and she felt directly responsible for providing children with some foreign language skills. She argued that at a young age people are more open-minded to learning languages, while later, in their teens, there was an attitude shift when they regarded language learning useless because they had no intention of leaving the country. The interviewee however insisted that access to a foreign language provided access to other cultures and even to the whole world. She considered that by refusing to become multilingual, the young people closed themselves from the experiences that the world could offer them. The isolation and egocentrism of the monolinguals was, in her opinion, prevalent in the UK. She went on to argue:

Languages are a way forward towards European identity, but it has to be supported by the government. Having languages at primary school is the primary choice, but they have to be consistent. That would make people more accepting, more able to connect with other cultures and become more European in that way. (UK_4)

In all these answers, the common theme was the responsibility that the educational system and the government had in providing foreign languages in school, from an early age. The participants quoted here all agree that by being exposed to languages from an early age, the British students would open up to new experiences and to the world, and that would eventually lead to feeling more European. There was just one participant who considered that foreign language learning was an indirect way of feeling more European, if it ever reached that point. This participant had taught himself most of the seven languages he was fluent in and he had lived abroad, in Europe, for several years:

I think there's more than language going on in terms of European identity and I don't think Britain will end up feeling more European very soon, even if loads of kids are going to learn to speak French. I think though that learning languages will make people more tolerant towards European identity and other languages being used here in Britain. I think that will help Britain to engage more. I think British students now are taking the opportunity to study abroad more and

to travel. Britain is beginning to get on board with that. Promotion and tolerance will lead to a greater sense of cooperation and a closer relationship between Europeans. How to implement it, is another matter. (UK_5)

He argued here that language competency led to more tolerance, which in turn could influence young people to study abroad and travel, which would lead to more interactions with Europeans and thus, potentially, to a stronger European identity. In his opinion, the relationship between multilingualism and European identity was complicated and indirect, and implementing the changes in the system necessary for the promotion of multilingualism was a complex issue. Travelling and studying abroad seemed to be in his opinion precursors of European identity. As expected, this perception was expressed by other interviewees, as well:

Travelling would enhance people's experiences, particularly if they don't just spend their time in the hotel with other English people, they would realise the importance of languages. It would have to be an extended stay, that's why I think exchange programmes are a valuable thing. (UK_4)

Exchange programmes for school children, study abroad during university, travelling for extended periods of time and immersion in other cultures were deemed to be of great consequence for young British people. As discussed earlier, there was also an awareness that younger people were more interested in these experiences, that they were more open to explore and learn about new cultures.

For the only speaker of minority and regional languages, the support that the EU provided for these languages played quite an important role in his identification with Europe and the EU, because he perceived the EU to provide a sort of safety net for these languages:

The fact that the EU supports diversity ideologically does filter through and I feel that for the minority language speakers having something that is sort of above their sovereign state that is telling their state that the regional language is valid and has a right to exist, I think that can give a sense of security. The fact that we can communicate with the EU in Welsh and that there are Welsh speakers in the European Parliament kind of mutes Westminster. It's not that they are against Welsh, they're just indifferent. (UK_5)

From his perspective, being able to have a direct relationship with the EU and to use his language in the interaction with the EU was a valuable thing. Currently, Welsh has the status of co-official language in the EU, status that was requested and approved in 2008 (Welsh Language in the EU, 2012). The EU functions as a buffer between the regional and minority languages and the sovereign state. In his opinion, it was not the case that the UK government did not want to support Welsh, rather that it was indifferent to the fate of Welsh. This indifference was countered by the involvement of the EU in this matter.

The same participant when describing his identity, in general, offered proof that the European identity was context dependent and socially constructed. He argued:

I can be very flexible with my identity, the order can change. I can also put my accents on quite easily, I don't always do it on purpose. Maybe that confuses my identity a little, my accents. I'd say I'm Welsh first, Scottish, Londoner, British, European, but it would change because I consider myself to be all of them. If I'm speaking to my Polish friends about European issues, I would feel European first. (UK_5)

The kaleidoscopic self (Deaux & Perkins, 2001) discussed earlier is clearly represented by this quotation. The interviewee revealed that he identified with various regional and national levels of identity, as well as with the European identity, but he emphasised that depending on the context one of the identities surfaced and took precedence over the other ones. He made a point of arguing that he considered himself to be all of these identities, but depending on the interaction he engaged in, he identified more with one than the others. Here, the identities were not understood as nested or concentric, rather, they were all present consistently, and the participant had agency in choosing the one that was most relevant at a specific point in time.

The prevalence of English in the world has already been discussed in this chapter, but only one participant in the interviews in the UK mentioned the fact that English was not an ideologically neutral language. He advocated the use of Esperanto as a European language:

I've always thought that it was a shame that a language like Esperanto never took off, I think that would have been a fantastic thing. And this is a perfect example of how that would work: you've got the EU, you have the euro, and then Esperanto. Brilliant! Maybe English is serving that purpose to an extent, but it does have a baggage with it, either the colonial thing, or the US. It's not

ideologically neutral. It would be easily substituted for Esperanto.
 It's designed to be easily learned, maybe it's too Latin based, but
 Esperanto doesn't have all these connotations attached to it. (UK_3)

The EU, the euro and a common European language would help build a stronger European identity and a stronger Europe. For him, although English functioned as a *lingua franca*, it was still a language charged with its history - the colonial British past - or the influence of a powerful nation like the United States. Esperanto, an artificial language, was designed to be easily learned by speakers of Indo-European languages, like most of the EU citizens. Having the common institutions, the common currency and a common language would provide the framework for building a common European identity.

Although the widespread feeling among the UK participants was that British people did not feel very European, most of the interviewees declared that at least to some extent they identified with Europe. Being able to communicate in more languages was considered to be essential in feeling more European. The view that the younger generations were more interested in travelling and exploring the world and that, consequently, they would understand the value of multilingualism came up repeatedly in the interviews. Most of the participants considered that it was the duty of the government to make changes to the educational system so that foreign languages were taught at a younger age and for a longer period of time in British schools. In spite of the fact the the UK was considered to be different from many points of view from other European countries, the interviewees displayed similar levels of European identity, as well as similar concerns and opinions with the other interviewees from Romania and Belgium. The following chapter will attempt to bring together the conclusions of the quantitative and qualitative results presented in these studies.

5. Conclusion & discussion

In recent decades, especially since the creation of the European Union, much has been written about Europe and European identity. Philosophers, sociologists, political scientists, psychologists and linguists have debated the existence and basis of European identity in a land so diverse and constantly changing like Europe. There are some who suggest that the European identity has had a different trajectory than the national identity, being a supranational (Delanty, 2006; Schlenker, 2013) or transnational identity (Hermann, Risse & Brewer, 2004; Risse, 2010), while others have argued that it forms around the same foundational principles as the national identity (Díez-Medrano, 2010). Although the research in the field of European identity to date has been quite extensive, there are surprisingly few empirical studies which aim at understanding the components of European identity, or the factors that influence its strengths or weaknesses. The ones that exist are mostly theoretical and philosophical in nature, or are based on interviews. A notable exception are the Eurobarometers, the public opinion surveys commissioned by the EU at regular time intervals to monitor Europeans' attitudes towards a wide range of aspects of European life. Nonetheless, the research design of these surveys has been criticised frequently. The economic crisis that engulfed Europe and the rest of the world will most certainly have an effect on the relationships between the European nations and it will probably also influence European identity. Nevertheless, the forecasts have been contradictory: some suggested that a decline in economic prosperity will weaken the feelings of European identity (Guibernau, 2011), while others have argued that economic hardship will lead to increased cooperation between Europeans, and thus lead to a stronger European identity (Fligstein et al., 2012).

In light of these matters, the aim of this dissertation was to explore the nuances of European identity and how it is understood and appropriated by European citizens from very diverse backgrounds. Based on research on national identity, some have argued that European identity might be understood in different ways in Western and Eastern Europe, the former employing a more civic understanding of this identity, while the latter would perceive it in a more ethnic way (Risse, 2010; Smith, 1992). Previous theoretical and empirical data has indicated that European identity is composed of two distinct components, a civic and a cultural one, but these findings had not been validated in many European contexts (Bruter, 2005). There have also been studies suggesting a wide variety of factors that can have an effect on the strength of European identity, such as age,

educational level, history of travelling and contact with other Europeans, or frequency of use and proficiency in foreign languages, and again these assumptions have not been extensively examined empirically (Fligstein, 2008). Lastly, Europe is a diverse environment, encompassing many languages, ethnicities, nationalities and cultures, and all throughout history this diversity was one of the causes of many conflicts and wars. A question that arises then is if the diversity, particularly the diversity of language, is an asset or a vulnerability in the creation and development of a European identity across all the nations of the EU.

It was essential then to understand European identity in order to be able to identify and explore its link with multilingualism. The European identity is understood here from a social psychological perspective, as being both an individual and a collective identity, and one of the many facets of a person's multiple identities, having a stable core, while at the same time being triggered by contextual cues. For a more in depth understanding, a mixed methodology approach was employed in three European contexts. Multilingualism is here understood not only as the proficiency and frequency of use of more languages, but also comprising attitudes towards being multilingual, anxiety when using a foreign language, intention to continue studying languages and the intensity of this drive. Previous studies have investigated the relationship between European identity and knowledge of other languages, but one of the objectives of this dissertation was to understand whether all these other linguistic factors are related and can predict higher levels of European identity.

The relation between national and European identity is complex and intricate, and this study attempted to better understand if these identities were perceived as conflictual or harmonious. In order to understand this relation, instruments for bicultural identity were adapted to address the interaction between national and European identity. The contexts in which the studies were conducted were chosen in such a way as to provide a clearer understanding of the concepts and their relationship. Previous studies have considered data from the United Kingdom and Belgium, but little research has been carried out to date on these topics in Romania. Based on previous studies, Eastern Europe had a more cultural and ethnic understanding of European identity, while Western Europe endorsed more the civic elements of European identity. Studies that have been conducted in Belgium have rarely investigated the linguistic contexts separately (unless one of their aims was to look at linguistic differences). This dissertation separated the Francophone and Dutch-speaking Belgians, and investigated each linguistic context independently. Another aim was to

explore whether there are any differences between younger and older participants in the studies, since the literature suggests younger Europeans endorse European identity more than the older ones.

The methodology was comprised of surveys and interviews; two methods that complement each other efficiently; one providing empirical data, and the other the nuances to better comprehend the topics of study (Dörnyei, 2007). This methodology addresses a void in the research to date with regards to empirical studies of European identity. The quantitative section was conducted using data obtained from online survey questionnaires, translated into the language of each context, an efficient method of involving large numbers of participants in the study, with a potential increased ecological validity than traditional pen and paper questionnaires (Dewaele & Wilson, 2010). The qualitative part consisted of interviews with participants about their understanding and attitudes towards linguistic and identity constructs. These two components of the study aimed to inform each other, and thus provide a more refined comprehension of the concepts. The statistical analysis fills a gap in the literature on European identity, which has traditionally been discussed using qualitative methods, such as interviews or political, philosophical and theoretical conceptualisations. To my knowledge, there is only one instrument (Bruter, 2005) to date assessing the European identity concept, an instrument that has not been consistently tested for validity and reliability in many international European contexts. This scale's characteristics were assessed statistically in all contexts, and the items on the scale were discussed with the participants in the interviews in order to evaluate its content validity. The surveys also provided the means to test another scale, aimed at understanding the relationship between national and European identity. This scale has been previously used to discern the way in which bicultural individuals manage their two identities (Comănanu & Noels, in preparation). The results will be discussed in this section.

5.1. National & European identity

As discussed in the Introduction, the relationship between national and European identity is complex. The two might be nested, blend to form a hybrid or they might develop independently of each other. At least from an institutional level, efforts have been made to provide European citizens with European symbols in order to help the development of this identity: the anthem, the flag, the common currency, and even the European day. The emergence of these symbols has been linked to surges in the levels of European identity

Caporaso & Kim, 2009; Fligstein et al., 2012; Risse, 2003), however this does not reflect the nuances of the relationship between European and national identities, and the Europeans' understanding of it. The present study attempted to provide a better understanding from a bottom-up perspective, that is, the Europeans' understanding of this connection.

In order to assess this relationship, I examined the literature on biculturalism, the association of two cultural identities of an individual. Previous studies conducted by Benet-Martínez and her colleagues (2000, 2002, 2005) have identified two dimensions that were considered relevant for bicultural people: conflict-harmony and distance-overlap. These studies also found that the cultural frame-switching - the contextual priming cues - was relevant for biculturals. Combining these principles of biculturality, a new instrument called *Bicultural Integration Orientation Scale* (Comănanu & Noels, in preparation) was created and tested. This scale was used to assess the relationship between two identities in the case of bicultural individuals and has been adapted for the present study to investigate the relation between the participants' national and European identity. These orientations have been discussed in the literature on the relationship between European and national identity (Fligstein et al., 2012; Risse, 2010) as forming a hybrid, or a marble cake, being nested or in conflict. Situational Europeans was also a term that originated from Fligstein and his colleagues' work (2012), corresponding to the alternation orientation. Nonetheless, no empirical study investigated these concepts consistently in the field of European identity. Thus the BIOS, although it is an instrument developed for bicultural identity, had strong grounding in the European identity literature and was adapted to this context.

The scale showed consistent correlations with a graphical representation of the European and national identities in all contexts (see Appendix A-D for the diagrams). The next step investigated the connections between the adapted BIOS dimensions and other concepts of interest to this study, related to linguistic and European identity. The five orientations of the scale were: conflict (perceiving national and European identities as incongruous), monoculture (preferring to identify with just one of the two identities), alternation (alternating between the national and the European identity, but keeping them separate), compatibility (perceiving the two identities as complementing each other), and hybridity (feeling that the national and the European identity are blending into one identity).

The most endorsed orientations in all contexts were *compatibility* and *hybridity*, suggesting that Europeans consistently view these two identities in accord with each other and even blending. This finding is consistent with previous literature which suggests that at least in

some European contexts the civic ideals associated with Europe are also consistent with the national identity (Smith, 1992; Risse, 2010; Schlenker, 2013). Risse (2010) argues that in many cases, national identities are being Europeanised, incorporating values and ideals congruent with the European project into the national identity traits. These ideals can include respect for human rights, democracy, equality, cosmopolitanism, education, open-mindedness and tolerance. The least supported views were that national and European identity were *conflictual* or that the participants would prefer to have only one of these identities. This dimension could be regarded as the national European identity (Risse, 2010), which specifies that people who endorse this *monocultural orientation* effectively feel no relation to Europe, but rather prefer to consider themselves just nationals of their own country. *Alternation* was moderately endorsed in all contexts, with the Dutch-speaking Belgians recording slightly higher levels. This dimension taps in the concept of situational Europeans (Fligstein et al., 2012), implying that there are some Europeans who feel a strong allegiance to their nation and to Europe, but they consider these loyalties to be separate and alternate between them depending on the context.

The pattern of correlations with European identity scales suggest that the more people perceived the relationship between the national and European identity compatible or blended, the stronger their identification with Europe, in general, but also with the cultural and civic components of this identity. The results varied slightly between the contexts, but overall, the pattern was similar: feeling European was in opposition to considering the two identities to be in conflict, or having a preference for only one, and was strongly related to believing that the two are compatible and even form a hybrid. Again, this finding lends support to the idea that national identities today are becoming Europeanised. This strategy is effective in creating a sense of collective European identity without imposing on an individual's national identity. By not perceiving their national identity to be threatened by European identity, the latter one can potentially become the norm in a society.

The pattern of correlations described above was also observed with some of the linguistic variables. Proficiency and frequency of use of foreign languages showed consistently these same associations to the BIOS concepts, and so did confidence in using a foreign language. As expected, anxiety had an inverse relation. With regards to attitudes to multilingualism, in some contexts the relationship followed the same trend, but the statistical significance was not always present. Thus, the linguistic profile of a person who perceives their European identity to be compatible with national identity points to the importance of

foreign language proficiency and use. The participants in this study were highly educated Europeans, many of them declaring themselves as multilinguals. For them, multilingualism was an every day reality. Without attempting to generalise these results beyond the scope of this project, we can infer that multilingualism can become one of the important features of a Europeanised national identity and even a European identity.

The relation between the national and European identities was also considered in the interviews. In each context, the nested-ness of the different levels of identities was mentioned by some participants, usually going from local, to regional, national and then European. This pattern was disrupted in a few cases when participants refused to identify with their local identities because they had relocated to other areas, which were more urban and cosmopolitan (such as London and Brussels); others also rejected the association with their regional identity if this identity was perceived to be supportive of nationalistic and even ethnocentric feelings (as in the case of the Flemish identity).

For the Romanian participants, for example, the compatibility between the two identities was given by the rights that Romanians gained after joining the EU. This view was more endorsed by the younger participants. The older ones discussed the need to be accepted by the other European countries in order to perceive these identities as compatible. The Belgian interviewees spoke consistently of the relationship between Belgium and the EU, primarily because of the salience of the European identity in their daily lives, due to the presence of the EU institutions in Brussels. The fact that Belgium had been a member of the EU from the beginning of this institution meant that the Belgian and European ideals had blended and they were discussed interchangeably by Belgian participants. The statistical results showed that hybridity was significantly less endorsed by the British when compared to the other groups. Consistently, the UK interviews participants spoke of the distinct political and cultural aspects of the UK and Britain when compared to other European contexts. Some suggested that they would prefer to be closer to Europe, while other participants supported a certain distance between the British institution and way of life, and the European ones. These results were also consistent with Bruter's (2005) interviews in the British context.

The quantitative analysis suggests that the more educated people, who knew and used foreign languages, and who felt confident doing so, felt that their national and European identity were compatible and blended together. Although some differences were recorded among the contexts, overall they all showed a consistent pattern of agreement with the

orientations, supporting the positive ones significantly more than the negative ones. The qualitative component of the study provided a better understanding of this relationship and the effects of this contextualisation, depending on the salience of European institutions and symbols, as well as on the historical and political characteristics.

5.2. Components of European identity

The concept of European identity has been studied in light of the understanding of national identity. Smith (1991) suggested that national identity can be either civic or ethnic, the former being more prevalent in the Western European countries, while the latter being specific of Eastern countries. Risse (2010) adapted this theory to the European identity context and proposed that there are two types of European identity: a cosmopolitan one and a national European identity. Others (Bruter, 2005; Burgess, 2002) argued that these components are combined to form an individual's understanding of European identity, as well, and should not be understood only at group level. Thus, Bruter (2005) developed an instrument to test the degree to which each of these components was supported at an individual level. As discussed earlier, his multi-method study was conducted in three Western European countries and proved to be a reliable and consistent measurement.

In order to assess this instrument's validity and reliability, it was included in the online survey and used as a starting point of the discussion with the interviewees. The aim was to improve our understanding of the way these components form a sense of European identity at an individual level and to test the scale's validity. The pilot study conducted in Romania suggested that it was a reliable scale for this context, with one exception - the sports question. Even Bruter (2005) found in his study that this item was problematic and had its basis on "the assumption that if citizens feel closer to fellow Europeans than to non-European they will unconsciously be prone to choose the European team against a variety of non-European challengers" (Bruter, 2005, p. 108). This question was part of the set of questions tapping at the cultural European identity. Its content validity was also discussed with the Romanian interviewees. These discussions indicated that many participants knew more than expected about the sport and thus chose their answer based on their preference for the athlete, rather than underlying feelings of solidarity with fellow Europeans. It was thus decided that the question be dropped from the analysis in all contexts.

Another issue with the scale was recoded in the two Belgian contexts. Although in Romania and in the UK, all components of the scale displayed suitable levels of reliability, in the two Belgian contexts the cultural European identity scale showed a lack of reliability. Consequently, this component was dropped from the analysis in the two Belgian contexts.. The question that arises then is whether the items on the instrument were unreliable, or whether the component of cultural European identity is not a valid construct in the Belgian context. Since the headquarters of the EU are in Brussels, Belgians are exposed to the civic elements of the European Union constantly. As a result, they can identify more with the civic elements. Nonetheless, this unreliability of the cultural component does not imply a hierarchy between the components; rather, it points to its unsuitability in these contexts. Fortunately, these assumptions could be tested in the qualitative component of the study. The discussions with Belgian participants during the interviews found evidence for a somewhat strong identification with Europe from a cultural perspective - the beliefs that all Europeans have a common history, share a common European heritage, and have common ideals were prevalent among the interviewees, regardless of their linguistic background. Conclusively, the construct of cultural European identity appears pertinent for the Belgian context as well, however, the scale developed by Bruter (2005) is not the appropriate measurement to assess it.

Although the instrument proposed by Bruter (2005) has reliability issues in the contexts studied, the results of the quantitative and qualitative analysis suggest that these are valid components of the European identity concept. Overall, participants endorsed the general European identity quite strongly in all contexts, but when comparing them the Romanian participants had significantly higher levels. This finding can be understood in light of Romania's recent membership to the EU, a couple of years prior to the data collection. The changes brought about by joining the EU meant that Romanians could enjoy the freedom of movement within the EU, and many had taken advantage of these new rights to travel, study or work in other European countries. These changes were discussed in the interviews, and participants expressed their enthusiasm at being able to move freely in the EU. Another theme that emerged quite frequently in the Romanian interviews was Europe's view of Romania and its place in the EU. Some participants talked about the way the 'others' viewed Romanians, while some talked about the European family in which Romania was now part of.

The civic European identity was least endorsed by the participants from the UK, a result consistent with previous data from Eurobarometers, but also with the findings presented by Bruter (2005) in the original study regarding the components of European identity. As previously discussed, the UK did not join the eurozone, nor the Schengen agreement, and thus many of the civic European identity symbols that are quite salient to other Europeans are not present in the UK. These differences were also registered in the interviews: the British participants seemed to know less about the EU, its institutions and regulations, and even about their rights as European citizens within the EU. However, it emerges that European identity is an aspirational identity for many of the British participants. They also presented numerous ways which, in their opinion, would foster a stronger European identity in the UK. Additionally, the younger participants seem to endorse European identity more than the older ones. Many of the interviewees discussed this generational shift, arguing that the younger British people travel more and are more exposed to European culture, and this in turn influences their identification with the continent and its values. In the UK quantitative study, impressive relationships were observed between the European identity variables and the linguistic variables. They all correlated strongly, indicating that in the case of the UK sample this relation was extremely important in defining a sense of European identity. This finding was again consistent with the interviews, where most participants argued that knowledge of more foreign languages would be beneficial for the development of a stronger sense of closeness to Europe.

When investigating the participants' understanding of the relationship between the components of European identity and the BIOS instrument, a strong association emerged between endorsing general and civic European identities, and perceiving that national and European identities were compatible or blended. Conversely, the more they identified with Europe, the less they believed that national and European identity were in a conflictual relationship. This pattern of correlations was consistent across the contexts. The Dutch-speaking participants recorded the highest levels of alternation (only significant when compared to the Romanian group). For this group, alternation was significantly related to higher endorsement of civic European identity. Thus, the stronger the identification with the institutional aspect of the European Union, the more Dutch-speaking Belgians preferred to keep their national and European identities separate and alternate between them depending on the context.

These outcomes suggest that the national and European values are rather consistent, at least in the case of the contexts discussed here. The cultural and civic components of European identity were also related to measures of linguistic identity. These results will be discussed next.

5.3. Multilingualism & European identity

Europe is not the most linguistically diverse area, but based on the Eurobarometer data, most Europeans have at least some knowledge of a language that is not their mother tongue (Special Eurobarometer 386, 2012). At an institutional level, the EU acknowledges the importance of European languages, by conferring them official status in the EU and protecting the regional and minority languages. Within the European institutions, there are translation and interpreting services which are responsible not only for providing assistance to the EU employees, but also for translating the official EU documents so that they can be accessed by all Europeans in their native tongue (Grindheim & Lohndal, 2008; Grin, 2008). The EU also suggests, although it does not have the legislative power to enforce it, that all Europeans should be fluent in at least two European languages apart from their native language (The White Paper, 1995). The implementation of this directive is enforced differently in each European country.

The participants in the present study were highly educated individuals, and can even be considered to be part of the elite (Risse, 2010) or in some cases, Eurostars (Favell, 2009). An overwhelming majority reported knowledge in at least one other language in all the contexts investigated. Following the example of Pascual Y Cabo and Rothman (2013), the term multilingual has been used in this study to include individuals who were at least bilingual. Apart from high proficiency and frequency of use of foreign languages, many participants reported extremely positive attitudes to multilingualism (Baker, 1992), in general, although the Romanian group showed significantly more positive attitudes than the participants in the other contexts. Other variables that composed the linguistic profile of the participants in these studies were motivational intensity and intention to continue studying foreign languages (Gardner, Tremblay and Masgoret, 1977). Again, the Romanians were more motivated than the other participants to further engage in language learning. At the other end of the scale were the Dutch-speaking Belgians who reported low levels of interest in learning more languages. This result should be understood in light of the high proficiency levels that the Dutch speakers had in at least two foreign languages. Lastly,

anxiety and confidence in using foreign languages (Clément, Gardner, & Smythe, 1977) were also investigated and the results suggest that the British group and the Francophone Belgians were significantly more anxious than the Romanians and the Dutch speakers.

One of the most important components of national identity is considered to be language (Pascual Y Cabo & Rothman, 2013). Ever since the birth of the first nations in Europe, language has been used as a tool to create an “imagined community” (Anderson, 1991) within the geographical borders, a community that united around language and other common characteristics, and which used language to distinguish its members from members of other communities. One of the main goals of this dissertation has been to explore and assess whether multilingualism can have a similar function for the European identity as language has for the national identity. This section will present and discuss the findings of the quantitative and qualitative studies regarding multilingualism and European identity for the contexts studied.

The first analyses conducted for each context aimed at assessing the relationship between multilingualism and European identity, and how they influence each other. At a bivariate level, many of the linguistic variables showed a strong positive association with European identity in general, but also with its components. These relationships were also positive and significant with the BIOS variables. Thus, more proficiency and frequency of use of foreign languages, less anxiety, more positive attitudes to multilingualism, motivational intensity and intention to continue studying languages were related on an individual level to stronger identification with Europe. These associations varied slightly between the contexts, but there was one consistent correlation across all contexts: the more positive attitudes one had towards multilingualism, the more that person identified with European identity and its components, the civic and the cultural European identity (this link could not be assessed in Belgium, where the cultural identity was not reliable). General European identity was also consistently related to other measures of linguistic identity, such as proficiency, motivational intensity, confidence or anxiety in using a foreign language. In the case of the British group, all linguistic variables correlated strongly and positively with measures of European identity, suggesting that in this particular context the more multilingual a person was, the more s/he would identify as European. British and English identities had exactly the opposite relation to the linguistic variables, suggesting the stronger feelings of identification with national identity in the UK was inversely proportional to multilingualism and the positive connotations it might bring to an individual's life.

These strong relationships provided the grounds for assessing the predictive value of the linguistic identity variables for European identity. Two linguistic concepts proved to be of importance at the multivariate level: attitudes towards multilingualism and anxiety in using a foreign language. In all contexts, positive attitudes towards multilingualism was a good predictor for all the components of European identity. Lower levels of anxiety in using a foreign language predicted a stronger identification with general European identity in all contexts. The fact that these results were consistent across all the contexts suggest that positive attitudes to multilingualism are not only related to European identity, but they can actually anticipate it and influence its strength. Moreover, not feeling anxious when using a foreign language can also be beneficial in developing a stronger sense of European identity. These results point to the important role played by multilingualism in the European context for establishing a stronger European identity. Being consistent across the contexts studied, these results show a potential for generalizability across Europe, especially among the highly educated Europeans.

The outcome of the quantitative analysis was congruous with the opinions presented by the interviewees in all contexts. The interviews presented the opportunity to discuss in greater depth the connection between multilingualism and European identity. Most of the people interviewed were multilingual and the majority used more than one language on a regular basis, be it for work, study or in the family environment. The interview data supported the connection between positive attitudes to multilingualism and European identity, either as a direct relationship or mediated by other factors, such as exposure and familiarity with foreign cultures and people, and travel.

Consistently throughout the interviews, but particularly in the British context, interviewees suggested that multilingualism should be encouraged at an early age, in the educational institutions. Participants declared that this would encourage young people to become multilingual and thus feel more European, and it would open a range of opportunities for work and study abroad. Although currently English is the *de facto* lingua franca of Europe and possibly the whole world, the British interviewees advocated the benefits of language learning for personal development. The Romanian interviewees were aware of the fact that if they wanted to take advantage of the opportunities that came about when Romania joined the EU they needed to be able to communicate in a language other than Romanian. Travelling, studying or working in another European country was considered possible only if one was multilingual. The Belgian interviewees also discussed

the potential political advantages that could arise if all Belgians were fluent in both Dutch and French. The Belgian context is charged from a linguistic point of view, but the participants in the interviews declared that being able to speak the other official Belgian languages could have an impact on the political situation in Belgium. In all contexts, some interviewees talked about the cultural, economic and personal benefits of being multilingual in Europe.

Multilingualism and European identity were consistently and strongly supported by the participants in the quantitative and qualitative studies in all the contexts investigated. Furthermore, there were significant associations between the various concepts that defined them and there is evidence that positive attitudes to multilingualism predicts higher levels of European identity. These results have potential implications at various levels. On an individual level, multilingualism has health benefits, as well as social and economical advantages, allowing Europeans to profit from the rights granted to all European Union citizens. On a national level, supporting multilingualism through educational institutions can lead to an increase in economical cooperation with other European countries. At a European level, multilingualism can foster a stronger European identity, which in turn will tighten the relationships between European citizens and countries, and lead to a stronger Europe.

5.4. Future studies

Future studies looking at European identity and multilingualism should continue to use mixed methodology, as this study provided evidence for the benefits of this approach. Triangulation of data, methods and theory (Duff, 2006; Dewaele, 2009) will provide valuable insight into the research questions. Duff (2006) also suggests that the same data should be investigated by different researchers in order to give an objective assessment of the results. Particularly in the case of qualitative data, this other dimension of triangulation should be employed in order to bypass the researcher's bias when interpreting the findings.

5.4.1. National & European identity

The present study substantiated the assumption that there are generational differences in the understanding of national and European identity. Current ongoing projects (Ross, 2007; 2012) are investigating the perceptions of young Europeans towards their local, regional,

national and European identities, by conducting focus groups in various current and potential future member states of the EU. The valuable insight that this extensive project will provide should be complemented by survey data and a quantitative component developed to test the findings of the focus groups.

Other studies could focus on the development of these identities over time, by conducting longitudinal studies: interviews, focus groups and surveys with the same participants at different time intervals (before the country's accession to the EU, immediately after, a few years later, once the country joins the eurozone and the Schengen area, and so on).

Longitudinal and cross-sectional research studies can inform each other. They can provide an appreciation of the development and formation of the European identity in parallel with the national identity. These studies could identify the specific events leading to a change (either increase or decrease) in the European and national identity levels.

Previous studies (Favell, 2009; Risse, 2010; Fligsteing et al. 2009; Duchesne, 2008 and others) found evidence that more educated Europeans have a stronger European identity and enjoy the benefits of the European citizenship more than non-elite or less educated Europeans. The level of education of the participants in this study was quite high in all contexts. While providing valuable information about this social stratum, the results cannot be generalised to all members of the countries where the data was collected. Future studies should aim at exploring the opinions and perceptions of the non-elite Europeans in order to complement the results presented here. Focus groups, interviews and survey data could be collected in order to better understand the European identity at all social levels. Other studies could focus on comparing the perceptions of Europeans from various countries, but who are part of the same profession. For example, as discussed in some of the interviews in the present study, it may be that farm workers from a particular country have more in common with other European farm workers than with people from their own country. Similarly, academics, students, engineers, blue-collar workers and so on could have more in common across European countries. These similarities could be investigated in cross-national studies.

Understanding the relationship between national and European identity is vital for grasping the factors that influence European identity. The present study provides evidence that perceiving them as compatible and blended is related to other favourable variables, such as confidence in using another language or positive attitudes to multilingualism. The instrument used in this study to look at this relationship (the adapted BIOS) should be

further tested in other European contexts. It can be adapted and re-tested to ensure its validity and reliability across contexts. A future study should complement the quantitative data collected through surveys to date with a qualitative assessment of the items on the scale.

The national and European identity embody a set of values and beliefs, some common among European countries, and some possibly specific to a particular region. It has been suggested that the belief in human rights, equality and democracy are not only European values, but also characteristic of the civic national identity specific to Western countries. Future studies should provide a more detailed taxonomy of these common values and beliefs, since they could be catalysts in creating a hybrid national-European identity. If it is uncovered that these values are more predominant in some parts of Europe and not in others, European projects could be designed to address this imbalance.

5.4.2. Components of European identity

The present study found evidence that the European identity has a civic and a cultural component, but as discussed previously, the scale provided by Bruter (2005) showed poor reliability in some contexts. I suggest then that future studies should employ a rigorous methodology to provide better instruments for assessing these components. The new scale will require testing and validation across European contexts to ensure its reliability. Since then, Bruter has refined the instrument for assessing European identity, and this instrument is currently being used in a large multinational study (Bruter, personal communication). The results of those studies should inform the next steps in developing and refining an instrument for European identity.

The findings presented here indicate that there are some differences with regards to the endorsement of these components in various contexts. Further research should continue to assess these differences in other contexts, by comparing data from Western European countries with Eastern ones, and older EU member states with newer ones. These studies will also shed more light on the notion of institutional inertia proposed by Bruter (2005). The effects that these differences have on people's endorsement of the European integration project should also be assessed. These results could have implication for European and national policy and projects.

Sassatelli (2009) discussed the impact of the European Capital of Culture project, however this is only one of the many projects supported by the European Union. The influence exerted by other Europe-wide cultural and civic initiatives should be investigated, and they could result in recommendations for future campaigns designed to increase the levels of awareness and understanding of the European Union, European identity and its components.

5.4.3. Multilingualism & European identity

This study has shown that positive attitudes to multilingualism and consistent practices of multilingualism can predict higher levels of European identity. There are theoretical indications, and this project found evidence for them, that multilingualism can have a direct effect on European identity. Nevertheless, it can also influence it through other mediating factors, such as exposure to other European citizens and their cultures, long stays abroad for study or work, short stays for travel, and so on. Future studies should attempt to investigate in-depth the direct and mediated effect of languages on European identity.

Minority groups or people living on the borders between nations have been previously discussed as having transnational identities, and possibly feeling more European than people living in a more homogeneous environment. For the transnational people, the regional or ethnic identity might be stronger than their national identity. The measures put in place by the European Union to safeguard the languages and the cultures of these populations might be influential in their development of stronger ties to Europe. A special case of transnationality that should be investigated is that of the Romani minority. The Romani do not actually have a state of their own, but they have a minority status in various European countries. They have traditionally been a nomad minority, travelling through Europe even before the open borders of the EU. Currently however, the negative discourse which surrounds any appearances in the media of the Romani minority have led to increased levels of racism and xenophobia against this minority. The Romani are one of the most interesting cases of transnational Europeans. Other groups that could be assessed for their levels of European identity are different generations of immigrants from inside and outside Europe.

An interesting comparison could be made between the European countries and, for example, South America. The Union of South American Nations, or UNASUR, is an intergovernmental union aimed at the regional integration of South American countries, which has been steadily forming and gaining strength in the area since 2008 (UNASUR, 2013). This union aims to model itself after the European Union, and provide in the future a common passport, currency and parliament for all its members. The South American continent is a linguistically diverse place, incorporating many indigenous cultures and languages. However, only very few of these languages have official status alongside Spanish and Portuguese, which have traditionally been the elite languages. Studies should be designed to monitor the development of a common South American identity together with the evolution of UNASUR, and the importance of the multilingualism for this context. The comparison with the European identity could provide insight into the intricate connection between language and supranational identities.

Consistently across the contexts studied in this project, some participants declared that another layer of their identity (and in some cases a replacement layer for national or European identity) was world citizenship. The fast moving globalised world of today provides an opportunity for people to travel all over the world and experience diverse cultures and traditions. Although this identity has not been studied extensively yet, it seems to be gaining ground in recent years. Future studies should aim at understanding the development of this identity and its relation to European, national, regional and local identities. These studies should also look at the importance of multilingualism in identifying as a world citizen.

5.5. Concluding remarks

Using a mixed-method approach in three contexts, this study provided much needed empirical evidence for the existence and composition of the concept of European identity, and identified linguistic characteristics that are related and can even predict it. The study assessed the validity and reliability of the European identity scale developed by Bruter (2005) and found that although the constructs of the scale are valid and reliable, the instrument developed by Bruter (2005) is not consistently reliable across different contexts. The study also found evidence that for many Europeans, their national and European identities were compatible and even formed a hybrid identity. Furthermore, it presented and discussed the differences between the contexts with regards to European identity and

its components, and their relationship to measures of linguistic identity and multilingualism.

The outcomes of this dissertation have implications for the theoretical conceptualisations of European identity, but also for the understanding of the role of multilingualism in the European context. Multilingualism is known to have beneficial effects for the cognitive health of individuals (Bialystok, Craik & Luk, 2012) and also to foster interethnic relations. In countries where there is a tradition for multilingualism, such as Belgium or Romania, learning foreign languages is part of the school curricula, and it is regarded as personally relevant. However, in the UK, more institutional efforts need to address multilingualism and foster language learning in schools.

Multilingual education (Cenoz, 2009), maintenance of minority, regional and heritage languages (Comănanu & Noels, 2009; Pascual Y Cabo & Rothman, 2013), institutional support for multilingualism (Grindheim & Lohndal, 2008) will have significant influence on the attitudes to multilingualism in countries where the norm is not to be multilingual. In turn, these positive attitudes together with increased opportunities for contact, travel, study or work in other European countries will have positive effects on the European identity. Working together, the European Union and the national governments can devise a strategy for providing the European citizens with increased opportunities for language learning and contact. Once the European identity becomes stronger than the national identities, we can expect to find economic, political and social benefits. Especially now, when the economic crisis can decide the fate of the European Union, a strong sense of European identity and cooperation between the European countries can be determining factors for the future of Europe.

Appendices

Appendix A¹ - Belgium - French Questionnaire

ACCORD PREALABLE

Vous êtes cordialement invité à participer à une étude sur les opinions et attitudes envers l'apprentissage de langues étrangères dans l'Union Européenne et le sentiment d'identité. Cette étude s'inscrit dans un projet multinational portant sur différents groupes d'âge. L'auteur est Ruxandra Comanaru, étudiante de doctorat à Birkbeck, University of London.

Votre participation à cette étude est extrêmement appréciée. Elle est entièrement volontaire, anonyme et confidentielle. Les données obtenues à travers l'enquête seront traitées statistiquement et votre nom ne sera pas associé aux réponses. Il n'y a pas de « bonnes » ni de mauvaises réponses, soyez donc le plus honnête possible. Nous vous prions également de répondre à toutes les questions, même si certaines sont assez similaires.

Nous vous remercions sincèrement de votre participation. Si vous êtes curieux de connaître les résultats de cette étude, ou si vous avez des questions, n'hésitez pas à contacter Ruxandra à l'adresse mentionnée ci-dessous.

RUXANDRA COMANARU

rcomano1@students.bbk.ac.uk

Age_____

Sexe: M_____ F_____

Dernière école graduée: lycée ____; école professionnelle ____; faculté ____; maîtrise ____; doctorat ____; d'autres (quelles?) _____

Lieu de naissance (ville, pays):_____

Lieu de résidence (ville, pays):_____

¹ The questionnaires have been adapted to address the specific characteristics of each context, thus they vary slightly.

Nationalité : _____

Comment définiriez-vous votre origine ethnique? _____

Quel est le background ethnique de votre mère? _____

Quelles langues est-ce que votre mère parle? _____

Quel est le background ethnique de votre père? _____

Quelles langues est-ce que votre père parle? _____

S'il vous plaît indiquer les langues que vous connaissez, quel que soit le niveau de compétence:

Première langue (L1) _____

Cinquième langue (L5) _____

Deuxième langue (L2) _____

Sixième langue (L6) _____

Troisième langue (L3) _____

Autres (quelles?) _____

Quatrième langue (L4) _____

Quelle langue parlez-vous le plus fréquemment? _____

Sur une échelle de 1 à 6, indiquez votre niveau de compétence pour parler cette langue, pour la comprendre, la lire et l'écrire :

Minimal 1 2 3 4 5 6 Excellent

Parler: L1 _____

Lire: L1 _____

L2 _____

L2 _____

L3 _____

L3 _____

L4 _____

L4 _____

Comprendre: L1 _____

Ecrire: L1 _____

L2 _____

L2 _____

L3 _____

L3 _____

L4 _____

L4 _____

Est-ce que vous suivez des classes de langue en ce moment? Oui_____ Non_____

Si oui, quelles langues? _____

Si oui, combien d'heures par semaine avez-vous ces classes ? _____

Avec quelle fréquence utilisez-vous vos langues étrangères en dehors de la classe de langue?

Indiquez l'option qui décrit le mieux votre situation:

Moins qu'une par mois	Une fois par mois	Toutes les 2-3 semaines	Une fois par semaine	Tous les 2-3 jours	Tous les jours
1	2	3	4	5	6

L1 _____

L3 _____

L2 _____

L4 _____

Est-ce que vous parlez parfois à vos amis dans une langue qui n'est pas votre L1 ?

Dans quelles situations utiliseriez-vous ces langues? (réponse ouverte)

Est-ce que vous utilisez des sites comme Facebook ? Messagerie instantanée? Est-ce que vous êtes susceptible d'y utiliser une langue qui n'est pas votre L1 ? (likert)

Minimal 1 2 3 4 5 6 Excellent

Pourquoi? (réponse ouverte)

Combien désirez-vous apprendre une nouvelle langue? (likert)

Minimal 1 2 3 4 5 6 Excellent

Quelle langue choisiriez-vous et pourquoi? (réponse ouverte)

Comment voulez-vous apprendre une autre langue? (Cours? Livres? Internet? etc.)

Pensez-vous qu'il est important d'être fluide dans plus d'une langue ? Pourquoi ?

Ci-dessous se trouvent un nombre de déclarations avec lesquelles certaines personnes sont d'accord alors que d'autres ne sont pas d'accord. Indiquez dans quelle mesure vous êtes personnellement d'accord avec ces déclarations, et dans quelle mesure elles reflètent ce que

vous pensez. Si vous ne sont pas actuellement inscrits dans une classe de langue, de répondre aux questions réflexion sur le dernier cours de langue que vous avez pris. Utilisez l'échelle suivante :

Pas du tout d'accord 1 2 3 4 5 6 Tout à fait d'accord

1. Je crois que je connais assez bien ma L2 pour la parler correctement.
2. Je crois que je suis capable de lire et comprendre la plupart des textes dans ma L2.
3. Quand je dois passer un coup de fil, je suis confus/e si je dois parler ma L2.
4. Je sens que je comprends assez bien quelqu'un qui parle ma L2.
5. Je ne me sens pas à l'aise quand je parle ma L2.
6. Dans un restaurant, je me sens calme quand je dois commander en parlant ma L2.
7. Je deviens timide quand je dois parler ma L2 avec un supérieur (chef, professeur etc).
8. Chaque fois que je parle avec quelqu'un qui a comme langue maternelle ma L2, je ne me sens pas à l'aise.
9. Dans mon opinion je connais assez bien ma L2 pour écrire facilement.
10. Je me sens à l'aise quand je parle ma L2 avec mes amis parmi lesquelles il y'a des gens qui parlent ma langue native et des gens qui parlent ma L2.
11. Je me sens très sûr/e de moi et détendu/e quand je demande des conseils dans ma L2.
12. Je crois que la connaissance de ma L2 me permet de m'en sortir de la plupart des situations dans lesquelles je dois parler cette langue.
13. Je suis très sûr/e de ma capacité d'écrire dans ma L2 correctement.
14. Parler plusieurs langues convient mieux aux gens plus âgés qu'aux plus jeunes.
15. Je sens de la pitié pour les gens monolingues.
16. Je n'essaie pas de comprendre les aspects les plus complexes des langues.
17. Parler plusieurs langues peut aider les gens à obtenir des promotions au travail.
18. Les gens sauraient plus s'ils parlaient plus de langues.
19. J'aimerais abandonner l'étude des langues.
20. Je travaille vraiment dur pour apprendre des langues.

21. Les élèves devraient apprendre à parler au moins deux langues à l'école.
22. Je tends à ne pas vérifier les corrections de mes devoirs de cours de langues.
23. La connaissance de plusieurs langues peut créer des problèmes pour certaines personnes.
24. Il est suffisant de parler ma L1.
25. Les multilingues peuvent avoir plus d'amis que les monolingues.
26. Quand j'étudie les langues, j'ignore les distractions et je me concentre totalement.
27. Je vais continuer l'étude des langues le plus longtemps possible.
28. Le multilinguisme devrait être important dans la région où j'habite.
29. Parler plusieurs langues n'est pas difficile.
30. Je compte reprendre l'étude des langues à l'avenir.
31. Les jeunes enfants peuvent facilement apprendre plusieurs langues simultanément.
32. Si j'avais des enfants, j'aimerais qu'ils soient multilingues.
33. Il est important de parler plusieurs langues.
34. J'ai tendance à déconnecter quand notre prof de langue parle de choses qui ne font pas partie de la leçon.
35. Quand j'ai un problème de compréhension dans une classe de langue, je demande toujours de l'aide.
36. Je compte arrêter l'étude des langues.
37. Comme adulte, j'aimerais être considéré comme multilingue.
38. Les gens qui connaissent plus de langues peuvent gagner plus d'argent.
39. Je ne paie pas trop d'attention au feedback que je reçois dans ma classe de langue.
40. Des locuteurs natifs de différentes langues peuvent cohabiter dans ma région.
41. La connaissance de plusieurs langues rend les gens plus intelligents.
42. Les enfants devraient apprendre à lire dans plusieurs langues.
43. Parler plusieurs langues permet d'obtenir un emploi
44. Il suffit aux gens de connaître une seule langue.

45. Les enfants qui apprennent plusieurs langues simultanément sont confus.
46. Je travaille presque quotidiennement à mes langues pour rester à jour.
47. Je vais continuer l'étude des langues après l'achèvement de mon cours actuel.
48. Il est important de pouvoir écrire dans plusieurs langues.
49. Les signes routiers devraient être multilingues.
50. Je n'aimerais pas que le français soit la seule langue dans cette région.
51. Je tends à faire mes devoirs de langue de façon peu structurée et aléatoire.
52. Je tente de comprendre toutes les langues que je vois et que j'entends.

Voici une liste d'items (sur votre perception de vous-même). Indiquez, sur une échelle de 1 à 6, dans quelle mesure vous vous identifiez avec chacun des items :

Bruxellois	Citoyen du monde
Wallon	Membres de l'Union européenne
Flamand	Anglophone
Belge	Citoyen de ma région
Européen	Citoyen de ma ville
Ouest-Européen	Locuteur/trice d'une autre langue (Quelle?)
Francophone	

En répondant à ces questions, pensez à votre identité personnelle, (régionale : Bruxelloise, Wallonne ou Flamande) ? nationale (Belge) et transnationale (Européenne) et comment vous percevez la relation entre les différents niveaux


Pas du tout d'accord 1 2 3 4 5 6 Tout à fait d'accord

1. Je me sens parfois confus sur mon identité ethnique.

2. Il y a un conflit en moi entre les cultures auxquelles j'appartiens (régionale, nationale, européenne).
3. Mes identités bruxelloise/wallonne, belge et européenne sont en harmonie.
4. Je sens qu'il faut être loyal envers son groupe régional.
5. J'éprouve des difficultés à réconcilier les différences entre ma culture régionale, nationale et européenne.
7. Mon identité ethnique varie en fonction d'avec qui je me trouve.
8. J'ajuste mon identité suivant que je me trouve avec d'autres Bruxellois/Francophones ou autres Européens.
9. Il est difficile d'appartenir à mon groupe régional, mon groupe national et le groupe européen à l' en même temps.
10. Je passe d'une culture à une autre dans différentes situations
11. Bien qu'ils soient différents, les différents groupes culturels (bruxellois/wallon, belge, européenne) vont bien ensemble.
12. Je sens que mon identité est hybride (régional, national et européen).
13. Mon identité bruxelloise/wallonne, belge est compatible avec la culture européenne.
14. Je sens qu'il faut prendre une décision sur le choix d'une culture particulière (belge ou européenne).
15. Je sens que je dois décider laquelle des cultures est plus centrale dans mon identité.
16. Mon identité bruxellois/wallon, belge s'accorde bien avec mon identité européenne.
16. Si je devais décrire la relation entre mes cultures (régional, national et européen), je les décrirais comme intégrées.
17. Je sens que je ne peux pas être Belge et Européen en même temps.
18. Je sens que mon identité est un mélange de cultures (régional, national et européen).
19. La plupart des mes amis me perçoivent comme appartenant simultanément aux cultures (régional, national et européen)
20. J'adapte mon identité ethnique suivant les circonstances.
21. Je sens qu'il faut être loyal envers son groupe national.


Comme définiriez-vous votre identité ethnique?

Regardez les images ci-dessous. Dans chaque diagramme, un des cercles représente votre identité nationale et européenne. Laquelle décrit le mieux la relation entre vos identités ?



L'image qui décrit le mieux la relation entre mes identités est _____

Regardez les images ci-dessous. Dans chaque diagramme, un des cercles représente votre identité régionale, nationale et européenne. Laquelle décrit le mieux la relation entre vos identités ?



L'image qui décrit le mieux la relation entre mes identités est _____

1. En général, diriez-vous que vous vous considérez comme un citoyen de l'Europe?
 - a. Oui, très fort.
 - b. Oui, à certaine mesure.
 - c. Je ne sais pas
 - d. Pas vraiment
 - e. Pas du tout
2. Depuis 1985, les citoyens de tous les pays de l'Union Européenne possèdent un passeport sur lequel se trouve le nom de leur pays et de l'Union Européenne. Pensez-vous que cela soit une bonne chose ?
 - a. Oui, une très bonne chose.
 - b. Oui, plutôt une bonne chose.
 - c. Ca n'a aucune importance.
 - d. Non, plutôt une mauvaise chose.
 - e. Non, une très mauvaise chose.
3. Comment décririez-vous votre réaction si vous voyiez quelqu'un brûler un drapeau européen ?
 - a. Je serais choqué et blessé.
 - b. Je serais choqué mais pas blessé.
 - c. Ca me laisserait indifférent.
 - d. Je serais heureux.
- 4.. Comment décririez-vous votre réaction si vous voyiez quelqu'un brûler un drapeau du coq rouge sur fond jaune?
 - a. Je serais choqué et blessé.
 - b. Je serais choqué mais pas blessé.
 - c. Ca me laisserait indifférent.

- d. Je serais heureux.
5. Comment décririez-vous votre réaction si vous voyiez quelqu'un brûler un drapeau belge?
- a. Je serais choqué et blessé.
- b. Je serais choqué mais pas blessé.
- c. Ca me laisserait indifférent.
- d. Je serais heureux.
6. Sur une échelle de 1 à 6, 1 signifiant que vous ne vous identifiez pas du tout et 6 que vous vous identifiez très fort avec ces lieux, que diriez-vous ?
- | | | | | | | | |
|-------------------------|---|---|---|---|---|---|-----------------------|
| M'identifie pas du tout | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | M'identifie très fort |
|-------------------------|---|---|---|---|---|---|-----------------------|
- ... l'Europe?
- ... la Belgique
- ... la région bruxelloise/la Wallonie
- ... votre ville
7. Certains disent que malgré les nombreuses différences, les Européens partagent un héritage commun qui les rend plus proches les uns des autres que, par exemple, les Japonais ou les Chiliens. Est-ce que vous êtes...(choisissez UN)
- a. Tout à fait en désaccord
- b. Plutôt pas d'accord
- c. Ni l'un ni l'autre / Je ne sais pas
- d. Plutôt d'accord
- e. Tout à fait d'accord
8. Un groupe d'athlètes de tous les pays de l'Union Européenne ont proposé que lors des prochains Jeux Olympiques, chaque fois qu'un/e athlète gagne une médaille d'or, l' "Ode à la joie", l'hymne européen, devrait être joué après l'hymne national. Pensez-vous que ce serait une bonne idée ? (choisissez UN)
- a. Oui, une très bonne idée.
- b. Oui, une très bonne idée.

- c. Ni bonne ni mauvaise idée.
 - d. Non, une mauvaise idée.
 - e. Non, une très mauvaise idée.
9. Quand les chefs d'état ou de gouvernement d'un pays de l'Union Européenne (comme la reine Elizabeth II, le roi Albert II ou le président français), font un discours à la TV, le drapeau national et le drapeau européen flag apparaissent derrière eux. Pensez-vous que c'est une bonne chose? (choisissez UN)
- a. Oui, une très bonne chose.
 - b. Oui, une bonne chose.
 - c. Ni bonne ni mauvaise chose.
 - d. Non, une mauvaise chose.
 - e. Non, une très mauvaise chose.
10. Est-ce que le fait d'être citoyen/ne de l'Union Européenne signifie quelque chose pour vous ? (choisissez UN)
- a. Oui, beaucoup.
 - b. Oui, quelque chose,
 - c. Non, rien du tout.
11. Si vous avez répondu OUI à la question précédente, diriez-vous que cela reflète ...? (choisissez AUTANT QUE VOUS DESIREZ).
- a. Un héritage européen commun
 - b. Le droit de voter dans les élections pour le parlement européen.
 - c. Des institutions communes.
 - d. Une histoire européenne commune.
 - e. Une hymne européenne, un passeport européen, un drapeau européen.
 - f. Le droit de voyager dans un autre pays européen sans passer de contrôles de douane.
 - g. Le droit de voyager dans un autre pays européen sans passer devoir montrer son passeport ni sans care d'identité.

- h. Quelques idéaux communs.
 - i. Etre membre de la famille européenne.
12. Diriez-vous que vous vous sentez plus proche d'autres Européens plutôt que, par exemple, de Chinois, Russes ou Américains ? (choisissez UN)
- a. Tout à fait d'accord
 - b. Plutôt d'accord
 - c. Ni l'un ni l'autre / Je ne sais pas
 - d. Plutôt pas d'accord
 - e. Tout à fait en désaccord

Je vous remercie !!!

R.C.

Appendix B - Belgium - Dutch Questionnaire

TOESTEMMINGSFORMULIER

Wij nodigen u uit om deel te nemen aan een studie over de meningen en attitudes ten opzichte van het leren van vreemde talen in de Europese Unie en het identiteitsgevoel. Deze studie maakt deel uit van een internationaal project met betrekking tot verschillende leeftijdsgroepen. De auteur is Ruxandra Comanaru, doctoraatstudente te Birkbeck, University of London.

Uw deelname aan dit onderzoek wordt erg op prijs gesteld. Ze is volledig vrijwillig, anoniem en vertrouwelijk. De verzamelde gegevens worden statistisch verwerkt en uw naam wordt op geen enkel moment geassocieerd met de resultaten. Er zijn geen "goede" of slechte antwoorden, probeer dus zo eerlijk mogelijk te antwoorden. We vragen u ook om alle vragen te beantwoorden, ook al zijn sommige vragen zeer gelijkaardig.

Alvast heel erg bedankt voor uw medewerking. Indien u nieuwsgierig bent naar de resultaten van dit onderzoek, aarzel dan niet om Ruxandra te contacteren op het onderstaande adres.

RUXANDRA COMANARU

rcomanor@students.bbk.ac.uk

Leeftijd: _____

Geslacht: M_____ F_____

Laatst behaalde diploma: Secundair onderwijs ____; Professionele bachelor/ korte type hoger onderwijs ____; Academische bachelor/ korte type hoger onderwijs ____; Master ____; Doctoraat ____; Andere (welke?) _____

Geboorteplaats (stad, land):_____

Woonplaats (stad, land):_____

Nationaliteit :_____

Hoe zou u uw etnische identiteit omschrijven? _____

Wat is de etnische achtergrond van uw moeder? _____

Welke taal/talen spreekt uw moeder? _____

Wat is de etnische achtergrond van uw vader? _____

Welke taal/talen spreekt uw vader? _____

Vul a.u.b. in welke talen u kent, ongeacht uw niveau:

Eerste taal (L1) _____

Vijfde taal (L5) _____

Tweede taal (L2) _____

Zesde taal (L6) _____

Derde taal (L3) _____

Andere (welke?) _____

Vierde taal (L4) _____

Andere (welke?) _____

Op een schaal van 1 tot 6, geef uw niveau van vaardigheid om die taal spreken, begrijpen, lezen en schrijven:

Minimaal 1 2 3 4 5 6 Uitstekend

SPREEKT: L1 _____

LEEST: L1 _____

L2 _____

L2 _____

L3 _____

L3 _____

L4 _____

L4 _____

BEGRIJPT: L1 _____

SCHRIJFT: L1 _____

L2 _____

L2 _____

L3 _____

L3 _____

L4 _____

L4 _____

Volgt u momenteel taallessen? Ja _____ Nee _____

Indien ja, welke talen? _____

Indien ja, hoeveel uren per week heeft u les ? _____

Hoe vaak gebruikt u uw verschillende talen buiten de taallessen?

Minder dan een keer per maand	Een keer per maand	Om de 2-3 weken	Een keer per week	Om de 2-3 dagen	Elke dag
1	2	3	4	5	6

L1 _____

L3 _____

L2 _____

L4 _____

Praat u soms met vrienden een taal/talen die niet u L1 is/zijn? In welke situaties gebruikt u deze talen?

Gebruikt u sites zoals Facebook, Hi5, MySpace ? Ja ____ Nee ____

Gebruikt u chat? (bv. Yahoo Messenger, MSN/Hotmail, Gmail Talk enz.) Ja ____ Nee ____

Indien u ja heeft geantwoord op een van de twee voorgaande vragen, bent u geneigd om een taal te gebruiken die niet uw L1 is in deze situaties?

Nooit 1 2 3 4 5 6 Heel vaak

Waarom? _____

Zou u graag een nieuwe taal willen leren?

Helemaal niet geïnteresseerd 1 2 3 4 5 6 Heel erg geïnteresseerd

Welke taal zou u kiezen en waarom? _____

Hoe wilt u een andere taal leren? (Lessen? boeken? Internet? enz.) _____

Denkt u dat het belangrijk is om een taal vaak te praten? Waarom? _____

Hieronder staan een aantal verklaringen waarmee sommige mensen akkoord gaan en anderen niet. Geef aan in welke mate u het persoonlijk eens bent met deze verklaringen, en in welke mate ze aangeven wat u denkt. Als u momenteel niet ingeschreven in een taal die klasse, beantwoord de vragen na te denken over de laatste taal die je nam.

Helemaal niet akkoord 1 2 3 4 5 6 Helemaal akkoord

1. Ik voel me op mijn gemak wanneer ik mijn L2 praat met vrienden wanneer er mensen bij zijn die mijn moedertaal spreken en mensen die mijn L2 spreken.
2. Ik vind dat de kennis van mijn L2 me toelaat om mijn plan te trekken in de meeste situaties waarin ik deze taal moet praten.
3. Ik word verlegen wanneer ik mijn L2 moet praten met een overste (baas, professor, enz.).
4. Ik voel me niet op mijn gemak wanneer ik mijn L2 praat.
5. Ik voel me rustig wanneer ik in een restaurant moet bestellen in mijn L2.
6. Ik ben er erg zeker van dat ik mijn L2 correct kan schrijven.
7. Ik ben in de war wanneer ik mijn L2 moet gebruiken aan de telefoon.
8. Ik vind dat ik mijn L2 voldoende beheers om ze correct te kunnen praten.
9. Ik voel me erg zelfzeker en ontspannen wanneer ik advies moet vragen in mijn L2.
10. Volgens mij ken ik mijn L2 goed genoeg om ze makkelijk te kunnen schrijven.
11. Ik vind dat ik in staat ben om de meeste teksten in mijn L2 te lezen en begrijpen.
12. Ik voel dat ik iemand die mijn L2 praat redelijk goed begrijp.
13. Ik zou liever stoppen met het leren van talen.
14. Als volwassene zou ik het belangrijk vinden om beschouwd te worden als meertalige.
15. Ik wil in de toekomst de studie van talen hervatten.
16. Ik zou het niet leuk vinden mocht het Nederlands de enige taal zijn in deze regio.
17. Het is voldoende dat mensen slechts een taal kennen.
18. Kinderen zouden moeten leren lezen in verschillende talen.
19. In mijn regio kunnen sprekers van verschillende talen samenleven.

20. Meerdere talen kennen zorgt ervoor dat mensen intelligenter zijn.
21. Verkeersborden zouden meertalig moeten zijn.
22. Ik heb de neiging om mijn taken voor de taalvakken op een weinig gestructureerde en onzekere manier uit te voeren.
23. Wanneer ik tijdens de taallessen iets niet begrijp, vraag ik altijd hulp.
24. Ik werk echt hard om talen te leren.
25. Meerdere talen spreken helpt bij het vinden van werk.
26. Ik wil stoppen met de studie van talen.
27. Kinderen die meerdere talen tegelijk leren, zijn verward.
28. Meertaligheid zou belangrijk moeten zijn in de regio waar ik woon.
29. Ik heb de neiging om de verbeteringen van mijn huiswerk van de talencursus niet na te kijken.
30. Ik besteed niet veel aandacht aan de feedback die ik krijg tijdens de taallessen.
31. Ik doe geen moeite om de moeilijkste aspecten van talen te begrijpen.
32. Ik werk bijna dagelijks aan mijn talenkennis om bij te kunnen blijven.
33. Het is belangrijk om meerdere talen te praten.
34. Het is belangrijk om in verschillende talen te kunnen schrijven.
35. Als ik kinderen heb, zou ik willen dat ze meertalig worden.
36. Ik heb medelijden met eentaligen.
37. Meerdere talen kennen kan bij sommige mensen problemen creëren.
38. Ik wil zo lang mogelijk talen blijven studeren.
39. Het is niet moeilijk om meerdere talen te spreken.
40. Jonge kinderen kunnen makkelijk meerdere talen tegelijk leren.
41. Meerdere talen kunnen spreken, kan mensen helpen om promotie te maken op hun werk. Het is voldoende om mijn L1 te praten.
42. Ik probeer om alle talen die ik zie en hoor te begrijpen.

43. Meerdere talen spreken is vanzelfsprekender voor oudere mensen dan voor jongere mensen.
44. Mensen zouden meer weten, mochten ze meer talen kunnen spreken.
45. Wanneer ik met taalvakken bezig ben, negeer ik afleidingen en ben ik heel erg geconcentreerd.
46. Ik heb de neiging om afgeleid te zijn wanneer onze leraar talen praat over zaken die niets te maken hebben met de les.
47. Kinderen moeten op school minimum twee talen leren praten.
48. Wanneer ik klaar ben met mijn huidige cursussen, ga ik mijn talenstudie verderzetten.
49. Meertaligen kunnen meer vrienden hebben dan eentaligen.
50. Mensen die verschillende talen kennen, verdienen meer geld.

Hieronder vindt u een lijst van labels (over hoe u zichzelf ziet). Geef a.u.b. aan in welke mate u zich identificeert met elk van deze labels:

Helemaal niet 1 2 3 4 5 6 Helemaal

Brusselaar

Franstalig

Waals

Wereldburger

Vlaams

Lid van de Europese Unie

Belg

Engelstalig

Europeaan

Burger van mijn regio

Oost-Europeaan

Burger van mijn stad

Spreker van een andere taal (Welke?)

Wanneer u deze vragen beantwoordt, denk aan uw persoonlijke identiteit (regionaal: Brusselaar, Waals of Vlaams)? nationaal (Belg) en transnationaal (Europees) en hoe u de

relatie tussen deze verschillende niveaus ziet.


Helemaal niet akkoord 1 2 3 4 5 6 Helemaal akkoord

1. Hoewel ze verschillend zijn, gaan de verschillende culturele groepen (Brussels/Vlaams, Belg, Europees) goed samen.
2. Ik pas mijn identiteit aan afhankelijk van of ik in het gezelschap ben van andere Brusselaars/Vlamingen of andere Europeanen.
3. Mijn etnische identiteit varieert in functie van de mensen waarmee ik omga.
4. Mijn gevoel van tot een bepaalde cultuur te behoren varieert afhankelijk van de situatie.
5. De meeste van mijn vrienden zien me als iemand die tegelijk tot verschillende culturen behoort (regionaal, nationaal en Europees).
6. Mijn Brusselse/Vlaamse, Belgische en Europese identiteit is in harmonie.
7. Ik vind dat ik moet kiezen welke cultuur het belangrijkste is voor mijn identiteit.
8. Ik voel me soms verward over mijn etnische identiteit.
9. Ik vind dat mijn identiteit hybride is (regionaal, nationaal en Europees).
10. Mijn Brusselse/Vlaamse, Belgische identiteit komt goed overeen met mijn Europese identiteit.
11. Ik voel dat ik niet tegelijk Belg en Europeaan kan zijn.
12. Ik vind dat men trouw moet zijn tegenover zijn nationale groep.
13. Het is moeilijk om terzelfdertijd te behoren tot mijn regionale groep, mijn nationale groep en de Europese groep.
14. Mijn Brusselse/Vlaamse, Belgische identiteit is compatibel met de Europese cultuur.
15. Er is een conflict tussen de culturen waartoe ik behoor (regionaal, nationaal, Europees).
16. Als ik de relatie tussen mijn culturen moet beschrijven (regionaal, nationaal en Europees), dan zou ik ze geïntegreerd noemen.

17. Ik ondervind moeilijkheden om de verschillen tussen mijn regionale, nationale en Europese cultuur met elkaar te verzoenen.
18. Ik vind dat men loyaal moet zijn ten opzichte van zijn regionale identiteit.
19. Ik voel dat mijn identiteit een mengeling is van culturen (regionaal, nationaal en Europees).
20. Ik pas mijn etnische identiteit aan afhankelijk van de omstandigheden.
21. Ik vind dat men een keuze moet maken voor een bepaalde cultuur (Belg of Europees).

Hoe definieert u uw etnische identiteit? _____


Bekijk de onderstaande diagrammen. De afzonderlijke cirkels stellen uw nationale en Europese identiteit voor. Welk diagram geeft het best weer hoe deze identiteiten zich tot elkaar verhouden?



Het diagram dat de relatie tussen mijn identiteiten het best weergeeft is: _____

Bekijk de onderstaande diagrammen. De afzonderlijke cirkels stellen uw regionale, nationale en Europese identiteit voor. Welk diagram geeft het best weer hoe deze

identiteiten zich tot elkaar verhouden?



Het diagram dat de relatie tussen mijn identiteiten het best weergeeft is: _____

- I. Zou u zich over het algemeen beschouwen als een Europees burger?
 - a. Ja, helemaal
 - b. Ja, in zekere zin
 - c. Ik weet het niet
 - d. Niet echt
 - e. Helemaal niet
2. Sinds 1985 beschikken alle burgers van de Europese Unie over een paspoort waarop zowel de naam van hun land staat als de Europese Unie. Vindt u dat een goede zaak?
 - a. Ja, een zeer goede zaak
 - b. Ja, een goede zaak
 - c. Dat heeft geen enkel belang

- d. Nee, eerder een slechte zaak
 - e. Nee, een zeer slechte zaak
3. Hoe zou u uw reactie beschrijven, mocht u iemand de vlag van de Europese Unie zien verbranden?
- a.. Ik zou geshockeerd en gekwetst zijn
 - b. Ik zou geshockeerd zijn maar niet gekwetst
 - c. Dat laat me onverschillig
 - d. Ik zou tevreden zijn
4. Hoe zou u uw reactie beschrijven indien u iemand een Vlaamse vlag zou zien verbranden ?
- a.. Ik zou geshockeerd en gekwetst zijn
 - b. Ik zou geshockeerd zijn maar niet gekwetst
 - c. Dat laat me onverschillig
 - d. Ik zou tevreden zijn
5. Hoe zou u uw reactie beschrijven, mocht u iemand een Belgische vlag zien verbranden ?
- a.. Ik zou geshockeerd en gekwetst zijn
 - b. Ik zou geshockeerd zijn maar niet gekwetst
 - c. Dat laat me onverschillig
 - d. Ik zou tevreden zijn
6. Geef a.u.b. aan in welke mate u zich identificeert met elk van de volgende plaatsen. U beschikt over een schaal gaande van 1 tot 6, waarbij 1 betekent dat u zich helemaal niet en 6 helemaal wel identificeert.

Ik identificeer me helemaal niet 1 2 3 4 5 6 Ik identificeer me helemaal wel

Europa

België

het Brussels Hoofdstedelijk Gewest/Vlaanderen

uw stad

7. Bepaalde mensen stellen dat ondanks alle verschillen, Europeanen toch een gemeenschappelijk erfgoed delen dat hen dichter bij elkaar brengt dan bv. bij Japanners of Chilenen. Bent u...
- a. Helemaal niet akkoord
 - b. Eerder niet akkoord
 - c. Noch het ene noch het andere/ Ik weet het niet
 - d. Eerder akkoord
 - e. Helemaal akkoord
8. Een groep atleten uit alle landen van de Europese Unie heeft voorgesteld om tijdens de volgende Olympische Spelen, elke keer er iemand een gouden medaille wint, de Ode aan de Vreugde, de Europese hymne, af te spelen na de eigen nationale hymne. Vindt u dit een goed idee ?
- a. Ja, een heel goed idee.
 - b. Ja, een goed idee.
 - c. Noch een goed, noch een slecht idee.
 - d. Nee, een slecht idee.
 - e. Nee, een heel slecht idee.
9. Wanneer staatshoofden van één van de landen van de Europese Unie een toespraak geven (zoals koningin Elisabeth II, koning Albert II of de Franse president), ziet u achter hen de nationale en de Europese vlag. Vindt u dit een goede zaak ?
- a. Ja, een heel goed idee.
 - b. Ja, een goed idee.
 - c. Noch een goed, noch een slecht idee.

- d. Nee, een slecht idee.
 - e. Nee, een heel slecht idee.
10. Zou u zeggen dat u zich meer verbonden voelt met andere Europeanen dan met bv. Chinezen, Russen of Amerikanen ?
- a. Helemaal akkoord
 - b. Eerder akkoord
 - c. Noch het ene, noch het andere/Ik weet het niet
 - d. Eerder niet akkoord
 - e. Helemaal niet akkoord
11. Betekent het feit dat u een Europese burger bent iets voor u ?
- a. Ja, veel.
 - b. Ja, iets.
 - c. Nee, helemaal niets.
12. Indien u JA geantwoord heeft op de vorige vraag, zou u dan zeggen dat dit betekent...? (meerdere antwoorden mogelijk)
- a. Een gemeenschappelijk Europees erfgoed
 - b. Stemrecht bij Europese verkiezingen
 - c. Gemeenschappelijke instellingen
 - d. Een gemeenschappelijke Europese geschiedenis
 - e. Een Europees volkslied, een Europees paspoort, een Europese vlag
 - f. Het recht naar andere Europese landen te reizen zonder via grenscontroles te moeten passeren
 - g. Het recht naar een ander Europees land te reizen zonder je paspoort of identiteitskaart te moeten tonen
 - h. Enkele gemeenschappelijke idealen
 - i. Lid zijn van de Europese familie

j. Iets anders (wat?) _____

Bij voorbaat dank!

R.C.

Appendix C - Romania Questionnaire

CONSIMTAMANT

Va invitam sa luati parte la un studiu legat de parerea dumneavoastra fata de invatarea limbilor straine si atitudinile fata de identitatea dumneavoastra ca membru al Uniunii Europene. Acest studiu face parte dintr-un proiect multi-national, pe diferite grupe de varsta. Acest studiu este condus de Ruxandra Comanaru, doctorand la Birkbeck, University of London.

Participarea dumneavoastra este foarte apreciata. Va informam ca aceasta participare este voluntara, anonima si confidentiala. Datele obtinute nu vor fi folosite ca atare, ci vor fi integrate in diverse analize statistice. Orice citat folosit va fi anonim, iar numele dumneavoastra nu va fi niciodata asociat cu raspunsurile. Nu exista raspunsuri corecte sau incorecte la aceste intrebari, asa ca va rugam sa fiti cat se poate de sinceri. Unele intrebari sunt asemanatoare, dar va rugam sa raspundeti la toate cu sinceritate.

Va multumim pentru timpul si seriozitatea acordata acestui studiu. Daca sunteti interesati de rezultatele obtinute sau daca aveti intrebari, va rugam sa o contactati pe Ruxandra la adresa de email de mai jos dupa vara 2011.

RUXANDRA COMANARU

rcomano1@students.bbk.ac.uk

Varsta _____

Sex: M _____ F _____

Ocupatie _____

Ultima scoala absolvita: liceu _____; scoala profesionala _____; facultate _____; master _____;
doctorat _____; alta _____

Locul nasterii (oras, tara): _____

Unde locuiti in momentul de fata? (oras, tara): _____

De ce etnie sunteti? _____

De ce etnie este mama dumneavoastra? _____

Ce limbi vorbeste mama dumneavoastra? _____

De ce etnie este tatal dumneavoastra? _____

Ce limbi vorbeste tatal dumneavoastra? _____

Indicati limbile cunoscute, indiferent de nivel:

Limba materna _____

A patra limba _____

A doua limba _____

A cincea limba _____

A treia limba _____

A sasea limba _____

Alta (va rugam specificati care): _____

Ce limba vorbiti cel mai frecvent? _____

Pe o scara de la 1 la 6, specificati cat de bine vorbiti, intelegeti, cititi si scrieti limbile
mentionate mai sus:

Foarte rau 1 2 3 4 5 6 Foarte bine

VORBESC: Limba materna _____

INTELEG: Limba materna _____

A doua limba _____

A doua limba _____

A treia limba _____

A treia limba _____

A patra limba _____

A patra limba _____

CITESC: Limba maternal _____

SCRIU: Limba materna _____

A doua limba _____

A doua limba _____

A treia limba _____

A treia limba _____

A patra limba _____

A patra limba _____

Momentan sunteti inscris la vreun curs de limbi straine? Da _____ Nu _____

Daca da, ce limbi? _____

Cate ore pe saptamana aveti cursuri de limbi straine? _____

Cat de des folositi limbile straine mentionate mai sus in afara salii de curs? Va rugam sa alegeți optiunea care se potriveste cel mai bine fiecarei limbi:

Mai putin de c data pe luna	Lunar	La 2-3 saptamani	Saptamanal	La 2-3 zile	Zilnic
1	2	3	4	5	6

Limba materna _____

A treia limba _____

A doua limba _____

A patra limba _____

Vorbiti vreodata cu prietenii dumneavoastra o limba care nu este limba dumneavoastra materna? In ce situatii ati folosi alta limba?

Folositi vreo retea sociala pe Internet? (ex. Hi5, Facebook, MySpace etc.) Da _____ Nu _____

Instant messenger? (ex. Yahoo, MSN/Hotmail, Gmail Talk etc.) Da _____ Nu _____

Pe o scara de la 1 (deloc) la 6 (foarte des), cat de des folositi o limba diferita de limba dumneavoastra materna in aceste situatii? _____

De ce credeti ca este asa?

Pe o scara de la 1 la 6, 1 fiind "deloc interesat" si 6 fiind "foarte interesat", cat de interesat/a sunteti sa invatati o noua limba straina? _____

Ce limba ati alege si de ce?

Cum ati proceda ca sa invatati o noua limba straina? (ex. Cursuri? Singur/a? Pe internet? etc.)

Credeti ca este important sa stiti mai multe limbi straine? De ce? De ce nu?

Mai jos, sunt niste fraze cu care unii sunt complet de acord, iar altii deloc. Va rugam sa alegeți numărul de la 1 la 6 care vi se potrivește cel mai bine în fiecare caz, exprimând cu acest număr cât reflectă fiecare frază situația dumneavoastră. Gândiți-vă la limba pe care ati notat-o mai sus ca limba a doua.

Deloc de acord	1	2	3	4	5	6	Total de acord
----------------	---	---	---	---	---	---	----------------

1. Ma simt increzator si relaxat cand trebuie sa cer indicatii de mers in a doua mea limba.
2. Cand vorbesc la telefon in a doua limba, ma simt incurcat.
3. Ma simt nesigur de fiecare data cand intalnesc un vorbitor nativ al limbii mele a doua.
4. Sunt convins ca sunt capabil sa citesc si sa inteleg majoritatea textelor in a doua mea limba.
5. Intr-un restaurant, sunt calm cand trebuie sa comand mancarea in a doua mea limba.
6. Ma simt confortabil daca trebuie sa vorbesc a doua mea limba intr-un grup de prieteni unde sunt si vorbitori ai limbii mele materne si vorbitori ai limbii mele a doua.
7. Devin timid cand trebuie sa vorbesc in a doua mea limba cu un superior (sef, profesor etc.)
8. Cred ca nivelul cunostintelor mele in limba a doua imi permite sa ma descurc in majoritatea situatiilor in care trebuie sa folosesc a doua mea limba.
9. Ma simt incomod de fiecare data cand trebuie sa folosesc a doua mea limba.
10. Stiu suficient de bine a doua mea limba incat sa pot sa scriu nestingherit.
11. Cred ca stiu suficient de bine a doua mea limba incat sa vorbesc corect.
12. Am incredere in abilitatile mele de a scrie in a doua mea limba.

13. Cred ca pot sa inteleg relativ bine pe cineva care vorbeste in a doua mea limba.
14. Ma intimidez de fiecare data cand trebuie sa vorbesc in a doua mea limba cu un vanzator.
15. Este important sa poti vorbi mai multe limbi.
16. E destul sa vorbești romana.
17. Invatarea mai multor limbi ii face pe oameni mai destepti.
18. Copiii se confunda cand invata mai multe limbi deodata.
19. Vorbirea mai multor limbi ajuta cand doresti sa te angajezi.
20. E important sa poti scrie in mai multe limbi.
21. Scolile ar trebui sa invete elevii cel putin doua limbi straine.
22. Semnele rutiere ar trebui sa fie multilingve.
23. Nu este dificil sa vorbești mai multe limbi straine.
24. Cunoasterea mai multor limbi creeaza oamenilor probleme.
25. Imi pare rau de oamenii care nu pot vorbi mai multe limbi.
26. Copiii ar trebui sa invete mai multe limbi.
27. Oamenii știu mai multe daca cunosc mai multe limbi.
28. Oamenii care vorbesc mai multe limbi au mai multi pretenii decat cei care vorbesc o singura limba.
29. Cunoasterea mai multor limbi este mai importanta pentru cei mai in varsta decat pentru cei tineri.
30. Cunoasterea mai multor limbi poate sa fie folositoare pentru promovarea profesionala.
31. Copiii mici invata usor mai multe limbi deodata.
32. Cunoasterea mai multor limbi este importanta in regiunea in care locuiesc eu.

33. Oamenii pot sa castige mai mult daca cunosc mai multe limbi.
34. Nu mi-ar placea ca romana sa fie singura limba din aceasta zona.
35. Mi-ar placea sa fiu vazut ca un vorbitor de mai multe limbi.
36. Daca as avea copii, mi-ar placea sa vorbesca mai multe limbi.
37. Vorbitorii nativi de limbi diferite pot trai impreuna in aceasta regiune.
38. Oamenii au nevoie sa cunosca o singura limba.
39. As dori sa ma las de invatarea limbilor straine.
40. Intentionez sa studiez limbi straine pe viitor.
41. Intentionez sa nu mai invat limbi straine.
42. Imi doresc sa continui sa invat limbi straine atat timp cat este posibil.
43. Doresc sa continui sa invat limbi straine dupa ce termin cursul la care sunt inscris acum
44. Nu ma intereseaza sa depun efort in plus ca sa inteleg aspectele mai complexe ale limbilor straine.
45. Intentionat, incerc sa inteleg toate limbile care le vad si le aud.
46. Am tendinta sa imi fac temele la limba straina intr-un mod neplanificat si aleatoriu.
47. Ma stradui cat pot sa invat limbi straine.
48. Sunt la zi cu temele la limbile straine tot timpul.
49. Nu sunt foarte atent cand profesorul imi da sugestii legate de performantele mele la limbile straine.
50. Daca nu inteleg ceva la cursul meu de limbi straine, intotdeauna cer ajutor.
51. Nu ma intereseaza sa verific temele corectate de profesor la limbile straine.
52. Am tendinta sa nu fiu atent cand profesorul vorbeste de lucruri care nu sunt direct relateate cu limba straina care o invat.

53. Când învăț limbi străine, ignor ce se întâmplă în jurul meu și încerc să mă concentrez pe ceea ce fac.

Cât de tare vă identificați dumneavoastră cu următorii termeni:

Deloc 1 2 3 4 5 6 Foarte tare

roman_____

vorbitor de a doua limbă a mea_____

european_____

locuitor al regiunii mele (ex. ardelean, banatean etc.) _____

est-european_____

vorbitor de română_____

locuitor al orașului meu (ex. clujean, satmarean etc.) _____

cetățean al lumii_____

vorbitor al altei limbi (care?) _____

membru al Uniunii Europene_____

Pentru următoarele întrebări, vă rugăm să vă gândiți la identitatea dumneavoastră, și națională (română) și trans-națională (europeană) și cum percepeți relația între cele două. Folosind scara de mai jos, răspundeți cât de bine se potrivește fiecare frază cu sentimentele dumneavoastră:


Deloc de acord 1 2 3 4 5 6 Total de acord

1. Nu pot să mă simt și european și român în același timp.
2. Cred că fiecare trebuie să aleagă o cultură sau alta (fie român, fie european)
3. Cred că fiecare trebuie să fie leal unui singur grup cultural.
4. Cred că trebuie să decid care dintre cele două culturi (română sau europeană) este mai importantă pentru identitatea mea.
5. Identitatea mea etnică depinde de persoana cu care sunt în acel moment.
6. Deseori, îmi dau seama că oscilez între diverse culturi în funcție de situație.
7. Îmi adaptez identitatea în funcție de etnia celor cu care sunt, dacă sunt din România sau altă țară europeană.

8. Identitatea mea culturala se adapteaza circumstantelor.
9. Identitatea mea romana e compatibila cu identitatea mea europeana.
10. Chiar daca sunt diferite, aceste doua culturi, cea romana si cea europeana, sunt compatibile.
11. Identitatea mea romana merge bine cu identitatea mea europeana.
12. Identitatea mea romana si cea europeana sunt in armonie.
13. Exista o stare conflictuala intre cele doua culturi de care apartin (cea romana si cea europeana)
14. Cateodata sunt confuz cand e vorba de identitatea mea etnica.
15. Cred ca e dificil sa faci parte din doua grupuri culturale.
16. Cu greu pot sa reconcilies diferentele dintre cultura mea romana si cea europeana.
17. Cred ca identitatea mea e un hibrid intre cultura romana si cea europeana.
18. Cred ca identitatea mea e un amestec de doua culturi, cea romana si cea europeana.
19. Daca ar trebui sa descriu relatia intre cultura mea romana si cea europeana in cazul meu, as spune ca sunt integrate.
20. Majoritatea prietenilor mei considera ca sunt un membru al culturii romane si al celei europene.


Cum ati defini prin cuvintele dumneavoastra identitatea dumneavoastra etnica si culturala?

In fiecare diagrama de mai jos, un cerc reprezinta identitatea dumneavoastra romana si celalalt cerc reprezinta identitatea europeana. Care dintre diagramele de mai jos descriu cel mai bine relatia intre aceste doua identitati pentru dumneavoastra?



Imaginea care reprezinta cel mai bine aceasta relatie este: _____

In fiecare diagrama de mai jos, un cerc reprezinta identitatea dumneavoastra regionala, alt cerc reprezinta identitatea dumneavoastra romana si celalalt cerc reprezinta identitatea europeana. Care dintre diagramele de mai jos descriu cel mai bine relatia intre aceste trei identitati pentru dumneavoastra?



Imaginea care reprezinta cel mai bine aceasta relatie este: _____

1. In general, ati spune ca va considerati un cetatean al Europei?
 - a. Da, intr-o oarecare masura.
 - b. Nu stiu.
 - c. Nu chiar.
 - d. Deloc
2. Din 1985, cetatenii din toate tarile Uninunii Europene au un pasaport european pe care este scris si numele tarii lor si Uniunea Europeana. Credeti ca este un lucru bun?
 - a. Da, foarte bun.

- b. Da, relativ bun.
 - c. Nu conteaza deloc.
 - d. Nu, e relativ rau.
 - e. Nu, e foarte rau.
3. Cum ati reactiona daca ai vedea pe cineva arzand ateagul Uniunii Europene?
- a. As fi socat si ranit.
 - b. As fi socat, dar nu ranit.
 - c. Nu mi-ar pasa.
 - d. M-as bucura.
4. Cum ati reactiona daca ai vedea pe cineva arzand steagul Romaniei?
- a. As fi socat si ranit.
 - b. As fi socat, dar nu ranit.
 - c. Nu mi-ar pasa.
 - d. M-as bucura.
5. Cat de tare va identificati cu...
- | | | | | | | | |
|-----------------------|---|---|---|---|---|---|--------------------------|
| Nu ma identific deloc | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | Ma identific foarte tare |
|-----------------------|---|---|---|---|---|---|--------------------------|
- Europa?
- Romania?
- regiunea din care sunteti? (ex. Transilvania, Banat etc.)
- orasul in care traiti?
- 6.. Unii spun ca in ciuda numeroaselor deosebiri, europenii au un "patrimoniu comun" care ii face sa fie mai apropiati unii de altii comparativ cu altii, sa zicem, japonezi sau peruani. Domneavoastra...?
- a. Nu sunt deloc de acord cu aceasta parere.
 - b. Nu sunt chiar de acord cu aceasta parere.
 - c. Nici de acord, nici impotriva / Nu stiu.
 - d. Sunt relativ de acord cu aceasta parere.

e. Sunt foarte tare de acord cu aceasta parere.

7.. Un grup de atleti din Uniunea Europeana a propus ca la urmatoarele jocuri olimpice, de fiecare data cand un atlet sau o echipa din Uniunea Europeana castiga o medalie de aur, "Oda Bucuriei", imnul Uminunii Europene, ar trebui sa fie cantat pe langa imnul national al tarii de origine. Credeti ca e o idee buna?

- a. Da, foarte buna.
- b. Da, relativ buna.
- c. Nici buna, nici rea.
- d. Nu, relativ rea.
- e. Nu, foarte rea.

8. Cand capul unui stat european (regina Elisabeta II, presedintele Romaniei sau cancelarul german) tin un discurs televizat, steagul national si steagul european apar in spatele lor. Credeti ca e un lucru bun?

- a. Da, un lucru foarte bun.
- b. Da, un lucru relativ bun.
- c. Nici bun, nici rau. / Nu conteaza.
- d. Nu, relativ rau.
- e. Nu, foarte rau.

9. Faptul ca sunteti cetatean european inseamna ceva pentru dumneavoastra?

- a. Da, inseamna foarte mult.
- b. Da inseamna ceva.
- c. Nu, nu inseamna nimic.

10. Daca ati raspuns Da la Intrebarea anterioara. ce ati spune ca inseamna? (alegeti toate raspunsurile care se potrivesc)_____

- a. Un patrimoniu european comun.
- b. Dreptul la vot in alegerile parlamentare europene.
- c. Institutii comune.
- d. O istorie europeana comuna

- e. Un imn comun european, un pasaport european, un steag european.
 - f. Dreptul de a calatori in alte tari UE fara sa trecem prin vama.
 - g. Dreptul de a calatori in alte tari UE fara sa fie neaparata nevoie sa aratm un pasaport/carte de identitate.
 - h. Niste idealuri comune.
 - i. Sa fiu un membru al familiei europene.
- II. Ati spune ca va simiti mai apropiat de alti europeni decat de, sa zicem, chinezi, rusi sau americani? _____
- a. Da, mult mai apropiat.
 - b. Da, ceva mai apropiat.
 - c. Nu stiu.
 - d. Nu, nu chiar.
 - e. Nu, deloc.

Va multumesc!

R.C.

Appendix D - UK Questionnaire

INFORMED CONSENT

You are cordially invited to participate in a study that looks at your opinion about learning foreign languages and your attitudes towards your identity as a member of the European Union. This study is part of a multi-national project, looking at different age groups. The project is being conducted by Ruxandra Comanaru, PhD student at Birkbeck, university of London.

Your participation is extremely appreciated. We would like to take this opportunity to inform you that your participation in this study is entirely voluntary, anonymous and confidential. The data obtained from this survey will not be used as such; rather, it will be integrated in various statistical analyses. If we use any quotes, they will be anonymous, and your name will never be associated with your responses. There are no right or wrong answers, so please be as honest as you can. Please answer all the questions, even if some of them sound very similar to one another.

We would like to thank you for the time you dedicated to this study. Should you be interested in the results of this study or if you have any questions related to it, please don't hesitate to contact Ruxandra at the contact information listed below.

RUXANDRA COMANARU

rcomanor@students.bbk.ac.uk

Age _____

Gender: M_____ F_____

Occupation _____

Last school you graduated: high-school____; technical school____; university ____;

Master ____; PhD ____; Other ____

Place of birth (town, country) _____

Where do you currently live? (town, country) _____

How would you define your ethnic background? _____

What is your mother's ethnic background? _____

What languages does your mother speak? _____

What is your father's ethnic background? _____

What languages does your father speak? _____

Please, indicate below the languages you know, regardless of your level of knowledge:

First language _____

Fifth language _____

Second language _____

Sixth language _____

Third language _____

Other (please specify) _____

Fourth language _____

Which language do you speak most frequently?

On a scale from 1 to 6, rate how well you speak, understand, read and write the languages you mentioned above:

Very poorly 1 2 3 4 5 6 Excellent

SPEAK: First language _____

READ: First language _____

Second language _____

Second language _____

Third language _____

Third language _____

Fourth language _____

Fourth language _____

UNDERSTAND: First language _____

WRITE: First language _____

Second language _____

Second language _____

Third language _____

Third language _____

Fourth language _____

Fourth language _____

Are you currently enrolled in any language classes? Yes _____ No _____

If yes, what languages? _____

How many hours a week do you have language classes? _____

How often do you use foreign languages outside of the classroom? Please choose the option that best applies to your situation:

Less than once a month	Monthly	Every 2-3 weeks	Weekly	Every 2-3 days	Daily
1	2	3	4	5	6

First language _____

Third language _____

Second language _____

Fourth language _____

Are you currently enrolled in any language classes? Yes _____ No _____

If yes, what languages? _____

How many hours a week do you have language classes? _____

Do you ever speak to your friends in a language that is not your first language? In what situations would you use another language? _____

Do you use any social networking sites? (e.g., Hi5, Facebook, MySpace etc.) Yes _____
No _____

Do you use Instant Messenger? (ex. Yahoo Messenger, MSN/Hotmail, Gmail Talk etc.) Yes _____
No _____

If you answered yes for any of the two previous questions, how likely are you to use a language that is not your first language in these situations, 1 being Never and 6 being Very often?

How interested are you in learning another language? (1 being Not at all and 6 being Very much)

Which language would you choose and why?

Which language would you choose and why?

Do you think it is important to be fluent in more than one language? Why?

Below are a number of statements with which some people agree and others disagree.

Please rate how much you personally agree or disagree with these statements-how much they reflect how you feel or think personally. Use the following scale:

Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 Strongly agree

1. I feel confident and relaxed when I have to ask for directions in my second language.
2. When I make a telephone call, I get mixed up if I have to speak my second language.
3. Every time that I meet a native speaker of my second language and I speak with him/her in this language, I feel uneasy.
4. I really believe that I am capable of reading and understanding most texts in my second language.
5. In a restaurant, I feel calm when I have to order a meal in my second language.
6. I feel comfortable when I speak my second language among friends where there are people who speak my native language and people who speak my second language.
7. I get shy speaking my second language with a superior (boss, teacher etc.).
8. I believe that my knowledge of my second language allows me to cope with most situations where I have to use that language.
9. I feel uneasy whenever I speak my second language.
10. In my opinion, I know well enough my second language to be able to write comfortably.
11. I believe that I know well enough my second language to speak correctly.
12. I am very confident in my ability to write in my second language correctly.
13. I feel that I can understand someone speaking my second language quite well.
14. I get nervous every time I have to speak in my second language to a salesclerk.
15. People who speak more languages can have more friends than those who speak just one language.
16. I don't bother checking my corrected assignments in my language courses.
17. It is important to be able to speak more languages.

18. If I have children, I would like them to speak more languages.
19. When I am studying languages, I ignore distractions and stick to the job at hand.
20. People know more if they speak more languages.
21. People can earn more money if they speak more languages.
22. Knowing more languages creates problems for people.
23. To speak Romanian is all that is needed.
24. I tend to approach my language homework in a random and unplanned manner.
25. Speaker of different languages can live together in this region.
26. Children get confused when learning more languages at once.
27. I should not like Romanian to be the only language in this area.
28. Speaking more languages is more for older than younger people.
29. I would like to be considered as a speaker of more languages.
30. Speaking more languages is not difficult.
31. I feel sorry for people who cannot speak more languages.
32. When I have a problem understanding something we are learning in my language class,
I always ask for help.
33. I want to keep on learning languages as long as possible.
34. Children should learn to read in more languages.
35. I can't be bothered trying to understand the more complex aspects of languages.
36. Being able to write in more languages is important.
37. Schools should teach students to speak in at least two languages.
38. I would like to give up learning languages.
39. Knowing more languages should be important in the region where I live.
40. Speaking more languages can help people get promotions in their job.
41. Speaking more languages helps to get a job.
42. Knowing more languages makes people cleverer.
43. I intend to study languages again in the future.

44. I really work hard to learn languages.
45. I make a point of trying to understand all of the languages I see and hear.
46. I keep up to date with languages by working on it almost every day.
47. People only need to know one language.
48. I intend to stop learning languages.
49. I have a tendency to give up when our language instructor talks about things that are not part of our lesson.
50. Young children learn to speak more languages at the same time with ease.
51. I want to continue to learn languages after I finish this course.
52. I don't pay too much attention to the feedback I receive in my language class.
53. Road signs should be multilingual.

Here is a list of items. Please rate, on a scale from 1 to 6, how much you identify with each one of the items:

Not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 Very much

English _____

Member of the European Union _____

British _____

Speaker of my second language _____

European _____

Citizen of my geographic region (e.g.,
Midlander, Northerner etc.) _____

Western-European _____

English speaker _____

Citizen of my town/city (e.g., Londonder,
Geordie etc.) _____

World citizen _____


Speaker of another language (which?) _____

When answering these questions, please think about your personal identity, both national (British) and trans-national (European) and how you perceive the relationship between the two.

1. I have difficulty reconciling the differences between my British culture and the European culture.
2. I adapt my ethnic identity according to the circumstances.
3. My British identity is compatible with the European culture.
4. I adjust my identity depending on whether I am with people from the UK or other European countries.
5. I feel one cannot feel both British and European at the same time.
6. I feel my identity is a mix of two cultures (British and European).
7. My British identity pairs nicely with my European identity.
8. I often find myself switching between cultures in different situations.
9. Most of my friends see me as belonging to both the British culture and the European culture.
10. My British and European identities are in harmony.
11. If I were to describe the relationship between the two cultures (British and European) within myself, I'd depict them as integrated.
12. Although they are different, the two cultural groups (British and European) go well together.
13. There is a conflict within myself between the two cultures I belong to (British and European).
14. I feel it is hard to belong to two cultural groups.
15. I feel that I must decide which of the two cultures is more central to my identity.
16. Sometimes I am confused about my ethnic identity.
17. I feel one has to make a decision of choosing a particular culture over the other (either British or European).
18. I feel my identity is a hybrid of two cultures (British and European).
19. I feel one should be loyal to only one cultural group.
20. My ethnic identity varies depending on whom I am with.


In your own words, how would you define your (ethnic and cultural) identity?

Please consider the images below. In each diagram, one of the circles is meant to represent your British identity and the other one your European identity. Which one of the images best describes how you see the relation between the two within yourself?



The image that best describes the relation between my British and European identity is ____.

Please consider the images below. In each diagram, one of the circles is meant to represent your regional identity, another one your British identity and the other one your European identity. Which one of the images best describes how you see the relation between the three identities within yourself?



The image that best describes the relation between my regional, British and European identity is _____ .

1. In general, would you say you consider yourself a citizen of Europe?
 - a. Yes, very much.
 - b. Yes, to some extent.
 - c. I don't know
 - d. Not really.
 - e. Not at all.

2. Since 1985, citizens from all the countries of the European Union have had a common European passport on which both the name of their country and the European Union is written. Do you think this is a good thing?
 - a. Yes, a very good thing.
 - b. Yes, a rather good thing.
 - c. It doesn't matter at all.
 - d. No, a rather bad thing.
 - e. No, a very bad thing.

3. What would best describe your reaction if you saw someone burning a European flag?
 - a. I would be shocked and hurt.
 - b. I would be shocked but not hurt.
 - c. I would not mind.
 - d. I would be happy.

4. What would best describe your reaction if you saw someone burning a UK flag?
 - a. I would be shocked and hurt.

- b. I would be shocked but not hurt.
 - c. I would not mind.
 - d. I would be happy.
5. How much do you identify with ...
- | | | | | | | | |
|------------|---|---|---|---|---|---|-----------|
| Not at all | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | Very much |
|------------|---|---|---|---|---|---|-----------|
- Europe?
- United Kingdom?
- the region where you are from? (ex. Midlands, North etc.)
- the town/city you live in?
6. Some say that in spite of their numerous differences, Europeans share a “common heritage” that makes them slightly closer to one another than they are to, say, Japanese or Chilean people. Do you...?
- a. Strongly disagree with this view
 - b. Somewhat disagree with this view
 - c. Neither agree nor disagree / I don't know
 - d. Somewhat agree with this view
 - e. Strongly agree with this view
7. A group of athletes from all the countries of the European Union have proposed that at the next Olympics, whenever an athlete/team from the European Union wins a gold medal, the “Ode to Joy”, the European anthem, should be played after, and in addition to their national anthem. Do you think this would be a good idea?
- a. Yes, a very good idea.
 - b. Yes, a rather good idea,
 - c. Neither a good idea, nor a bad idea.
 - d. No, a rather bad idea.
 - e. No, a very bad idea.
- 8.. When the heads of state/government of a European Union country (such as Queen Elizabeth II, the Romanian president or the German Chancellor), make a speech on TV,

both the national flag and the European flag appear behind them. Do you think this is a good thing?

- a. Yes, a very good thing,
- b. Yes, a rather good thing.
- c. Neither good nor bad / It doesn't matter at all.
- d. No, a rather bad thing
- e. No, a very bad thing.

9. Does being a citizen of the European Union mean anything to you?

- a. Yes, it means a lot.
- b. Yes, it means something.
- c. No, it does not mean anything.

10. If you answered yes to the previous question, would you say that, among other things, it means...? (choose AS MANY AS APPLY).

- a. A shared European heritage
- b. The right to vote in the European parliament elections.
- c. Common institutions.
- d. A common European history
- e. A common European anthem, European passport, European flag.
- f. The right to travel to another EU country without passing through customs.
- g. The right to travel to another EU country without having to show your passport/ ID.
- h. Some common ideals.
- i. To be a member of the European family.

11. Would you say that you feel closer to fellow Europeans than, say, to Chinese, Russian, or American people?

- a. Yes, strongly.
- b. Yes, to some extent.

- c. I don't know.
- d. No, not really.
- e. No, not at all.

Thank you!

R.C.

Appendix E - Guiding interview questions

1. What icons symbolise the EU for you? What connotations do you associate with these symbols?
2. The motto of the EU is United in Diversity. What does this mean to you? Do you think this is an achievable goal?
3. What is your experience with the EU? What is its meaning in your every day life?
4. What are the factors which could make people feel more European? (travelling - has this made you feel more European? contact with others, contact with non-Europeans?)
5. What does it mean to feel European? How would you describe it? How about British? English? Scottish? etc
6. What is the last trip you took abroad? Have you tried to learn a few words in the language of the country you visited? Why? Why not?
7. Have you ever lived in another EU country? For how long? Details.
8. Do you feel European? part of the EU or more in a geographic sense?
9. Do you think feeling European is the same thing as approving of the EU?
10. What do you think are the advantages and disadvantages of being an EU citizen?
11. Do you think there is such a thing as the European heritage? What does it mean for you? Do you feel closer to other Europeans than to people from other backgrounds?
12. Do you know what the official language of the EU is?
13. How many languages do you think a EU citizen should speak? How about a *nationality* person? Is any one more important than others within the EU space?
14. Do you think that knowing more languages is beneficial for an individual? Could help in any way the personal and national integration into the EU?
15. Would you be interested in learning any other language? Why?
16. What does a foreign language mean to you? What do you think it brings to your personality, if anything?
17. How would you define European identity? Do you think it is a prevalent feeling here in the *nation*? In *city*? In Europe in general? What could influence this European identity? Do you think the European identity has more to do with the geographic space of Europe or with the EU?

Appendix F - Cronbach alpha values for all scales

	Romania	Belgium - French	Belgium - Dutch	UK
Confidence	0.89	0.92	0.92	0.97
Anxiety	0.82	0.85	0.83	0.94
Motivational intensity	0.63	0.74	0.78	0.75
Intention to continue	0.86	0.82	0.86	0.83
Attitudes	0.78	0.84	0.85	0.88
Hybridity	0.72	0.67	0.71	0.79
Compatibility	0.85	0.79	0.79	0.88
Alternation	0.80	0.78	0.88	0.84
Monocultural orientation	0.67	0.45	0.66	0.73
Conflict	0.69	0.85	0.70	0.64
Eur civic	0.62	0.54	0.63	0.77
Eur cultural	0.58	-0.04	-0.09	0.63

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